University of Arkansas, Fayetteville

ScholarWorks@UARK
Graduate Theses and Dissertations
8-2014

The Responses of the Roman Imperial Government to Natural
Disasters 29 BCE-180 CE
Michael Timothy McCoy
University of Arkansas, Fayetteville

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.uark.edu/etd
Part of the Ancient History, Greek and Roman through Late Antiquity Commons, Emergency and
Disaster Management Commons, and the Political History Commons

Citation
McCoy, M. T. (2014). The Responses of the Roman Imperial Government to Natural Disasters 29 BCE-180
CE. Graduate Theses and Dissertations Retrieved from https://scholarworks.uark.edu/etd/2148

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UARK. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Graduate Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UARK. For more
information, please contact scholar@uark.edu.

The Responses of the Roman Imperial Government to Natural Disasters (29 BCE
180 CE)

The Responses of the Roman Imperial Government to Natural Disasters (29 BCE180 CE)

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in History

by

Michael Timothy McCoy
Missionary Baptist Seminary
Bachelor of Theology, 2000
University of Arkansas
Bachelor of Arts in History and Classical Studies, 2005
University of Arkansas
Master of Arts in History, 2009

August 2014
University of Arkansas

This dissertation is approved for recommendation to the Graduate Council.

Dr. Charles Muntz
Dissertation Director

Dr. Lynda Coon
Committee Member

Dr. Daniel Levine
Committee Member

Abstract
This dissertation examines the practice of imperial disaster relief between 29
BCE and 180 CE. It focuses upon both the process of disaster aid delineating how
Roman emperors were petitioned for assistance, the forms disaster relief took, and
the political motives individual emperors had for dispensing disaster aid. Chapter 1
provides a brief introduction to the topic. Chapter 2 outlines the scope of the study
as well as the examples used to establish disaster relief in context. Chapter 3 gives
an overview of euergetism and also discusses two cases of disaster assistance that
pre-date the reign of Augustus. Chapter 4 describes the process of disaster aid from
petition to benefaction. It offers analysis of the different stages of disaster recovery
and when acts of imperial aid fit within those stages. It also examines the funding
sources for imperial benefactions designed to assistant cities rebuild. Chapter 5
explains the correlation between disaster relief and an emperor’s political image. It
explores the religious significance that could be attached to major disasters. Then,
the chapter shifts to three specific case studies that illustrate how disaster response
could positively or negatively impact the political standing of an emperor. Chapter
6 offers a final, brief summary of the key points of this study.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Three days after the terrible events of September 11, 2001, Chris Matthews
published a syndicated column in the Jewish World Review wherein he wrote:
“Lucky though he was, Bill Clinton never
had his shot at greatness. He could lower
the jobless rate, balance the budget, console
us after the Oklahoma City bombing. But he
never got the opportunity George W. Bush
was given this Tuesday: the historic chance
to lead.”1
Matthews’ basic assumption is that political greatness is not achieved through
governing during prosperous times, it is earned through strong leadership during
crises. A strong response to a disaster increases the public stature of political
leaders while a poor reaction undermines a leader’s popularity and legitimacy to
govern.2 President George W. Bush, who saw his popularity rating soar from 51%
before September 11, 2001 to 90% ten days after the disaster, experienced a
reversal of his political fortunes and faced lingering questions about his competency
after the U.S. government’s slow response to aid victims of Hurricane Katrina in

1

Chris Matthews, “Bush’s War,” Jewish World Review, September 14, 2001,
http://www.jewishworldreview.com/cols/matthews091401.asp (accessed January 15,
2014).
2

This correlation between political reputation and disaster response after a
catastrophe has been studied in an US context. US voters base their views of
politicians on their post-disaster spending not their pre-disaster preparedness. See
Andrew Healy and Neil Malhotra, “Myopic Voters and Natural Disaster Policy,”
American Political Science Review 103, no. 3 (August 2009): 387-406.

2
3

2005.

Matthews’ observations about President Clinton echo ancient sentiments.
Suetonius’ biography of the emperor Gaius (r. 37-41 CE), better known by his
childhood nickname, Caligula, includes an anecdote wherein the Emperor ironically
bemoans the misfortunes of his time as emperor saying:
Queri etiam palam de condicione temporum
suortim solebat, quod nullis calamitatibus
publicis insignirentur; Augusti principatum
clade Variana, Tiberi ruina spectaculorum
apud Fidenas memorabilem factum, suo
oblivionem imminere prosperitate rerum;
atque identidem exercituum caedes, famem,
pestilentiam, incendia, hiatum aliquem
terrae optabat (Cal. 31).
He even used openly to deplore the state of
his times, because they had been marked by
no public disasters, saying that the rule of
Augustus had been made famous by the
Varus massacre, and that of Tiberius by the
collapse of the amphitheatre at Fidenae,
while his own was threatened with oblivion
because of its prosperity; and every now and
then he wished for the destruction of his
armies, for famine, pestilence, fires, or a
great earthquake (trans. Rolfe).
Caligula, like Chris Matthews later, concluded that disasters, not prosperity, made
a leader’s tenure memorable. The similar observations of a Roman emperor and

3

Presidential approval numbers are based upon Gallup’s weekly tracking poll.
Gallup, “Presidential Approval Ratings -- George W. Bush,”
http://www.gallup.com/poll/116500/presidential-approval-ratings-george-bush.aspx
(accessed January 17, 2014). For the effect of Katrina on the Bush presidency, see
Kenneth T. Walsh, “Hurricane Katrina Left a Mark on George W. Bush’s
Presidency,” U.S. News & World Report, December 11, 2008,
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2008/12/11/hurricane-katrina-left-a-mark-ongeorge-w-bushs-presidency (accessed January 16, 2014).
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American political commentator reveal that disasters exert political power that
transcends time, geography, and state organization. A political leader can educe
fame, so Caligula and Matthews infer, from the public’s misfortune.
Disasters, ancient or modern, affect human lives and destroy large amounts
of property. No society, regardless of how rich or poor, enjoys total immunity from
being vulnerable to some type of hazard and the damage it can cause. Disasters are
economic events because the havoc they cause disrupts local and regional markets
and destroys important structures such as houses, shops, or infrastructure. They
are also political events in at least two ways. First, their occurrence can cause the
public to doubt the quality of their leaders. Second, catastrophic events allow
political leaders opportunities to impact the lives of people and to reshape the
public’s view of their ability to lead through providing assistance to victims and
survivors of disasters.
This dissertation examines how Roman emperors in the early Empire (31
BCE-180 CE) gave aid to their subjects who suffered from a disaster. It will also
demonstrate how emperors used disaster assistance to their political advantage
with the Roman people and with those who lived in the provinces. Augustus’
victory at Actium (31 BCE) led to the permanent altering of the diffusion of power
within the Roman state. The gradual consolidation of imperial power caused a
diminution in the political importance of the Senate and Rome’s ambitious,
traditional elites. But, during the early Empire, the process of this transformation
was only in its initial stage. The Senate played a vital role by mediating an
emperor’s aid to the provinces, and when necessary, the emperors gave elites

4
opportunities to oversee disaster reconstruction thereby including them in the
functions of state.
Despite the sense the term “emperor” conveys to the modern ear, in the early
days of Rome’s imperial government, the emperors had yet to create a true
autocracy. The basis of imperial power always rested on the loyalty of the army,
but the early emperors did not have unchallenged regimes. Consequently, the
individuals who ruled Rome needed ways to legitimate themselves as leaders.
Emperors often demonstrated their keen sensitivity to open challenges to their
authority. Tiberius (r. 14-37 CE) and Nero (r. 54-68 CE) carried out assassinations,
murders, and forced suicides with extreme brutality against the faintest whispers of
opposition. Stoic values coupled with republican virtues of honor and family legacy
motivated some elite Romans to risk their lives to remove a man from power they
perceived to be an enemy of the Roman state.4 Disasters of any kind could create
unrest among the general public and, therefore, serve as fodder for skeptics and
critics of imperial auctoritas. In the early Empire, when the equipoise between the
emperor, Senate, and the Empire’s ruling elites was still in flux, the benevolence an
emperor displayed when informed of a catastrophe developed into a powerful public
relations opportunity.
But disaster relief in the provinces involved more than the personal
ambitions and political machinations of the emperors. It was occasioned by the
intricate web of interpersonal relationships between emperors and local elites upon

4

Ramsay MacMullen, Enemies of the Roman Order: Treason, Unrest, and Alienation
in the Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), 13.
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which Roman control of the provinces relied. Because emperors did not volunteer to
assist without formal petitions, the cities had to supplicate an emperor’s aid.
Consequently, imperial disaster relief, especially in the Greek provincial cities, took
place at the request of the cities rather than the behest of the emperor.
Each side had an interest in the process of recovery. For the Romans,
provincial cities were the economic engines of the Empire via the taxes they paid
into the imperial treasury. They were the administrative centers of the provinces
through which Rome’s governors meted out justice and managed provincial affairs.
The citizens of the Greek cities in particular oriented their civic lives around
magistracy buildings, gymnasia, theaters, and fountains; buildings that were so
often destroyed during disasters. These important civic structures required large
sums to rebuild, and the Emperors possessed the financial resources necessary to
fund their reconstruction. Therefore, Greek civic ideology provided an impetus for
the citizenry of the poleis to seek imperial disaster aid.
The evidence for disaster assistance also indicates the importance of
communication and cooperation between the cities of the Empire. During times of
crisis, the cities depended upon one another for the kind of immediate aid the
difficulties of communication and travel made impossible for a distant ruler living
in a remote imperial capital. Once the news of a disaster spread, nearby cities
offered shelter to survivors who lost their homes, and they provided transportation
so people could flee the damage and begin the process of rebuilding their lives.
Thus, the nexus between cities became an important source for the kinds of aid that
Rome could not and would not provide.

6
Nevertheless, following severe disaster events, the cities often did petition
the early emperors for rebuilding assistance. The concept of appealing to the
current hegemon for disaster relief did not originate with the establishment of
Roman rule. Neither did Roman emperors invent the forms of assistance they gave.
Especially in the Greek East, most of the practices predated Rome’s dominance of
the Mediterranean Basin. Thus, disaster assistance offers a glimpse into the
Roman Empire’s ability to utilize existing practices to foster local fealty while
superimposing a new hierarchy of relationships that fundamentally transformed
the power structure of society.
The assistance provincial cities gave each other showed continuity with preRoman practices, but with the dawn of Rome’s imperial state, their situation had
changed. The Greek cities, for example, continued to compete with one another for
honors and status, but it was now the emperor who granted these coveted favors
instead of local monarchs. Rome’s interest in ruling through elites created a new
political dynamic within the cities. Greek elites had long been expected to use their
wealth to benefit their home city. But, now, they could equally accomplish this by
volunteering to travel to petition Rome’s emperor without having to promise to
build or repair costly civic structures.
Imperial disaster assistance evolved in a world undergoing change. This
dissertation will focus on how supplying aid became an important aspect of wielding
imperial power. It will also elucidate what relief looked like and how the forms it
took had their precursors among the Greeks of the Hellenistic period but grew over
time into established imperial precedents.

7
Surprisingly, no advanced student of Roman history has ever produced a
work of scholarship that is devoted exclusively to the examination of Roman
disaster relief. In the 20th century, disaster assistance received little attention
within the broader scholarship. However, that does not mean scholars avoided the
topic altogether or did not recognize its importance for the imperial period of Roman
history. Yet, acts of disaster assistance typically became subsumed within larger
discussions of imperial building, the role of the emperor, or the economics of empire.
In 1959, R. MacMullen published a seminal article titled “Roman Imperial
Building in the Provinces.” MacMullen offers an excellent overview of the various
ways Roman emperors helped out the cities of the Empire through providing
materials for building as well as giving them financial aid.5 Nevertheless, his lone
mention of disaster assistance occurs in a footnote. S. Mitchell focused more
narrowly on imperial building in his 1987 article titled, “Imperial Building in the
Eastern Provinces.” Mitchell discusses disaster relief more openly describing the
methods of giving tax remissions and monetary grants as means of supplying aid.
Mitchell also provides an overview of the petition process required for the provinces
to receive benefactions from the emperor.
Interest in modern day disasters like Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and the
Fukishima earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear meltdown have captured the
attention of the public at large, and twenty-four hour satellite and cable television
has made it possible for volcanic eruptions, earthquakes, tsunamis, famines, and

5

R. MacMullen, “Roman Imperial Building in the Provinces,” Harvard Studies in
Classical Philology 64 (1959): 210.
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other crises to be known more broadly than ever before. Furthermore, major events
like the 2001 attacks on New York City and Washington DC and the 2007 bombings
in London have focused the public attention on the effectiveness of governments to
prepare and handle unexpected human catastrophes.
Alongside these broader developments, disasters in antiquity have
increasingly become a topic of scholarly inquiry. At the forefront of this recent
interest in ancient disasters, in 2007, Gary Aldrete published The Floods of the
Tiber wherein he examined the nature of floods in ancient Rome, how the floods
affected the city’s residents, and how the Romans intellectually processed the
frequent inundations along with the physical alterations these events made to the
landscape of the city. Aldrete was particularly interested in studying “the
geographic extent, duration, seasonality, frequency, and magnitude” of the Tiber’s
floods from the Republic through the end of the Empire.6
The rise of environmental concern in much of the Western world has
facilitated the interests of scholars in ancient disasters. The first work in this
category is J. Hughes’ Pan’s Travail published in 1994. Hughes set out to study the
ecological context in which the Greeks and Romans lived. In this seminal work,
Hughes focused on the environmental problems the Greeks and Romans faced as
well as the negative impacts they had on the environment. Thus, in the main body
of the book, Hughes studies the evidence for the effects of deforestation, soil erosion,
hunting, and urbanization on the ancient environment.

6

More recently Lukas

Gregory S. Aldrete, Floods of the Tiber in Ancient Rome (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 2007), 6.
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Thommen has published a similar work titled An Environmental History of Ancient
Greece and Rome.
But of greater relevance to this dissertation is Jerry Toner’s recent
publication title Ancient Disasters (2013). Toner’s work has two main strengths.
First, he focuses on the effects both disasters and attempts at disaster assistance
would have had on non-elite residents of Rome and provincial subjects. In that
regard, Roman Disasters follows closely to much of the published literature in
Disaster Studies since the appearance of Mike Davis’ Ecology of Fear in 1998.
Toner is concerned to show how economic disparity within the Empire would have
created harsh, unfair conditions for those who did were at the lower end the
Empire’s economic scale. Second, Toner does an excellent job of introducing the
reader to ways that people living in the Roman world would have experienced a
disaster. Toner provides graphic descriptions of the ways residents of a city would
have feared, fled, and coped with an occurrence of a major disaster where he or she
lived.
One of the key weaknesses of Toner’s approach is his treatment of disaster
relief. While he does devote a whole chapter to “dealing with the aftermath,” Toner
avoids talking about imperial disaster assistance with any depth. His main focus in
this chapter continues to be showing how income inequality within the Roman
empire, exacerbated conditions for those less fortunate. The key problem though is
his failure to use any specific case studies to show how Roman emperors bestowed
their largesse upon the people in order to assist the recovery of their lives and
cities.

10
This dissertation will focus on the practice of disaster relief during the early
Empire. In this study, I want to accomplish three main goals. First, through the
use of modern categories for understanding the stages of recovery, I will elucidate
at what stage of recovery emperors became involved in the process of disaster relief.
I also will observe what type of assistance they were able to give depending upon
the timing of their relief. Second, I want to examine assistance through looking at
specific case studies within their literary and epigraphical contexts. Third, I will
look at how disaster relief was used, successfully or unsuccessfully, as a political
tool by individual emperors.
My analysis of this topic depends upon two types of primary sources: literary
and epigraphical. The contributions of the major literary sources of Suetonius,
Tacitus, and Cassius Dio, with special focus on the latter two, have already received
attention in R. Newbold’s seminal article titled, “The Reporting of Earthquakes,
Fires, and Floods by Ancient Historians.”7 His statistics need not be repeated here.
But, one of the important contributions this dissertation makes is its use of
inscriptions to supplement the narratives found in the literary historical sources.
Inscriptions provide details that literary sources often do not. For example,
in regard to inscriptions related to earthquakes, A. Bérenger-Badel has isolated two
types of epigraphical evidence. On the one hand, there are those that credit the
emperors with the rebuilding of buildings that suffered damage from an

7

R.F. Newbold, “The Reporting of Earthquakes, Fires, and Floods by Ancient
Historians,” The Proceedings of the African Classical Associations, 16 (1982): 28-36.

earthquake.

8

11
In the other type of inscriptions, one or more cities acknowledge the

emperor as the savior or founder of a city which he assisted in its recovery from
significant damage they had sustained from an earthquake.9
These are important details, but epigraphical sources are not unassailable,
and they often generate as many questions as they do answers. There are three key
problems these sources have: dates, wording, and purpose. Dates for the disasters
they reference are not always obvious. Thus, an inscription that describes Titus’
aid to Salerno following an earthquake has been the subject of intense debate.10
The Campanian region suffered from earthquakes in 62 CE as well as in 79 CE
before, during, and after the Vesuvius eruption. Scholars have not always agreed
about which series of earthquakes prompted Titus to give his assistance to the city
of Salerno.
Another major issue related to inscriptions is the wording of the text
contained thereon. Few ancient inscriptions do not require some redaction and
restoration from highly specialized scholars. While scholars often reconstruct the
wording based upon internal clues from the words they can read, the precise
original wording is often unattainable. The wording of the text can affect both the
dating of the inscription as well as our overall understanding of the circumstances
under which an emperor bestowed his largesse upon a city. Finally, the purpose of
8

Agnès Bérenger-Badel, “Les séismes dans la documentation épigraphique et
numismatique sous le Haut-Empire: entre élaboration de la mémoire et
reconstruction de l’événement,” Récits et représentations des catastrophes depuis
l’Antiquité. Grenoble: Publications de la MSH-Alpes (2005), 144.
9

Bérenger-Badel, (2005), 145-146.

10

See chapter 5 for a detailed discussion of the problems related to this inscription.
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an inscription requires it to be approached with caution. Typically, references to
disasters and subsequent imperial aid occur on honorary monuments designed to
advertise imperial virtues and local gratitude for an emperors assistance.
Therefore, they were not designed to provide precise details about the number of
casualties sustained in the disaster or even the exact way the emperor contributed
to the restoration of some part of a city.
When I use evidence from inscriptions in this study, I present the major
difficulties relevant to their interpretation when appropriate. I have demurred,
however, to current consense on the reading and dating of these texts. Thus, the
precision of my interpretations depends on how accurately modern scholars have
reconstructed their wording and correctly ascertained their dates.
Despite these difficulties, disaser relief presents us with an opportunity to
see the various levels of the hierarchical Roman state at work. It is to describing
the importance and process of disaster relief in the early Empire that the remainder
of this work will be devoted.

13
Chapter 2
Disasters Defined

Contemporary Categories
Any survey of disaster assistance must begin by defining what constitutes a
disaster and explaining how people grapple with their vulnerability to the natural
world. From antiquity until the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet
Union, disasters were primarily viewed, in the West, as naturally occurring events
or acts of God, and their severity was often measured on the basis of quantifiable
numbers of dead and cost of damage. This means societies viewed humans as
passive victims of catastrophes and defined disasters based upon the effects natural
or man-made agents had upon human suffering.
After the Second World War, the threat of nuclear war generated an interest
among academics, government agencies, relief organizations, and insurance
companies in studying the effects of disastrous events upon people and learning
how catastrophic damage could be lessened.1 Today, the investigation of disasters
and disaster response has become its own field of academic inquiry designed to
increase awareness of the causes of disasters and to inform policy makers of better
strategies for improving recovery responses and rebuilding processes for survivors
of catastrophic events. The tangential fields of risk assessment and risk
management have also emerged. Experts in these fields evaluate a people’s level of
risk to potential causes of disasters and formulate management strategies to

1

Anders Wijkman and Lloyd Timberlake, Natural Disasters Acts of God or Acts of
Man? (Nottingham: Earthscan, 1985), 19.
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diminish their effects and reduce their impacts upon societies.

2

Because disastrous events commanded greater scrutiny in the late 20th
century, scholars noticed a steady rise in human and financial costs catastrophic
events caused even though the relative intensity of earthquakes and volcanic
eruptions remained static and no scientific consensus existed regarding changes in
Earth’s climatic conditions.3 These observations created a need to reevaluate the
way disastrous events are described and understood.
It is now generally accepted that natural events and the damage they
produce cannot be considered collectively as “natural” disasters. Physical events
like earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, and tsunamis happen because of geological
and climatic forces, and on their own they represent no threat to cause great harm.
These phenomena only have the potential to be dangerous and costly when they
intersect with human beings and the living environments they construct for
themselves.4 An earthquake or volcanic eruption, then, is a naturally occurring,
albeit extreme, event that becomes a “trigger” or “agent” for a human disaster
because humans have chosen to make themselves vulnerable to them by living in
areas of heightened risk for these events. In technical terms, vulnerability refers to
“the susceptibility of a potential victim to the life-threatening impact of a ‘disaster

2

A good overview of risk assessment and management can be found in David
Alexander, Natural Disasters (New York: Chapman & Hall, 1993), 574-582.
3

Wijkman and Timberlake (1985), 21-27. See also Randolph C. Kent, Anatomy of
Disaster Relief (London: Pinter Publishers Limited, 1987), 2.
4

Alexander (1993), 4.
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agent’.” Therefore, the consensus among disaster relief experts and academic
scholars is that humans are not the passive victims of forces of nature, but rather,
humans choose to accept a degree of vulnerability and build their social and
economic systems, upon which their ability to survive depends, in areas of increased
risk. Whenever one of these “triggers” threatens this constructed social and
economic environment to such a degree the ability of people to survive becomes
endangered, a disaster will result.6 Therefore, humans contribute to creation of
disasters.
Nevertheless, creating clear categories for disaster analysis has eluded
policymakers and scholars who study catastrophic events and how to prepare for
their occurrence. They have struggled with defining disasters partly because it is
difficult to establish a method of classification that reflects nuanced distinctions
between disaster types. One way to resolve this has been to categorize disasters by
time. According to this classification model, there are three observable disaster
types: sudden onset, creeping, and chronic.
Sudden onset or sudden impact disasters are those that happen in a
relatively short period of time, often with little warning to the eventual victims.
Earthquakes are sudden impact disasters because they usually last no more than a
few seconds and usually strike with little to no forewarning. Floods too fall under
this category because they can develop within a matter of hours, and flash floods

5

6

Kent (1987), 2.

Kent (1987), 3-4. Terry Cannon also provides insightful analysis on this topic in,
“Vulnerability Analysis and the Explanation of ‘Natural’ Disasters,” in Disasters,
Development, and Environment, ed. Ann Varley (John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 1994), 16.
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inflict their damage quickly and then often subside with equal expeditiousness.
Creeping, or slow onset, disasters refer to those that take months or even
years to form. The pressure in a volcano might gradually build over a long period
before it finally causes an eruption. Land erodes or undergoes desertification over
years or centuries, and ecological conditions gradually transform causing humans to
be unaware they face a potential disaster due to their effects on the land .
Disasters can also be classified based upon the nature of their agency. In this
system, there are three main classifications: geophysical, atmospheric or
climatological, and land surface. Earthquakes, volcanoes, and tsunamis all have
geophysical agents because they are caused by geological movements within the
earth. Events such as tornadoes, floods, and droughts, though they differ in the
way they impact human environments, are caused by changes in climate or
atmospheric conditions. Landslides, soil erosion, and desertification are examples
of disasters that develop due to changes in the surface of land over time.
Disasters can also have no natural agent and may, therefore, be branded as manmade. This type results entirely from conditions created by humans such as a
building collapse that occurs because of poor construction techniques. Regardless of
how they are classified, that all disasters impact human environments remains
undisputed. A disaster, whether triggered from natural or man-made agents, only
occurs whenever a disaster agent places stress upon vulnerable people to such a
degree they are no longer able to sustain themselves without outside assistance. 7
This brief overview of the modern approach to disasters reveals two

7

Kent (1987), 4.
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significant developments in how disasters are understood. First, experts have
refined the nomenclature for disasters in order to distinguish between disaster
agents. The use of specific terminology reflects the realization that disasters do not
result from a single agent such as fortune or a divinity. Also, since understanding
how people are affected by various triggers improves relief efforts, utilizing narrow
terminology helps modern relief organizations and government agencies to prepare
more adequately for the conditions the different disaster types create.
Second, recognizing that disasters do not result from a single cause has
allowed scholars to focus on human involvement in creating conditions for disasters
to happen. There is now an awareness that humans contribute to disasters beyond
experiencing suffering and misfortune. Humans expose themselves to the risks
hazard agents cause through choosing to live in areas known for one or more trigger
types. When people knowingly live in places of elevated risk, a disaster will be
inevitable.8 Whenever they choose to live in areas of heightened risk, human
created environments increase the potential for a hazard agent to inflict
catastrophic loss of life and destruction of property. In the modern world, for
example, Third World countries often experience greater loss of life and property
damage because they construct their homes with materials incapable of enduring a
severe event. Furthermore, nations, regions, or cities that have higher poverty
rates have fewer resources to cope with a disaster, and, therefore, people living in
those areas may suffer from additional disaster agents like food or water shortages,
fires, or exposure to the elements. Consequently, construction techniques, economic

8

Cannon (1994), 22.
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conditions, and even social structure determine the overall level of human
vulnerability to a disaster trigger and contribute to the severity of a disaster.

Ancient Approaches
While the modern understanding of disasters reflects a scientific approach to
hazardous events, ancient people often referred to any event where damage to
property or loss of life occurred. This ancient view focused more on how hazardous
agents caused people to suffer. Such events have also been referred to as
misfortunes, calamities, tragedies, and times of evil, but this terminology does not
account for human involvement in the disasters that hazardous agents trigger,
rather it assumes humans to be the victims of the forces of nature.
This approach to disasters treats hazardous events as an integral part of
nature and rejects separating the event from normal human existence. Until
recently, the traditional terminology applied to disastrous events focused upon the
suffering of the victims and the loss of or damage to property. Such terminology
portrays the nature of the event only in light of the effect the agent has upon what
humans perceive to be their normal lives.
An example of this thinking in the Roman sources comes from Tacitus’
description of the collapse of a temporary wooden amphitheater. This structure was
constructed to host gladiatorial games by a freedman named Atilius in the city of
Fidenae, located on the outskirts of Rome, in 27 CE. When the structure fell it
killed or injured between 20,000 (Suet. Tib. 40) and 50,000 (Tac. Ann. 4.62) people.
In his account of this man-made disaster, Tacitus used three different terms to
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describe the event. He refers to it as a clades, malus, and pestis within a single
paragraph recounting the calamity and its aftermath (Ann. 4.62).9 Yet, a massive
earthquake that destroyed twelve cities in Asia ten years prior to the Fidenae
amphitheater collapse also qualified as a pestis in Tacitus’ prose despite the
author’s recognition that poor construction techniques and overcrowding were
responsible for the later catastrophe. Thus Tacitus does not make narrow
distinctions between man-made disasters or natural disasters. In addition, the
Latin terms he uses to describe both types of disaster emphasize the suffering of or
experience of calamity by the people.
Despite the overlap in word usage between man-made and natural disasters,
it is clear the Romans recognized that human error caused such unfortunate
casualties. The Roman Senate issued a senatus consultum establishing a minimum
wealth requirement of 400k HS for anyone who wished to present a gladiatorial
show of his own accord (Tac. Ann. 4.63). In addition, the Senate also decreed that
future temporary amphitheaters had to be erected on proven solid ground. Tacitus
presented the Fidenae collapse as one misfortune the people of Rome experienced
during Tiberius’ absence from Rome that misled many to conclude the Emperor’s
retirement to Capri portended the end of his reign (Ann. 4.58). So, the Senate knew
human involvement had caused this pestis, but some saw this tragic circumstance
as a sign from the gods of the end of Tiberius’ reign.

9

Tacitus describes this as a disaster by saying, “an unforseen calamity equaled a
disaster in a mighty war” (ingentium bellorum cladem aequavit malum improvisum,
Ann. 4.62.1, trans. Rolfe). Later in the paragraph, using pestis, he says, “Hence the
destruction was more severe” (unde gravior pestis fuit).
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The modern, more scholarly approach to disaster studies has created useful
ways to evaluate and illuminate how Romans of the early Empire, and their
subjects, thought about disasters and the efforts required to give aid after them.
The evidence suggests that some in the Greco-Roman world had a basic grasp of
their vulnerability to hazardous agents. They also exhibited an awareness that
their actions contributed to their vulnerable situation. An example of a people
aware of their vulnerability comes from the descriptions of the ancient city of
Philadelphia, modern Alaºehir, given by the first century geographer, Strabo (died
ca. 21 CE).
The Greek city of Philadelphia was located some 30 miles from the important
administrative and conventus city of Sardis near the Catacecaumene, or “burned
land” region of southwestern Asia Minor.10 This zone still remains seismically
active, and in antiquity, it experienced prolific seismic and volcanic activity. By the
time Strabo wrote about the volatile situation in Philadelphia, the volcanism of the
region had entered dormancy. Nevertheless, because of its geological context, the
fault lines near Philadelphia remained so seismically active that Strabo referred to
it as “full of earthquakes” (óåéóìäí ðëÞñçò, 13.4.10). This characterization of the
city’s routine rumbling was Strabo’s way of expressing what is known as
“recurrence interval” in modern disaster studies. Recurrence interval, also known
as return period, refers to “the average length of time between events of a given

10

The importance of conventus cities, also called assize districts will be discussed in
greater detail in Chapter 3.
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size.”

11

Although the geographer’s observation the city was “full of earthquakes”

lacks the exactitude of scientific terminology, he does convey that earthquakes were
so regular they appeared to have a daily (êáèzºìÝñáí) return period (12.8.18).
Strabo’s comments about Philadelphia generally focus on the instability of
the walls of houses inside the city. Because the ground quaked with regular
frequency, the house walls (ïÊ ôïÃ÷ïé)12 were shaken (óáëåýïíôáé) and cracked
(äéßóôáíôáé) daily(12.8.18). In a later observation, Strabo cites the incessant cracking
of house walls (ïÛ ãñ äéáëåßðïõóéí ïÊ ôïÃ÷ïé äééóôÜìåíïé) as proof of the constant
seismic activity of the city (13.4.10). Strabo’s knowledge of the routine cracking
shows those who chose to dwell in the city understood the risks that came with
living in such a volatile place.
The people of Philadelphia could never have known that the regular tremors
that caused the persistent fracturing of the walls of their houses occurred because
of the geological situation of the whole of Roman Asia. Roman Asia, present day
Turkey, sat atop what modern geologists refer to as the Anatolian Plate. This
region experiences a high recurrence of tectonic activity due to multiple geological
factors. The Anatolian Plate has two significant fault lines that have formed due to
the effects of its collision with the Arabian Plate, on which sits much of the Middle
East, to the east. As the Arabian Plate, along with the continent of Africa, pushes

11
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Alexander (1993), 21.

Liddell and Scott make a distinction between the related terms ôïÃ÷ïò and ôåÃ÷ïò
stating the former refers to house walls while the latter connotes the walls of a city
(p. 1534). Strabo used ôïÃ÷ïò in both passages (12.8.18 and 13.4.10), and, therefore,
more likely focused on the stability of home construction rather than the city’s
protective walls.
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in a northward direction, its contact with the Anatolian Plate has
produced the Eastern Anatolian Fault Zone (EAFZ) which runs in a northwestern
direction. These tectonic movements combined with the movement of the Anatolian
Plate from east to west have generated the Northern Anatolian Fault Zone (NAFZ)
that bisects much of northern Anatolia. The seismic activity in southwestern
Anatolia is also affected by the Hellenic Arc.13

13

Neslihan Ocakoðlu, Emin Demirbað, and Ýsmail Kuºçu, “Neotectonic structures in
Ýzmir Gulf and surrounding regions (western Turkey): Evidences of strike-slip
faulting with compression in the Aegean extensional regime,” Marine Geology 219
(2005): 155-157. The Hellenic Arc refers to a roughly 1200 km (720 miles) plate
boundary between the Eurasian, African, and Arabian plates. It runs from the
island of Zakynthus (m. Zakynthos) to Rhodes. A brief introduction to the
formation of the Hellenic Arc can be found in Athanassios Ganas and Tom Parsons,
“Three-dimensional model of Hellenic Arc deformation and the origin of the Cretan
uplift,” Journal of Geophysical Research (Solid Earth) 114 (June 2009): 6404. See
the movement of plates illustrated in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Tectonic Map of Turkey illustrating the major plates and their
movements.14

Since the regular tremors wrought continual disturbance on the walls of their
homes, according to the geographer, the inhabitants reacted in one of two distinct
ways to the living conditions they faced. Strabo described those two responses in
the following manner:
ïÆêïØóéí ïÞí Ïëßãïé äé ôïØôï ô¬í ðüëéí, ïÊ ä¥
ðïëëïÂ êáôáâéïØóéí ¦í ô± ÷þñ ãåùñãïØíôåò,
§÷ïíôåò åÛäáßìïíá ãíq ëëÜ êáÂ ôäí Ïëßãùí
èáõìÜæåéí ¦óôßí, Óôé ïàôù öéëï÷ùñïØóéí,
¦ðéóöáëåÃò ôò ïÆêÞóåéò §÷ïíôåò q

14

http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/eqarchives/year/2003/2003_05_01_maps.p
hp

24
So, for this reason, few inhabit the city, but
the majority live out their lives in the
countryside farming and possessing
productive land. But there is reason to
marvel at the minority because they are so
fond of the city despite having unsafe houses.
(13.4.10)
The primary effect the seismic activity had upon the people was a distrust of the
living environment in Philadelphia. Consequently, the majority viewed the
surrounding farming villages as the safer alternative to life in the city.15 The
villages not only offered safety from falling walls but also nutrient rich soil. In
Strabo’s view, relatively few loved the city’s urban setting enough to risk living in
such a dangerous environment.
But, the few who out of fondness for the city decided to live therein had no
delusions that the tremors happened because of fate or any other supernatural or
metaphysical force. Instead, they must have recognized the inadequacy of their
methods of wall construction to withstand these regular shocks, but they willingly
chose to accept the risk of the most damaging and fatal outcomes. Strabo explained
the situation of Philadelphia in the following manner:
» ôå ÖéëáäÝëöåéá, º ðñÎò áÛô± ðüëéò, ïÛä¥ ôï×ò
ôïß÷ïõò §÷åé ðéóôïýò, ëë êáèz ºìÝñáí ôñüðïí
ôéí óáëåýïíôáé êáÂ äéßóôáíôáé äéáôåëïØóé ä¥
ðñïóÝ÷ïíôåò ôïÃò ðÜèåóé ôò ãò êáÂ
ñ÷éôåêôïíïØíôåò ðñÎò áÛôÜ.
And Philadelphia, the city next to it [Phrygia
Catacecaumene], does not have dependable
walls, but daily, in some way, they shake
15

In 12.8.18, discussed below, Strabo specifically characterized the walls of the city
as untrustworthy (ïÛä¥ ôï×ò ôïß÷ïõò §÷åé ðéóôïýò).
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and crack, but they constantly expect these
sufferings of the earth and build in
anticipation of them. (12.8.18)
Strabo concluded this passage by stressing the existence of a culture of anxiety
about and anticipation of earthquake damage among the fearless few choosing to
live inside of the city instead of opting for the fertile soils and relative safety of the
Lydian countryside. Earthquakes happened so frequently in the city that those who
lived therein learned to accept their routine occurrence and to construct their homes
knowing the dangers inherent in doing so. Strabo expressed this by saying “they
constantly expect these sufferings of the earth” (äéáôåëïØóé ä¥ ðñïóÝ÷ïíôåò ôïÃò ðÜèåóé
ôò ãò, 12.8.18). But, the phrase “they build in anticipation of them”
(ñ÷éôåêôïíïØíôåò ðñÎò áÛôÜ, 12.8.18) shows that the Philadelphians understood the
greatest threat to the stability and safety of the city structures came from their
methods of wall construction. Strabo’s use of the term ñ÷éôåêôïíïØíôåò suggests the
city’s inhabitants experimented with building techniques designed to mitigate the
damaging effects of the future tremors that they expected would place stress on the
walls of their homes.
This example illustrates ancient awareness of vulnerability and human
contribution to catastrophic events. The grasp that the citizens of Philadelphia had
of these concepts derived from personal experience over decades or centuries more
than from scientific inquiry. Therefore, although ancient authors like Tacitus and
Strabo referred to disastrous events using terms related to human suffering, they
also convey a broader awareness that people bore some responsibility for the
catastrophes they experienced because of where they chose to live and the poor
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construction techniques they used to construct their social and economic
environments.

Background of Study
In the absence of quantifiable standards for casualties and destruction of
property, Roman authors used common terminology for catastrophic events of all
types making it difficult to classify disasters and the responses to them. Such a
broad application of terms diminishes the possibility of an exhaustive examination
of all disaster assistance in the Early Roman Empire. Nevertheless, a sufficient
study of Roman disaster relief in the early Empire requires accounting for a
minimum of three key variables relative to any disaster: type, location, and time.
Roman emperors responded to different types of disaster triggers including
earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, floods, and fires. During the 207 years of the early
Empire, E.Guidoboni lists a total of 47 earthquakes, and there is literary or
epigraphical evidence, or both, for some kind of imperial aid being given following
19 of those earthquakes.16 A total of 27 floods, on average one every 19 years, of the
Tiber inundated Rome between 300 BCE and 200 CE, and both the emperor and the
Senate devoted time and money to finance reconstruction after floods and to
engineer the river to mitigate future flood damage.17 From the beginning of
Augustus’ reign through the death of Marcus Aurelius, Rome suffered from 17
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Emanuela Guidoboni, Catalogue of Ancient Earthquakes in the Mediterranean
Area up to the 10th Century (Rome: Editrice Compostori sal, 1994).
17

For the statistical frequency of floods of the Tiber, see: Aldrete (2007), 73.

known major conflagrations.
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Fires in the capital, like floods, demanded a response

from the imperial government to help citizens rebuild after many of the city’s
frequent fires. In order to prevent widespread conflagrations, the Emperor
Augustus established the city’s first permanent fire brigade (vigiles) to stand
prepared to control fires and their damage (Cass. Dio 55.26.4-5). 19 Emperors
assisted after fire outbreaks outside of Rome especially after the major fires in
Bononia and Lyon.20 The least common type of disaster for which there is evidence
of imperial aid is a volcanic eruption. Mt. Aetna, in Sicily, erupted and destroyed
the city of Catania in 121 BCE prompting the Senate to remit its tax obligations for
ten years (Orosius 5.13.1). During the period from Augustus to Marcus Aurelius,
only one documented volcanic eruption happened, namely the Vesuvius eruption
that destroyed three small cities and six towns in Campania.
While each kind of agent creates terrible conditions for people, it generates
its own unique kind of destruction and affects man-made structures in dissimilar
ways. Aqueducts, the enduring symbol of Roman architecture, and homes made of
stone or brick had a greater chance to withstand the effects of a fire or a flood than
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For a discussion of the known major fires in this period, see H.V. Canter,
“Conflagrations in Ancient Rome,” CJ (1932): 274-277.
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See also Lukas Thommen, An Environmental History of Ancient Greece and Rome
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 105.
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There are two main secondary studies of fires and fire brigades in the Early
Empire: Gehard J. Baudy, Die Brande Roms (Hildesheim & New York: G. Olms,
1991). PK Baillie Reynolds, The Vigiles of Imperial Rome (Chicago: Ares
Publishers, 1926). Lucas Rubin has written a more recent survey on Roman fires in
his doctoral dissertation. See Rubin, L. (2004). De incendiis urbis romae: The fires
of Rome in their urban context. (State University of New York at Buffalo). Available
from Proquest Dissertations and Theses database. (UMI No. 3141310)
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an earthquake. Since different agents produce varying kinds of damage, the
response needs for the survivors and their cities also differ. Consequently, a Roman
emperor might respond to a fire by giving money to the victims, but he might
rebuild an aqueduct in a provincial city following an earthquake. The damage
spawned by each disaster type begat circumstances that determined what form
imperial aid took.
Although Roman emperors of the early Empire mostly lived in the political
environment of the city of Rome and the Italian Peninsula, they did not limit their
acts of disaster relief to Roman citizens living in Italy. Emperors frequently aided
the cities of the provinces when those cities invited their support for their recovery
and rebuilding efforts. But, where a disaster occurred gave the imperial ruler a
variety of response options from which to choose depending upon the degree of
damage. The Roman Empire grew increasingly hierarchical and unequal over time.
Consequently, the financial obligations of provincials differed in substantial ways
from citizens living in Italy. Aemilius Paullus’ (228-160 BCE) defeat of the
Macedonian king, Perseus, in 168 BCE brought such a degree of wealth to Rome that
in the following year, Roman citizens no longer bore tax obligations to support the
army. From 167 BCE forward, Rome shifted its tax burdens from citizens to the
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provinces by imposing tribute upon provincial communities.
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The Social War (90-88 BCE) caused Rome to extend the franchise to the
Italians in Campania, thus bringing the entire Italian Peninsula under the umbrella
of Roman citizenship and, with it, freedom from contributing to the state revenues
via taxation.22 In the provinces, tribute became the onerous symbol of the Roman
overlord. Yet, these unequal financial responsibilities also meant that Roman
emperors had an important tool at their disposal for demonstrating good faith
toward and concern for the provinces. Emperors could help the provinces in a way
that was unnecessary in Italy because they had the power to suspend tax obligations
for a period of time in order to free local capital for reconstruction. 23
When a disastrous event happened also affected the nature of the imperial
response. The early Empire spanned from Octavius’ defeat of Antony in 31 BCE to
the death of Marcus Aurelius in 180 CE. During this interval the position and power
of the emperor evolved. The provinces, especially in the Greek East, began to appeal
more frequently to the emperor and less to the Senate for economic benefits. Tax
holidays became coveted awards whether or not a city needed to rebuild from a
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Andrew Lintott, Imperium Romanum (London: Routledge, 1993), 70. For different
applications of financial policy in the provinces compared to Italy, see G.H.
Stevenson, Roman Provincial Administration (New York: G.E. Stechert & Co.,
1939), 135-136. The shift in tax obligations to the provinces in 167 BCE
corresponded with increasing dependence upon allies and provinces to supply
troops. See Mary Beard & Michael Crawford, Rome in the Late Republic (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1985), 81.
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Beard & Crawford (1985), 79.
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Examples of imperial tax relief will be given in chapter 4.

catastrophe. Emperors financed public works with increased regularity.
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Imperial

building in the provinces became an integral aspect of Roman rule even when
provincial cities did not suffer from natural disasters. 25 But, a key component of the
development of the imperial office was the role the emperor took in granting
assistance in the aftermath of catastrophic events. Standard ways of supplying aid
became established over time. Emperors typically gave money grants or remitted
taxes. But, whenever a major catastrophe occurred, they often did both.
Nevertheless, the kind of help an emperor contributed for disaster assistance
depended upon his personal political needs and the overall condition of the imperial
treasury.
The financial condition of the imperial treasury during the reigns of Hadrian
(r. 117-138 CE), Antoninus Pius (r. 138-161 CE) and Marcus Aurelius (r. 161-180
CE) had declined compared to the days of the Julio-Claudians. Most emperors who
ruled during the early Empire exercised caution with the finances of the state, but
the rulers at the end of the early Empire had to account for a diminished treasury in
their fiscal decisions, including those related to disaster relief. Therefore, the timing
of the disaster could affect the financial options available to an emperor for making a
substantial response to aid its victims.
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Fergus Millar, The Emperor in the Roman World (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1977), 420-421.
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MacMullen(1959), 207–235. Stephen Mitchell, “Imperial Building in the Eastern
Roman Provinces,” Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 91 (1987): 333–365.

31
Survey of disasters
The narrow range of data limits the possible breadth of disaster relief
analysis. Ancient sources preserved details about floods and earthquakes more than
any other disaster type partly because these triggers happened with greater
regularity than other agents. But, accounts of major floods focus exclusively on the
Tiber River in Rome. Descriptions of earthquakes abound for Asia Minor compared
to other parts of the Empire including Italy. Unless a fire happened in conjunction
with an earthquake, ancient authors typically mentioned their outbreaks only when
they occurred in the capital city. These limitations create difficulties for providing
an exhaustive analysis of imperial disaster relief. Therefore, the cases selected for
this study have been chosen based upon the amount and quality of the source data,
the category of disaster, and the location of the catastrophe. These examples will
also illuminate how social, economic, and political exigencies influenced how
emperors responded on a given occasion. A brief synopsis of the disaster events
chosen for this study will occur below based upon the disaster type, location, and
time of occurrence in order analyze the evolution of imperial assistance.
Relief in the early Empire, however, cannot be investigated apart from a
Hellenistic model of disaster assistance that became prominent in the Greek world
following Alexander the Great’s death and had influenced Rome by the Late
Republic. In order to establish what occurred during the Hellenistic period, the
earthquake that struck the city of Rhodes in 227 BCE will function as a model. 26
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John Leopold reached a similar conclusion regarding the Rhodes disaster as a
paradigm. See John W. Leopold, “Consolando per edicta: Cassiodorus, Variae, 4, 50
and Imperial Consolations for Natural Catastrophes,” Latomus (1986): 817.
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Earthquakes
Rhodes (227 BCE):
In 227 BCE27, an earthquake struck the island polis of Rhodes causing the
famous Colossus devoted to the sun god, Helios, to break off at the knees
(ðåñéêëáóèåÂò áðÎ ôäí ãïíÜôùí, Strabo 14.2.5).27 This earthquake falls outside the
chronological scope of the Early Roman Empire, and there are no descriptions of the
degree of damage this earthquake caused beyond Strabo’s reference to the Colossus.
Nevertheless, Polybius’ account of how the Rhodians sought assistance from their
fellow Greeks establishes a precedent for how a Greek city procured help from other
poleis. According to Polybius, the Rhodians sent embassies to Greek city-states and
Hellenistic kings to inform them of the degree of damage their city had suffered and
appeal to them for their assistance (Pol. 5.88.1-4). Under Roman rule, Greek cities
continued to send embassies to represent their interests and appeal to the emperor
and the Senate for financial assistance. A majority of Roman earthquake relief went
to assist the Greek speaking provinces, especially those in Asia Minor, making
existing Hellenistic precedents relevant for understanding imperial disaster relief
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The traditional date for this earthquake is 227 BCE. The other possible dates for
when this seismic event might have occurred will be part of a more in-depth
discussion of this event below.
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Rhodes formed a single polis after the 4th century BCE. See Vincent Gabrielsen,
“The Synoikized Polis of Rhodes,” in Polis & Politics, eds. Pernille Flensted-Jensen,
Mogens Herman Hansen, Thomas Heine Nielsen, and Lene Rubinstein
(Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 2000), 190; Christy Constantakopoulou,
“Proud to Be an Islander: Island Identity in Mult-Polis Islands in the Classical and
Hellenistic Aegean,” Mediterranean Historical Review 20, no. 1 (June 2005): 7.
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during the early Empire.

Tralles/Laodicea 27 BCE:
The same year the Senate bestowed the title “Augustus” upon the Emperor, a
significant earthquake damaged the cities of Laodicea, Thiatyra, and Chios and most
likely damaged Tralles and the island of Cos in the Aegean. The sources do not
provide detailed descriptions of the damage this earthquake caused beyond Strabo’s
mention of the collapse (óõíÝðåóåí) of the gymnasium (ãõìíÜóéïí) and other parts
(ëëá ìÝñç) of the city of Tralles (12.8.18). Few sources even mention this
earthquake, but Strabo and Suetonius thought the imperial response to aid the cities
damaged by the quake politically significant and worthy of explication. Augustus’
aid to these cities serves as the first example of imperial disaster relief in the extant
sources. Strabo and Suetonius’ accounts of Rome’s response to this event provide an
important portrait of disaster assistance at the dawn of the early Empire. Strabo
saw the actions of the Emperor Augustus as archetypal for Tiberius’ later decision to
relieve the cities of Asia Minor from the devastating 17 CE earthquake (Strabo
12.8.18). This event also reveals the prominent role the Senate had, during the
reign of Augustus, in matters related to provincial assistance because Suetonius
reports that Laodicea, Thiatyra, and Chios made their requests for assistance to that
distinguished political body (Suet. Tib. 8). The same passage in Suetonius
establishes the political importance of participating in disaster assistance for future
emperors. Tiberius (r.14-37 CE), the future successor to the Emperor Augustus,
implored the Senate for earthquake assistance on behalf of these cities (Suet. Tib. 8).
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This was an important milestone in the beginning of his political career. Thus, not
only did giving disaster aid have political important for sitting emperors, Suetonius’
account of this event shows that arguing for disaster relief in the Senate helped
establish the political bona fides of Augustus’ eventual successor.

Asia Minor 17 CE:
In the third year of Tiberius’ reign, twelve important (celebres) cities of Asia
Minor experienced what the Elder Pliny called “the greatest earthquake in mortal
memory” (maximus terrae memoria mortalium exstitit motus, Pliny HN, 2.86). The
key sources for this earthquake are Strabo (12.8.18, 13.3.5, 13.4.8), Suetonius
(Tib.48), Tacitus (Ann. 2.47), and Cassius Dio (57.17.7). Two other important Roman
sources make brief mentions of this memorable event, namely, Velleius Paterculus
(2.126) and Seneca (ad. Luc 14.91.9, QNat., 6.1.13). The Chronicon of Eusebius, a
later Christian source compiled in the 4th century CE, tersely references the
earthquake that wrought such great damage on the cities of Asia during the reign of
Tiberius.
Although this earthquake received atypical attention in antiquity, those who
mentioned it left no clues about the number of casualties it caused and provided few
insights regarding the kinds of buildings it destroyed. What little evidence remains
primarily comes from the city of Sardis. Strabo says Sardis lost many dwellings
(ðÝâáëå ðïëë¬í ôò êáôïéêßáò, 13.4.8). Archaeological evidence indicates the main
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street received damage and had to undergo significant repairs.

28

During the last

years of his reign, Claudius (r. 41-54 CE) gave money for the construction of an
aqueduct in Sardis which, it seems, had yet to be rebuilt after the destructive 17 CE
earthquake.29 Another inscription commemorates the repair of the temple by a Julia
Lydia. The text of the inscription reads:
ÓùêñÜôçò Ðïëåìáßïõ
Ðáñäáëò ôÎí íáÎí êáôåóêåýáóåí êáÂ ô¬í ~Çñáí íÝèçêåí {vac.} zÉïõëßá Ëõäßá º ßùí¬
áÛôïØ ìåô ôÎí óåéóìÎí
¦ðåóêåýáóåí.
Socrates, the son of Polemaios Pardalas built
the temple and consecrated it to Hera {vac.}
Julia Lydia, his grandaughter, rebuilt it after
the earthquake (SEG 28:928).

The text of the inscription indicates Julia Lydia’s grandfather devoted the original
temple to Hera. During the great 17 CE earthquake, the temple sustained at least
enough damage to require repair.30
While the sources give short shrift to damage reports, they do provide plenty
of particulars about the earthquake. Seneca and Pliny the Elder both report that
the destruction of twelve cities happened as a single event. Seneca (d. 65 CE), a first
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The Greek word (¦ðåóêåýáóåí) connotes both repair and restoration (s.v.
¦ðéóêgõÜæù, LSJ, 552). Therefore, the minimum damage this earthquake caused
required repairs to the temple. It is also possible a complete reconstruction took
place.
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century Stoic philosopher, says “ In Asia, twelve cities collapsed simultaneously”
(Asia duodecim urbes simul perdidit, 6.1.13). Pliny thought their destruction
occurred in a single night (XII urbibus Asiae una nocte prostratis, HN, 2.86). Tacitus
concurred with Pliny’s memory of a nighttime earthquake destroying the cities of
Asia (duodecim celebres Asiae urbes conlapsae nocturno motu terrae, Ann. 2.47).
Tacitus gave a dramatized portrayal of the havoc and terror the earthquake
caused. He intensifies the suffering of the victims by portraying the ground as
dividing (diductis terris), the mountains as collapsing (sedisse inmensos montis), and
the ruins blazing (ruinam ignis) during the seismic event (2.47).31 Tacitus’ greatest
contribution for this study comes from his discussion of the relief efforts of the
Emperor Tiberius in response to the petitions by the twelve cities for assistance.
Tacitus and Cassius Dio (57.17.7) both credit Tiberius with the use of tax remission
as a form of aid. This was the first attested occasion that a Roman emperor
responded to a disaster by granting the victims a limited immunity from their tax
obligations.

Smyrna 177/178 CE:
During the final years of Marcus Aurelius’ (r. 161-180) reign, another
powerful earthquake destroyed an important city in Asia Minor. The city of Smyrna
again suffered significant damage and requested the aid of the joint emperors
Marcus Aurelius and his son Commodus.32 Unfortunately, the source information
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for this disaster and the subsequent recovery efforts is not as varied or reliable as
the major quake of 17 CE or the eruption of Vesuvius in 79 CE.33 Nevertheless, the
Smyrna earthquake to which Marcus Aurelius supplied assistance “is the best
attested occasion of restitution of a city by an emperor and the processes which
brought this about.”34
The text of Cassius Dio mentions the earthquake in the context of the
Emperor’s acts of munificence toward the Roman people and the cities of the
provinces. It briefly reads, “and he gave money to many cities among which also
Smyrna was ruined by an earthquake” (÷ñÞìáôÜ ôå ðïëëáÃò ðüëåóéí §äùêåí, ¦í áÍò êáÂ ô®
Óìýñí® äåéíäò ßðÎ óåéóìïØ öèáñåßó®,72.32.3 = Zon.12.3). Cassius Dio also recounts the
sending, by command of the Emperor, of an unnamed senator of praetorian rank to
rebuild the city (72.32.3).
Three letters (Orations 18-21) written by the Sophist philosopher Aelius
Aristides (d. ca. 181 CE) detail the damage this earthquake caused in Smyrna. In
his initial letter of appeal to the Emperors, Aristides asserts the city suffered from a
fire along with the earthquake (ðõñÂ êáÂ óåéóìïÃò, Or. 19.1).35 More importantly, the
correspondence to Marcus Aurelius and Commodus paints a partial portrait of the
destruction of the beautiful vistas and the important civic structures of the city both
of which formerly brought renown to Smyrna. In order to secure imperial assistance
for his city, Aristides took the rulers on a verbal tour of the destruction via his letter.
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He knew Marcus visited the city in 176 CE, so he told the Emperor that all aspects
of the city that had induced imperial awe now “lies in the dust” ( íØí ðÜíôá ¦í êüíåé
Or. 19.2). He then described the city as though it had experienced death, saying the
harbor:
ìÝìõêå ì¥í ¦êåÃíïò ëéìÞí, ïÇ÷åôáé ä¥ ãïñò êÜëëç,
êüóìïé ä¥ Òääí öáíåÃò, ãõìíÜóéá ä¥ áÛôïÃò
íäñÜóé êáÂ ðáéóÂ äéÝöáñôáé, íáïÂ ä¥ ïÊ ì¥í êåÃíôáé,
ïÊ ä¥ êáôÝäõóáí (Or. 19.3)
has closed its eyes, the beauty of the
market-place is gone, the adornments of the
streets have disappeared, the gymnasiums
together with the men and boys who used
them are destroyed, some of the temples have
fallen, some sunk beneath the ground (trans.
Behr).
Each of these buildings played an important role in the economic vitality and the
reputation of the city in antiquity. Writing approximately 150 years before the
earthquake destroyed the city, Strabo had praised the city as “the most beautiful of
all (êáëëßóôç ôäí ðáóäí, 14.1.37). From his perspective, the harbor, gymnasium, the
division of the streets, and a library contributed to the aesthetic quality of the city.
The death of the city, as Aristides decried it, involved the downfall of these same
buildings Strabo thought beautified the city.
The Chronicon of Hieryonomous also attests to an earthquake that destroyed
the city of Smyrna in the 239th Olympiad, a four year interval from 177-180 CE. The
source refers to the event in a brief excerpt saying, “Smyrna, a city in Asia, collapsed
in an earthquake, for the renewal of which, immunity from taxes was given for a
period of ten years” (Smyrna urbs Asiae terraemotu ruit, ad cuius instaurationem
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decennalis tributorum immunitas data est, 210c). Despite its brevity, this statement
uniquely credits the joint emperors with relieving taxes as a method of aid.
Although much is known about the imperial response to the disaster, scholars
have not reached a consensus on the precise year the earthquake damaged Smyrna.
The traditional date is the year 178 CE, and most earthquake catalogs follow this
convention. But, A. Garzetti thought the destruction of Smyrna occurred in the year
176 CE and connected it with earthquakes in Nicomedia, Ephesus, Antioch, and
Carthage.36 E. Guidoboni follows the traditional 178 CE date in her catalog, but she
says the Chronicon places the earthquake in the year 179 CE.37
The most compelling argument, in my opinion, comes from C. Behr who
believed earthquake happened in the year 177 CE.38 He established this date on the
basis of three key points. First, the earthquake seems to have occurred during the
annual meeting of the Provincial Assembly which convened that year in Ephesus.39
Behr suggests, “the Assembly met annually in a four year cycle, for three of those
four years in Pergamum, Smyrna, and Ephesus, and on the fourth year in one of the
remaining six cities.”40 This means the city of Ephesus hosted the annual meeting
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every fourth year in the cycle. Since there is evidence that the Assembly met in
Ephesus in 149 CE and 161 CE, the city should have welcomed the meeting in 165
CE, 169 CE, 173 CE, and 177 CE. In addition, Smyrna appears to have held the
Assembly in years following Ephesus.41 Therefore, if the earthquake occurred while
the Assembly met in Ephesus, the most likely date year was 177 CE. Thus,
according to Behr’s calculations, the meeting in Ephesus took place in 177 CE, and it
reconvened the following year in Smyrna while the city was undergoing
reconstruction.42
Second, Cassius Dio’s text grouped together the return of Marcus to Rome
after an eight year hiatus with his relief of Smyrna following the earthquake.43
Since Marcus left the city in 169 CE, an eight year absence makes 177 CE the year
of his return. Third, since the Chronicon lists the tax relief given to Smyrna as an
event of the 239th Olympiad (177-180 CE), Behr concludes this coincides with the
year 177 CE.44
This earthquake is very important for analyzing the development of imperial
disaster relief. The use of tax relief, grants of money, and the appointment of a
senator of praetorian rank to oversee reconstruction suggests standard practices had
emerged for responding to extreme catastrophes. Furthermore, Aristides describes
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assistance provided to Smyrna by other Greek cities. This evidence shows local
assistance was equally important as imperial aid. Finally, the relationship between
Aristides and Marcus Aurelius indicates the sustained importance of Greek elites to
the Roman governance of the Greek East. It further reveals that economic aid and
political objectives often overlapped.

Volcanic Eruptions
Vesuvius 79 CE:
There is ample literary evidence that a few volcanic eruptions occurred in the
Mediterranean between the reigns of Augustus and Marcus Aurelius.45 However,
only one volcanic eruption is known to have happened during that same span for
which there is evidence for disaster assistance. That eruption was the 79 CE
Vesuvius eruption that destroyed three small cities and six towns in Campania.
Four literary, primary sources detail the extent of the damage caused by the volcanic
eruption and the earthquakes that preceded it. Tacitus briefly mentions the
destruction in Campania as part of his larger commentary on the disastrous state of
the Empire, more broadly, following the death of Nero (d. 69 CE). These times were
marked by disasters in Italy including “cities from the most fruitful region of
Campania having been consumed or buried” (haustae aut obrutae urbes,
fecundissima Campaniae ora, Hist. 1.2.2). This reference to cities being buried in
Campania is an obvious allusion to the Vesuvius eruption. Unfortunately, whatever
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else Tacitus might have written about this disaster, the damage it caused, and the
measures taken by Titus to assist survivors has not survived.
At Tacitus’ request, his friend, Pliny the Younger, wrote two letters (Ep. 6.16;
6.20) describing his personal experiences in Misenum, as a teenager, during the
eruption. The value of these letters for vivid descriptions of Vesuvius’ ash plume,
the panic the eruption sparked in Misenum, and the movements of the Elder Pliny,
Pliny the Younger’s uncle, both in his official capacity as admiral of the imperial
navy and in his private pursuit of understanding nature has proven incalculable.
But, Pliny gave no hints about the nature of the damage to the cities of the region,
local attempts to assist victims and survivors, or the response by the Emperor to
revitalize the area once the volcano quieted.
The remaining major literary sources for this disaster are Suetonius
(Tit.8.3-4) and Cassius Dio (66.21.1-24.1). Suetonius presented the Vesuvius
eruption as one disaster among many Titus faced during his brief tenure as emperor.
His account offers no explanation of the damage caused to any building or city in the
vicinity of the volcano. The chief contribution Suetonius’ version makes is his record
of Titus’ decision to send men of consular rank, chosen by lot, to oversee the recovery
of the region.46 Cassius Dio’s account of this event resembles much of Suetonius’
narrative. His work acknowledges the destruction of Pompeii and Herculaenum by
the volcanic eruption. He, like Suetonius, also described the efforts by Titus to aid
the region so that it might recover.
Literary references to Vesuvius’ destruction of Campania in 79 CE or the
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aftermath thereof can be found in the poems of Martial (d. ca. 104 CE) and Statius
(d. 96 CE) as well as in the Meditations of the emperor Marcus Aurelius (r. 161-180
CE). Martial’s Epigrammata (4.44.6) and Marcus Aurelius’ Meditations (4.39)
characterize the whole area (Martial) and the cities of Pompeii and Herculaneum
(Marcus Aurelius) as buried beneath the ash of Vesuvius. Statius (Silvae 3.5) offers
a unique perspective because he describes a renewed and vibrant civic life in the Bay
of Naples despite the fear and destruction the volcanic eruption had previously
caused.47
In addition to the literary sources, there are four inscriptions that some
rebuilding did occur in Campania and credit Titus for the restoration.
Reconstruction of unspecified buildings took place in Naples.48 The city of Sorrento
attributes to Titus the rebuilding of a clock (horologium) that had collapsed in an
earthquake.49 Two additional inscriptions also indicate Titus aided the
reconstruction of buildings in Nola and Salerno.50
This disaster offers a unique contribution to the study of imperial responses to
natural disasters because it provides the only case when a sitting emperor went to
tour the damage site. Furthermore, when Titus traveled through the region
inspecting the damage, he received word of the outbreak of a major fire in the city of
Rome and returned to oversee the efforts in the capital (Cass. Dio 66.24.1). Because
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he had to leave prematurely, he appointed men to oversee the revitalization of the
region (Cass. Dio 66.24.5; Suet. Tit. 8.4). Titus also contributed money for the
recovery of the area (Cass. Dio 66.24.6). Nevertheless, this disaster demonstrates
the political imperative that disasters created. Titus held the imperium for four
months, assuming a November eruption, before the disaster occurred. His
reputation as well as his legitimacy hung in the balance, and therefore, it was all the
more important for the new emperor to be seen assisting the victims of the disaster.

Fires
Caelian Hill 27 CE:
In the year 27 CE, a violent fire (ignis violentia) broke out on the Monte
Caelio in Rome (Tac. Ann. 4.64). Tacitus (Ann. 4.64) and Suetonius (Tib. 48) are the
two most important sources for establishing the damage this fire caused and
Tiberius’ political motivations for aiding those who suffered from it. Velleius
Paterculus also praised Tiberius for helping “all ranks of people” (omnis ordinis
hominum) after this fire (2.130).
Tacitus and Suetonius describe the destruction generated by this
conflagration in different ways. Tacitus chose to emphasized the extent of the
damage through the use of a broad expression. He characterized the Caelian Hill as
“having been consumed” (deusto, Ann. 4.64). Notably absent from this description is
any reference to specific structures damaged in the fire. Instead, by claiming the
entire Caelian Hill was consumed by the fire, Tacitus leaves it to his audience to
infer that the incendiary event devastated anything in the path of the flames. The
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fire destroyed the entire area.
Suetonius’ account, on the other hand, fills in the gaps left unanswered by
Tacitus’ version of the fire. Suetonius specifies that large buildings (insularum)
burned down in the fire. The noun insularum refers to multiple high rise apartment
complexes occupied by the urban poor in Rome since the invention of concrete in the
second century BCE.51
The response by Tiberius to this fire is important for two reasons. First, it
reveals how the Emperor elected to aid the victims of this disaster. Consequently, it
permits a comparative analysis with the responses of Tiberius and other emperors to
catastrophes, of similar and different types, that happened in the provinces. Second,
the aid to victims of this disaster allows a glimpse into the importance disaster relief
had for Rome’s emperors. Political legitimacy and disaster responses were
intertwined.52
Aventine Hill 36 CE:
During the consulship of Sextus Papinius and Quintus Plautus, the area of
Rome near the Circus Maximus and the Aventine Hill experienced a significant
fire.53 There are two literary sources that attest to this event and the subsequent
response by Tiberius. The account of Cassius Dio (58.26.5) dates the event to the
consulship of S. Papinius and Q. Plautus. Tacitus (6.45) and Cassius Dio both fix
51
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the number of sesterces given by Tiberius to the victims of the fire at 100 million.
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Information about how this fire began comes from one epigraphical source. The
Fasti Ostiensis claims the fire originated among the basket-makers (inter Vitores) in
the region of the Aventine where their shops were located.55
Tacitus alone supplies information about the kinds of structures that received
damage from this fire. He comments that Tiberius turned this catastrophe to his
renown (quod damnum Caesar ad gloriam vertit) through paying the value of the
homes (domuum) and apartment buildings (insularum) destroyed in the fire (Ann.
6.45). This indicates that people’s homes along with the apartment complexes on the
Aventine received significant damage and became the focal point of imperial
assistance in response to this hazardous event.
Tiberius’ reaction to the 36 CE fire differs little from the aid he gave to the
victims of the Caelian fire nine years earlier. Yet, such consistency of action
suggests that norms for assisting victims of fires had developed. Tiberius clearly
understood the political potency that this event had for shaping public perception
about his tenure as emperor. The aid he showered upon the victims of this fire
reflects the aging Emperor’s continued grasp of the political significance of providing
disaster relief in Rome. Therefore, this event further illustrates that disaster relief
was simultaneously a political and economic event especially in the political
environment of the city of Rome.
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Great Fire (64 CE):
The most well-known conflagration to ignite the tinderbox that was ancient
Rome is the 64 CE fire during the reign of the Emperor Nero (r. 54-68 CE) that razed
three of the fourteen city-districts (regiones) to the ground (Tac. Ann. 15.40). No
fewer than eleven sources mention this fire, making it the most well-documented
disaster of the early Empire. Tacitus (Ann. 15.38-44) provides the most thorough
account of the fire’s origins, the amount of damage it inflicted upon the people and
buildings of Rome, and the measures taken by Nero and private individuals to assist
victims and restore the city. Cassius Dio (63.16-18) describes, with much specificity,
the conflagration, the ruined structures, and the terror it caused within the city.
Suetonius (Nero 31.1; 38) discusses the occasion of the fire and casts suspicion on the
Emperor for having his men set the blaze.56
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Figure 2: Damaged regions of Rome from the 64 CE fire.
Printed by permission of Lucas G. Rubin57
According to Tacitus, the fire started on July 19 (Ann. 15.41) and burned for
five continuous days (Ann. 15.40).58 The blaze began in the area of the Circus
Maximus that adjoined the Caelian and Palatine hills (initium in ea parte circi
ortum quae Palatino Caelioque monitbus contigua est, Ann. 15.38). The fire spread
quickly from this area of the city because of the combustible combination of shops
(tabernae) filled with inflammable merchandise, the lack of stone buildings in this
regio, and a strong wind. Tacitus says the Romans had installed preventative
mechanisms (remedia) in response to previous fires, but he does not elaborate on
what they were. Instead, he says that even they proved unable to retard the
advance of the flames, permitting it spread to more areas of the city (Tac. Ann.
15.38.2).

57

58

Original map is in Rubin (2004), 100.

Suetonius (Nero, 38) and Seneca Ep. ad Paul. 12 claim the fire lasted for six days.
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The literary sources give an abnormally detailed list of structures that were
damaged by the fire. The pseudepigraphal letters of Seneca addressed to the
Christian Apostle Paul claim the blaze destroyed 132 houses (Centum triginta duae
domus) and four insulae over the six days it raged through Rome (Ep. ad Paul. 12).
Tacitus describes the destruction of three types of structures: private homes,
apartment complexes, and temples (domum et insularum et templum, Ann. 15.41).59
He lists five different temples destroyed by the fire: Luna, Altar to Hercules, Jupiter
Statoris, Numa, and Vesta (Ann. 15.41). The flames also engulfed Nero’s palace, and
it burned monuments and artifacts that had been captured as spoils of war and
publicly displayed to commemorate Roman victories over the Greeks (Ann. 15.41).
Both Cassius Dio (68.16-17) and Tacitus portray scenes of chaos and panic
among the people of the city. People tried to escape the rapid spread of the flames
only to be overrun by others or to be engulfed by the flames. People shouted at one
another and tried to gather what possessions they could and flee from the
approaching fire.
This disaster is important not only for the damage it caused but also for the
response it elicited from the emperor. The 64 CE fire was more than an economic
disaster. Nero attempted to help the victims of the disaster by providing shelter and
food for the people, and he established new building codes so that new structures
would be made of non-flammable stone rather than inflammable wood. It became a
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political event, and the Emperor’s response remained shrouded in suspicion.
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Floods
The Tiber River routinely overflowed its banks in antiquity, creating logistical
nightmares for anyone wishing to navigate their way through the imperial capital.
Evidence for the inundations of the Tiber abound in the extant sources. Despite
their frequent references to floods in the sources, emperors responded more often to
the secondary conditions floods created than to the floods themselves. Floods, like
other disasters, generate environments for secondary dangers such as pestilence and
food shortages. Consequently, the immediate responses associated with floods
usually involve putting additional grain into the market to curb rises in prices or
supplying it to the people directly at state expense. Another difficulty they present
is limited evidence for them outside of the city of Rome. No example of imperial
assistance to a flooded provincial city exists. The following examples illustrate how
the sources connected floods with other kinds of hazardous agents to which the
emperors of Rome reacted.
Tiber River 54 BCE:
According to Cassius Dio, the Tiber River overflowed its banks and brought
significant destruction to the city of Rome in the year 54 BCE. His account of this
inundation provides a detailed list of the structures it damaged. The flood caused
the bricks in many houses to become soaked with water (äéÜâñï÷ïß) to the point that
they could no longer stand, and they immediately collapsed (êáôåññÜãçóáí, 39.61.2).

60

The suspicion surrounding Nero forms an important part of chapter 5.

51
Other houses stood for many days, but they too succumbed to the flood and caused
people to be injured when they fell (39.61.2). Those who did not try to escape the
rapid advance of the waters died either in their homes or in the streets (39.61.2).
Two aspects of this disaster elucidate the evolution of disaster assistance in
the Roman world. First, Dio claims the people believed the flood evidenced “the
anger of the divinity against them” (ÏñãÞí óöéóé ôïØ äáéìïíßïõ) for the restoration of
Ptolemy to the Egyptian throne by the governor of Syria, Gabinius (39.61.3). They
wanted to execute Gabinius in haste in order to assuage the anger of the gods.
Second, it was not the flood itself that became the focal point of relief, but the
ancillary effects it caused. The overflow of the Tiber created concern over the food
supply in the city and, therefore, threatened to engender a second, more widespread
disaster. The evidence for the developing concern over Rome’s food supply comes
from the actions of Pompey who was absent from Rome during the Gabinius intrigue
because he was securing the supply of grain in the aftermath of the flood. Cassius
Dio specifically says, “For Pompey had been away from the city to provide for a
supply of corn [grain], since much had been ruined by the river”(Ò ãñ ÐïìðÞéïò êáô
ô¬í ôïØ óßôïõ ðñüíïéáí, ¦ðåéä¬ ðïë×ò ßðÎ ôïØ ðïôáìïØ äéÝöèáñôï, Cass. Dio, 39.63.3).61
Despite the pervasive collapse of houses caused by this deluge, the reconstruction of
those structures garnered less concern than the security of Rome’s access to food.
Therefore, in this event, we see a republican precedent for a single, powerful
individual giving aid to the entire city of Rome following a catastrophe the public
associated with an expression of divine anger.
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Tiber River 22 BCE:
In the year Marcus Marcellus and Lucius Arruntius were consuls, the ninth
year of the reign of Augustus, Rome experienced a major flood of the Tiber River.
Cassius Dio offers the lone account of this event. He claims that the flood happened
in conjunction with a pestilence and a famine, thus increasing the difficulty of the
Roman people to cope with the situation. Dio gives no recitation of the damage this
flood caused to buildings, property, or people. After a brief mention of its occurrence,
his attention shifts to the outbreak of a pestilence (íüóïõ) in Rome, and perhaps
throughout the empire and the food shortage (ëéìïØ) these two disasters induced
(54.1.1-2.).
Conditions in the capital deteriorated so badly after the flood, pestilence, and
famine, the people insisted that Augustus accept the office of dictator (Cass. Dio,
54.1.3). The Emperor refused this role, but he did accept the position of praefectus
annonae. The most pressing concern became supplying the inhabitants of the city
with food and ending the famine. These developments illustrate the problem of
ascertaining what disaster assistance following a flood looked like. Augustus did not
respond to the flood directly. Instead, he, like Pompey before him, responded to the
severe conditions this flood generated for the food supply of the city.

Conclusion
People living in the Roman Empire experienced the terrible effects of a variety
of disasters. The kind of disasters that affected them often depended upon where
they lived. Nearly all of the known earthquakes during the early Empire happened
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in the Greek provinces, especially in Asia Minor and the islands in the eastern
Aegean near Asia Minor. The extant sources focus upon floods of the Tiber in Rome
more than any other hazard. Fires were also written about with frequency usually
because they happened so often in Rome and because they often accompanied
earthquake events in the provinces. Volcanic eruptions did not take place with
regularity. But when they did, they did not affect the entire Empire. Mt. Aetna in
Sicily had a reputation for frequent eruptions, but it created conditions for disaster
assistance only once during the Republic. Vesuvius emerged from its dormant state
with an extreme eruption in 79 CE, but it produced no subsequent events that
demanded the relief of Campania comparable to the time of Titus. No other region
of the Empire experienced a volcanic eruption because they did not live in the
vicinity of an active volcano.
What will become clear below is that time and distance affected the ways
emperors responded to help victims of a catastrophic event. Slow communication
and travel time between Rome and the provinces limited the ability of the emperors
to give immediate assistance to provincials. Yet, they were able to provide
emergency services to people living in Rome during a fire and immediately
thereafter. The occasion of a disaster did not predetermine the benefits the emperor
bestowed. Cities did not have to request his assistance, and in theory he could
refuse to grant it. Nevertheless, giving assistance became part of the routine of the
emperor. The story that unfolds in the ensuing chapters attempts to explain what
assistance looked like, how it changed over time, and what influences affected its
practice.
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Chapter 3
The Mentalité of Imperial Relief

Introduction
Severe disasters created paradoxical situations for Roman emperors just like
they do for modern politicians. On the one hand, they were political liabilities
because ancient people interpreted major disasters as a divine commentary on the
quality of the ruler’s leadership.1 On the other hand, since catastrophes drew
peoples’ attention to the quality of an emperor’s rule, they were political
opportunities because an emperor could publicly advertise his contributions to the
rebuilding efforts of victimized cities.2 A noticeable response could settle any
disquiet caused by the disaster and strengthen the political standing of an emperor.
A negligible response could generate political tensions because doubts would arise
about his capacity to manage the affairs of state.
Roman emperors wanted to settle any discontent a disaster might incite
whether in Rome or in the provinces. The Greek provinces, particularly in Asia
Minor, already had a system of gift exchange that Hellenistic kings and local
notables used to diminish internal unrest within their cities. The relationship that
developed between the emperors and the cities of the Greek East was based upon

1
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this system which is now called euergetism. The remainder of this chapter will focus
on defining euergetism and outlining how it was used following occurrences of
natural disasters.

Euergetism Defined
Euergetism is a term of recent origin first introduced into the scholarship of
the Ancient Mediterranean world by André Boulanger in his 1923 study of Aelius
Aristides titled Aelius Aristide et la sophistique dans la province d’Asie en IIe siècle
de notre ère. The most influential exposition of euergetism and its function within
Greco-Roman society is Paul Veyne’s magisterial Le Pain et Le Cirque (Bread and
Circuses) published in 1976. In this study, Veyne offered his now famous definition
of euergetism as “private liberality for public benefit.”3 A person who engages in the
euergetic act is called a åÛåñãÝôçò, a Greek noun often translated into English by its
Latin equivalent, benefactor. The benefactions bestowed by a åÛåñãÝôçò are
designated as åÛåñãåóßáé.4 The Greeks, especially the Athenians, practiced
euergetism prior to the Hellenistic period, but the transformation of the
Mediterranean society and politics after the death of Alexander prompted its more
pervasive use.
In actual practice, euergetism refers to a system of gift exchange wherein
kings and wealthy elites used their personal fortunes for the benefit of other
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individuals or, more commonly, their local, civic society in exchange for honor and
recognition from the community.5

A. Zuiderhoek argues that both the gift and its

corresponding commemoration completed an act of euergetism.6 Thus, civic
euergetism consisted of two equally important components. On the one hand the
benefactor made a substantial contribution to the improvement of civic life for all the
citizens of his, or even her, polis. The benefactions ranged from the construction of
major civic structures such as temples, stoa, or gymnasia to the supply of grain
during times of scarcity. Euergetic acts also included the beautification or
restoration of civic buildings, but they were not limited to large scale construction
projects. Volunteering to serve as an embassy or to perform civic offices at his own
expense constituted additional forms of euergetism for a Hellenistic notable. 8
On the other hand, the beneficiaries of the gifts, especially cities, honored
their benefactors by permanently commemorating their munificence usually by
means of honorific inscriptions, statues, or titles. Permanent recognition partly
motivated the notables to perform euergetic acts, and public acknowledgment of
their gifts through ceremonies and public monuments affirmed the reception of the
gift by a grateful civic community.9 These acts of reciprocity, therefore, equaled the
5
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benefaction in importance within this system of exchange.
The Purpose of Euergetism
Veyne saw euergetism as a “union of three ‘themes’ - patronage; the more or
less symbolic largesses that politicians confer out of their own pockets by virtue of
their office (ob honorem); and funerary liberalities and foundations.”10 The generosity
displayed by a city patron occurred in order to “perpetuate his glory in a building,
public inscriptions (epidoseis) and public promises of largesses.”11 Kings also built
buildings for cities and their subjects to gain legitimacy and to draw international
attention to themselves.12
Besides giving for the sake of recognition, Veyne believed Hellenistic kings
contributed grain, monuments, and money in order to maintain existing political
relationships, display their greatness, and reinforce local dependancy on them. 13 He
flatly rejected that euergetism occurred because it was a form of tax or a means of
maintaining political equilibrium within economically unbalanced city-states. In his
view, its purpose was something “external to the social problems of the Hellenistic
epoch.”14 Instead, through euergetic acts, local elites and Hellenistic monarchs,
though acting as public servants, demonstrated their superiority to the common
individual and therefore reinforced their right to control the political offices of their
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city-states.

15

While Veyne’s views remain standard regarding the royal use of euergetism to
enhance legitimacy, his interpretation of its function within Greek city-states has
undergone modification. The new consensus is that euergetism served to create
balance within poleis and increasingly did so as income disparity grew between
elites and non-elites.16 Such inequality had the potential to disrupt the unity
(homonoia) of the polis. As the discussion in the next section demonstrates,
euergetism and the rise of ruler cults reflected the need to find an equilibrium
between kings and elites and their non-elite counterparts. Each side made
concessions in exchange for stable societies.
Euergetism in Hellenistic Politics
The death of Alexander in June, 323 BCE marked the beginning of the
political, social, and economic transformation of the Greek world into its Hellenistic
successor. His abrupt death prompted a political crisis within the Macedonian
Empire that left in its wake the establishment of monarchy as the primary mode of
governance among the Greeks. When he died, Alexander had a young son named
Heracles, born of a Persian woman named Barsine, whom he refused to acknowledge
as his legitimate child.17 His wife Roxane was also pregnant and would later give
birth to a son, Alexander. In the absence of a clear successor, his untimely demise
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created a power vacuum within the Macedonian state, and it remained to his
generals, officers, and army to resolve this political problem. These men tried to
divide authority among themselves in a way that would placate the soldiers and,
more importantly, maintain the unity of the empire.18 The system produced the key
political development of the Hellenistic period, namely, the formation of independent
kingdoms ruled by dynastic monarchs.19
The predominance of kingship represented a transition for the Mediterranean
world in two important ways. For the Greeks, it represented a significant departure
from the political philosophy of 5th century BCE Greeks who associated it with
barbarian states and the more socially backward places in Hellas. 20 For the people
of Asia and the ancient Near East, a new system of rival monarchs supplanted the
Persians’ single Mediterranean state, disrupted the stability and tranquility of the
region, and imposed a new social hierarchy that required the kings to cultivate an
equipoise with their subjects and allies in light of growing political and economic
disparity.21
One of the social trends of the Hellenistic period was the division between
18
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Greek ruling elites, who were in the minority, and the more numerous local
populations.22 These populations had their own political, legal, and religious
traditions that had long been established before the emergence of their Hellenistic
suzerains. The Ptolemies, for example, controlled an Egyptian population where
modes of interaction between ruler and subject already existed. Seleucid rule in
Syria faced similar local traditions. In order to legitimize their rule and preserve
their power, Hellenistic dynasts often acclimated their regimes to the norms of those
under their hegemony.23
The interaction between Hellenistic kings and the localities they ruled led to
three important developments. On the one hand, kings established relationships
with the cities of the Mediterranean Basin by assuming the role of protector and
caretaker of the people. This protection was “from the vicissitudes of this life” which
included such things as warfare, famines, earthquakes, or other local needs. 24
Benefactions from the kings became their avenue for legitimation with local
populations. Hellenistic rulers also assumed certain commitments negotiated by the
cities, and this “collaboration process reflects the kings’ need for legitimacy, and for
acceptance by the local communities.”25
22
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On the other hand, to negotiate these royal euergetic acts, the “citizeninterceder” arose. Local elites helped their cities by petitioning the kings to engage
in munificent acts that benefitted their fellow citizens. The benefits they tried to
secure were things like tax exemptions, money grants, or gifts of grain. 26
Finally, the kings’ power to protect the cities under their hegemony led to the
development of the ruler cult. A. Chaniotis argues that inscriptions relevant to
understanding the rise of the civic ruler cults “suggest that royal cult was an
instrument used by the poleis in order to establish a close relationship with a
monarch and directly express their gratitude for past and their expectation of future
benefactions.”27 The formation of ruler cults, therefore, was not ancillary to the
practice of euergetism. Instead, it was an integral part of its development and
political use.
Ruler cult refers to the practice of honoring a ruler as a god while he lives.
While there were local variations on this practice, it seems to have had some
common elements. Cities erected local temples in honor of the ruler. Statues, a
priesthood, sacrifices and offerings, and festivals were all dedicated to the ruler
kings. Price argues the development of ruler cults in the Greek world suggests “that
the cities established cults as an attempt to come to terms with a new type of
power.”28 The Greeks had never before had to confront the prospect of monarchical
26
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power external the existence of their city-states. The political transitions following
the death of Alexander the Great created the need for a new way of interacting with
a novel form of power. According to Price, the Greeks developed the practice of
honoring the ruler as a god as a means of “the giving of thanks to benefactors.” 29
Consequently, Chaniotis’ observation about the close correlation between the
practice of euergetism and formation of ruler cults correctly assesses how
intertwined these two practices were for the Greeks of Hellenistic and Roman
periods.
In exchange for the benefactions of the kings, the cities bestowed upon them
honorary titles that reflected their power to protect and create. The most common
epithet reserved for protector kings was soter (óùôÞñ) or “savior.” This term connotes
a “deliverer, preserver, protector from all ills, healer, or guide.” 30 This honorary title
was reserved for kings and local benefactors “who had improved a situation or had
prevented a perilous one.”31 Often kings who founded cities or who gave
benefactions after natural disasters were worshiped locally as “founders” (êôßóôçò).
These developments coincided with other important transformations in the
Hellenistic world. Inter-city collaboration and contact grew beyond anything that
had previously existed among the Greeks. The armed conflicts of past centuries
gave way to rivalries for honors based upon alliances with kings and ties to ruler
cults. A common civic culture that now had uniform institutions and norms arose
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among the cities that transcended continents . The use of koine Greek triumphed
over the traditional dialects (Aeolic, Ionic, Doric) making possible the common
political language that would appear in the correspondence between the cities and be
expressed on commemorative inscriptions.32
The Example of Rhodes
The earthquake that struck the island of Rhodes in 227 BCE illustrates how
all of these transformations worked to bring aid to the victims in the aftermath of
the disaster. The response to this earthquake also shows the presence of all the
basic processes that would become staples of disaster relief throughout the period of
the early Roman Empire. This paradigm of sending embassies for aid dated, at
least, to the Rhodian earthquake of 227 BCE. During the Hellenistic period, Greek
cities became accustomed to sending citizens to present their interests to kings and
civic assemblies. The process by which the Rhodians obtained help from Hellenistic
kings and other Greek poleis follows those precedents and provides a model for
understanding how Greek cities petitioned for disaster assistance through the
Roman period . Polybius records the aid given to Rhodes as follows:
‘Ñüäéïé ä¥ êáô ôï×ò ðñïåéñçìÝíïõò êáéñï×ò
¦ðåéëçììÝíïé ôò öïñìò ôò êáô ôÎí óåéóìÎí
ôÎí ãåíüìåíïí ðáñ’ áÛôïÃò âñá÷åÃ ÷ñüíå ðñüôåñïí,
¦í ø óõíÝâç ôüí ôå êïëïóóÎí ôÎí ìÝãáí ðåóåÃí êáÂ
ô ðëåÃóôá ôäí ôåé÷äí êáÂ ôäí íåùñßùí, [2] ïàôùò
¦÷åßñéæïí íïõíå÷äò êáÂ ðñáãìáôéêäò ôÎ ãåãïíÎò ñò
ì¬ âëÜâçò, äéïñèþóåùò ä¥ ìëëïí, áÛôïÃò áÇôéïí
ãåíÝóèáé ôÎ óýìðôùìá. [3] ôïóïØôïí ãíïéá êáÂ
Õèõìßá äéáöÝñåé ðáñz íèñþðïéò ¦ðéìåëåßáò êáÂ
öñïíÞóåùò ðåñß ôå ôï×ò êáôz Æäßáí âßïõò êáÂ ôò
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êïéíò ðïëéôåßáò, òóôå ôïÃò ì¥í êáÂ ôò ¦ðéôõ÷ßáò
âëÜâçí ¦ðéöÝñåéí, ôïÃò ä¥ êáÂ ôò ðåñéðåôåßáò
¦ðáíïñèþóåùò ãßíåóèáé ðáñáéôßáò. [4] ïÊ ãïØí üäéïé
ôüôå ðáñ ôÎí ÷åéñéóìÎí ôÎ ì¥í óýìðôùìá
ðïéïØíôåò ìÝãá êáÂ äåéíüí, áÛôïÂ ä¥ óåìíäò êáÂ
ðñïóôáôéêäò êáô ôò ðñåóâåßáò ÷ñþìåíïé ôáÃò
¦íôåýîåóé êáÂ ôáÃò êáô ìÝñïò Òìéëßáéò, åÆò ôïØôz
³ãáãïí ôò ðüëåéò, êáÂ ìÜëéóôá ôï×ò âáóéëåÃò, òóôå
ì¬ ìüíïí ëáìâÜíåéí äùñåò ßðåñâáëëïýóáò, ëë
êáÂ ÷Üñéí ðñïóïöåßëåéí áÛôïÃò ôï×ò äéäüíôáò.
(Polyb. 5.88).
At about the same time the Rhodians, seizing
the occasion presented by the earthquake
which had taken place shortly before and in
which the great Colossus and the larger part
of the walls and dockyards collapsed, used the
incident in such a skilful [sic] and practical
way that the disaster became a source of
advantage to them rather than of damage [...]
Rhodian diplomacy enhanced the magnitude
and importance of the disaster, while their
envoys conducted themselves with dignity
and seriousness in public audiences and
private meetings. In this way they made
such an impression on the cities, and
especially the kings, that not only did they
receive presents beyond measure but they
even made the donors feel under obligation to
them.33

The primary purpose of Polybius’ account was to laud the wisdom of the
citizens of Rhodes for converting a calamitous event that did great damage to the
civic and economic life of their polis into a boon . But, it is the process he describes
that is most relevant. In order to procure aid, the Rhodians sent embassies into the
cities and kingdoms of the Hellenistic world where they engaged in public and
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private communications (ôáÃò ¦íôåýîåóé êáÂ ôáÃò êáô ìÝñïò Òìéëßáéò) regarding the
nature of the extreme event and the post-disaster state of their city (5.88.4) In these
discussions, they manipulated (ôÎí ÷åéñéóìÎí)34 their audiences by conflating the size
and severity (ìÝãá êáÂ äåéíüí) of the unfortunate event (ôÎ óýìðôùìá) so they could
garner great sympathy from their fellow Greeks and receive lavish gifts (5.88.4).
They succeeded to such a degree that Polybius claims the kings and cities considered
it a privilege (÷Üñéí)35 to have the opportunity to assist the Rhodians in their time of
need (5.88.4).
Polybius’ account is also noteworthy because his language implies the
Rhodians intentionally stressed the damage the earthquake caused to their city so
they might obtain greater benefits (55.8.2). Examples of disaster assistance in the
literary sources for the early Roman Empire suggest that this remained a common
practice for Greek embassies when they petitioned Rome for help. Tacitus’ account
of Tiberius’ assistance for the cities of Asia specifically associates imperial sympathy
with the degree of Sardis’ suffering. Tacitus observed “the calamity, being harshest
in Sardis, attracted for them most of the sympathy” (asperrima in Sardianos lues
plurimum in eosdem misericordiae traxit, 2.47.2). The cities of Asia Minor were
extremely competitive with one another for imperial benefits and honors. When
given an imperial audience, they often recounted their city’s antiquity and record of
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loyalty to Rome to distinguish themselves from other cities.
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The Rhodian example

and Tacitus’ hierarchy of cities imply the embassies dramatized the extent of their
city’s damage in order to procure the largest amount of aid from the emperors.
Disasters created a new basis for competition among the cities, namely, being rebuilt
by the Roman emperor (Aristid. Or. 20.5). The nature of Greek petitions for aid
changed little over time. They used the same methods on new rulers.
Indeed, Polybius later lauds the actions of the Rhodians following the
earthquake, saying “they are worthy of praise and emulation” (¦ðáßíïõ ãÜñ gÆóéí îéïé
êáÂ æÞëïõ, 5.90.5). He also makes a comparison between the paltry gifts kings offered
to cities in his own time and the lavish liberalities bestowed by Hellenistic kings
upon Rhodes. This latter observation suggests Polybius thought that the interaction
methods employed by the Rhodian ambassadors to secure their city’s aid and the
competition among the cities and kings to aid the Rhodians functioned as a disaster
relief model for his own time. In reality, it most likely establishes a baseline for
understanding how Greek cities secured relief whether from Hellenistic kings or
Roman emperors. Much of the process remained static in the midst of a
Mediterranean world that experienced dynamic political changes.
Polybius’ impressive list of the gifts showered upon the Rhodians by Greek
kings helps to elucidate why later Greek cities expected their Roman sovereigns to
contribute to their rehabilitation. The relief narrative gives a tally of nine kings who
provided economic and rebuilding assistance to the people of Rhodes. He says the
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rulers of Syracuse, Hiero and Gelo:
§äùêáí ©âäïìÞêïíôá êáÂ ðÝíô’ ñãõñßïõ ôÜëáíôá
ðñÎò ô¬í åÆò ôÎ §ëáéïí ôïÃò ¦í ôè ãõìíáóßå
÷ïñçãßáí, ô ì¥í ðáñá÷ñìá, ô ä’ ¦í ÷ñüíå âñá÷åÃ
ðáíôåëäò, ëë êáÂ ëÝâçôáò ñãõñïØò êáÂ âÜóåéò
ôïýôùí êáß ôéíáò ßäñßáò íÝèåóáí, [6] ðñÎò ä¥
ôïýôïéò åÆò ôò èõóßáò äÝêá ôÜëáíôá êáÂ ô¬í
¦ðáýîçóéí ôäí ðïëéôäí ëëá äÝêá, ÷Üñéí ôïØ ô¬í
ðóáí åÆò ©êáôÎí ôÜëáíôá ãåíÝóèáé äùñåÜí. [7] êáÂ
ì¬í ôÝëåéáí ôïÃò ðñÎò áÛôï×ò ðëïúæïìÝíïéò §äïóáí
êáÂ ðåíôÞêïíôá êáôáðÝëôáò ôñéðÞ÷åéò. [8] êáÂ
ôåëåõôáÃïí ôïóáØôá äüíôåò, ñò ðñïóïöåßëïíôåò
÷Üñéí, §óôçóáí íäñéÜíôáò ¦í ôè ôäí ‘Ñïäßùí
äåßãìáôé, óôåöáíïýìåíïí ôÎí äìïí ôäí ‘Ñïäßùí
ßðÎ ôïØ äÞìïõ ôïØ Óõñáêïóßùí (5.88.5-8).
gave them 75 talents of silver [for the
rebuilding of the walls? and] for the provision
of oil in the gymnasia, part at once and the
rest very shortly after. They dedicated in
addition silver cauldrons with their stands,
and some water vessels, and added to this (a
sum of) ten talents for sacrifices and another
ten for the enrichment of the citizens, with
the intention that their present should add up
to 100 talents. They granted furthermore
exemption to Rhodians sailing to their ports
and presented Rhodes with 50 three-cubit
catapults. After making all these presents
they still regarded themselves as under
obligation and set up statues in the Exchange
at Rhodes showing the people of Rhodes being
crowned by the people of Syracuse (trans.
Austin).
This sample of gifts ranges from money to apply to the rebuilding of collapsed
walls to utensils needed to reinitiate worship in the city’s temples. The Rhodians
also received ten talents to assist the citizens individually, and they obtained special
exemptions designed to lessen the economic burdens upon their merchants. In 195
BCE, Iasus in Caria benefitted from similar assistance at the hands of Queen
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Laodice. She contributed 1,000 Attic medimni of grain to the city for ten years in
order to assist its recovery following an earthquake in 195 BCE.37

Euergetism and Rome
These norms became crucial not only for cultivating the relationship between
the Roman emperors and the Greek speaking cities of Asia Minor, but also for
politics in Rome. By the Late Republic, the Roman state had begun to rely on
wealthy benefactors to secure the grain supply, construct buildings, or help with
disaster recovery.38 Thus, before an emperor ruled the Empire in a manner
resembling a monarch, the Romans had incorporated Hellenistic euergetism for the
management of crises. The precedents established by elite benefactors of the Late
Republic remained the norms after Augustus reconstituted the state. Consequently,
the lasting influence of Greek euergetism both in the Greek speaking provinces and
in the imperial capital meant that Augustus could project his power in the provinces
and in Rome through euergetic actions, especially after natural catastrophes. In
Rome, one of the Late Republican benefactors that provided a model for Augustus to
follow later was Pompey. His response to the 54 BCE flood in Rome shows him using
his power over the grain supply to project his influence in the city.
The Flood of 54 BCE
The precedents for imperial emergency relief in the city of Rome were
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established by the imperatores of the Late Republic. In 54 BCE, the Tiber inundated
the nearby neighborhoods “saturating” (äéÜâñï÷ïß) brick homes and causing them to
“collapse” (êáôåññÜãçóáí, Cass. Dio, 39.61.2). Those who either refused or were
unable to escape from the advance of the waters died in the deluge (Cass. Dio,
39.61.2). Three years before this terrible event, Pompeius Magnus had received
charge of the grain supply for the city and used this position as a pretext to remain
in Rome enabling him to secure control (êáôÜó÷®) over affairs there (ô åí ô± Ñþì®)
and throughout the rest of Italy (ô± ôå ëë® ºôáëß, Cass. Dio, 39.39.4). Since he
retained responsibility for Rome’s grain reservoirs in 54 BCE, he acted to help the
people of the city when the flood disrupted the flow of grain and destroyed much of
the existing supplies (ðïë×ò ßðÎ ôïØ ðïôáìïØ äéÝöèáñôï, Cass. Dio, 39.63.3). Cassius
Dio claims Pompey was absent from Rome during the contentious trial of Gabinius,
the former governor of Syria, who had restored Ptolemy to the throne of Egypt in 55
BCE, because he was trying “to care for the supply of grain” (êáô ô¬í ôïØ óßôïõ
ðñüíïéáí, 39.63.3).
Pompey’s attempt to ensure the availability of grain following the flood
suggests that he recognized the basic correlation between flood damage and people’s
access to adequate, affordable food. He also realized that the Romans expected a
man of his political stature to respond to the disaster for the public’s benefit. Thus,
the management of a flood crisis became a political opportunity for magnates like
Pompey to solidify power and advance a personal agenda. This would remain the
norm for the politics of emergency management throughout the early Empire.
Mutual Motivations for Disaster Assistance
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The Roman Empire amounted to a network of important cities that had
financial obligations to the emperors and to the imperial treasuries. In order to
ensure peace in the provinces emperors nurtured their relations with Greek elites
and the eastern cities through giving benefactions. Conversely, the Greek cities
treated their new Roman overlords in the same manner they had their previous
rulers. Consequently, the establishment of the imperial cult for living Roman
emperors became vital to the interactions between provincial cities and the political
center.
Roman emperors did not shower their bounty on all cities. Instead, accessing
the euergetic benevolence of the emperors required the status necessary to gain an
imperial audience. Thus, the Greek cities received assistance if they could
demonstrate a history of loyalty and help to Rome, their economic and
administrative importance to Roman rule, or their veneration for the imperial cult.
Each side had its own interests for working within this system. Roman
emperors wanted to maintain stability in the empire, and sometimes they needed to
respond to a disaster for the benefit of their political image. 39 These objectives made
the system of exchange vital for accomplishing imperial interests.
The Greek cities had at least two main reasons to send envoys to petition the
emperors especially after catastrophic events. First, the rivalries between the cities
had become competitions for Rome’s esteem.40 Consequently, securing imperial
assistance following a natural disaster would allow a city to advertize the emperor
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as its savior or founder, thus enhancing its reputation. Second, because of the
geology of western Asia Minor, earthquakes often damaged or destroyed one or more
civic buildings the Greeks believed integral for a real civic life.
Pausanias (fl. 150 CE), the periegete from Magnesia ad Sipylum, provides a
glimpse into the significance of certain buildings for Greek civic ideology. He once
questioned whether anyone could call the Phocian city (ðüëéò) Panopeus, located
some 20 stades from Chaeroneia, a true polis because it did not have a magistracy
(ñ÷åÃá), a gymnasium (ãõìíÜóéüí), a theater (èÝáôñïí), an agora, nor water
descending into a fountain (àäùñ êáôåñ÷üìåíïí ¦ò êñÞíçí, Description of Greece,
10.4.1). To this ancient commentary, A.H.M. Jones added:
Of the buildings which every self-respecting
city had to possess many have already been
mentioned--colonnaded streets and market
squares, aqueducts and fountains, temples,
gymnasia, baths, a stadium, a hippodrome, a
theatre, an odeum. To these may be added
buildings to house the various administrative
services--the offices of the several boards of
magistrates, the record office, the treasury,
and the council chamber.41
These building types like gymnasia or temples were quite large and required
expensive foundations to rebuild, and it was these costly structures that Greek cities
often depended upon benefactors to fund for them. 42 A recent reevaluation of the
polis in the Hellenistic and Roman periods by M. Hansen indicates that Greek citystates experienced a number of important transitions. Hansen says, “more and more
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cities were built, or restored, on the grid plan.”

43

The peace that accompanied

Roman suzerainty over the Mediterranean made the construction or rebuilding of
walls unnecessary. Buildings, theaters, stoa, and gymnasia became much more
monumental in nature, and the cities no longer built their important temples
exclusively on the acropolis, but spread them among the areas of the city were
people lived.44
For the Greek cities, restoration meant the recuperation of these structures so
they could once again be worthy of being called a polis and resume a respectable
Greek civic life. Thus, they eagerly sought imperial assistance because the emperors
had the financial resources to build the foundations they needed. So, they worked
within the existing system of euergetism and commemorated emperors as their
founders in exchange for the revival of their polis life.
Conversely, because of the broader transitions taking place in the character of
the Greek poleis, funding reconstruction after disasters gave Roman emperors an
opportunity to remake Greek cities in a Roman style while leaving monuments to
themselves in the form of traditional Greek civic buildings. Hence, through
demonstrations of liberality, the emperors could erect permanent monuments to
their memory that would outlast their own mortality.45
The transition to Roman suzerainty over the Mediterranean brought little
change to the practice of euergetism within the cities of the Greek world . The
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Romans understood a system wherein wealthy elites entered into a system of
reciprocal exchange with those who were not their equals. Thus because of the
similarities between the two systems, the Greek cities, especially in Asia Minor,
transitioned with little difficulty to having Rome as their overlords. Roman
domination merely “shifted the standards by which power and esteem were
measured.”46 Euergetism was the basis of the relationship between Rome’s emperors
and the cities of Asia and manifested itself in the invention of the imperial cult, the
application of the honorary titles “savior” and “founder” to emperors for their
benefactions for construction projects regardless of whether there had been a
disaster, and through an intense competition for imperial privileges.
The Origins of Imperial Assistance in Asia
The evolution of the practice of disaster relief in the early Empire coincides
with the establishment of the imperial office and with the development of the modes
of interaction between the emperor and his subjects. The formation of these
processes began with the accession of Octavius (b. 63 BCE) to the imperium
following his victory over Antony at Actium in 31 BCE. How he and his successors
expressed their power and legitimized their rule reflected the long term political and
social changes that took place in the Mediterranean world after the death of
Alexander the Great (d. 323 BCE). The model for how emperors responded to
requests for disaster assistance has its roots in the practice of euergetism that
Hellenistic kings employed to generate fealty and goodwill with their subjects as the
Greek world experienced greater political and economic disparity.
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The cities of the province of Asia were of vital political and economic interest
for Rome’s administration of the Eastern Mediterranean. Rome had officially
incorporated Asia as a Roman province in 133 BCE upon the death of King Attalus
III of Pergamum who had bequeathed it to the Roman state.47 Because of its
established trade routes and natural resources, the province quickly emerged as a
desired destination for exploitation by provincial governors and merchants. At the
conclusion of the Republic, the province suffered greatly because of political and
financial abuse exacerbated by an onerous system of taxation.48 Following his
victory over Pompey at Pharsalus in August, 48 BCE, Caesar reduced the tax
liabilities of Asia by one-third, and he reformed the method of tax collection by
eliminating the use of tax-farming corporations. Now, the cities collected direct
taxes on a communal basis and paid them to the provincial quaestor.49 The
combination of peace and this new, stable tax policy facilitated the economic and
civic life of the cities of Asia Minor.50
In the aftermath of the civil war between Octavian and Antony (42-31 BCE),
Asia Minor once again stood in need of economic and civic revitalization. Augustus
made the province, although technically under the Senate’s administration, the
center-piece of his Eastern policy. Its economic recovery, therefore, became integral
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to the overall success of the Empire.

51

Thus, he not only cultivated a close

relationship with the elites of the cities of Asia, but he also invested large sums of
money in order to reinvigorate the economies of the province’s major cities. 52
Augustus used benefactions and a nexus of personal relationships in order to
create a new equilibrium between wealthy elites in Asia and the Roman emperor.
As a consequence of this relationship, the cities of Asia began to send embassies to
the emperor to make formal petitions while the emperor granted privileges and
immunities to those cities or regions who acquiesced to his power. 40
It was the creation of this new equipoise between the center and the periphery
of the Roman Empire that formed the backdrop of imperial disaster relief because it
opened the channel of communication Roman emperors would need to give aid to
those cities or entire provinces that were affected by catastrophic events. Disaster
assistance in the Greek cities took place because the Romans adapted the
preexisting system of euergetism to allow for elites to acknowledge Roman hierarchy
and simultaneously remain loyal citizens of their poleis.
City Status and Disaster Relief
Roman emperors wished to maintain the political and economic stability of
the Empire, and central to that purpose was insuring the vitality of the cities in Asia
who supplied much money to the imperial treasuries in the form of taxes.
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Conversely, the cities wanted to surpass one another in prestige and importance to
the emperors thereby increasing their access to power and money. Assize and
neocorate cities were integral components to Roman provincial administration and
the maintenance of the imperial cult. Thus, it is no accident that cities benefitting
from the euergetic acts of the emperors after disasters usually fit into one or both of
these categories.
Assize Cities
One important way provincial administration and urban economic vitality
converged was through the selection of assize districts. 41 Assize districts refer to
select cities where the provincial governor would hold court to hear cases, administer
justice, and inspect local civic affairs.42 The evidence for the assize districts and the
dispensing of proconsular justice is much better for the period after the reign of
Vespasian when the conventus districts became fixed.43 Nevertheless, Burton has
shown that although minor alterations occurred over time, the conventus system in
Asia formed unusually early and remained relatively constant from the late Republic
to the Flavian dynasty.44 Before the end of the Republic’s final century, the Romans
created a circuit of conventus districts within the provinces of Asia and Africa, and
the governors spent much of their annual tenure making this administrative tour.
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Besides their importance for the direct administration of the province by the Roman
governor, the assize districts were significant for two additional reasons.
First, it was an honor for a city to be given the headship of an assize. 45 In
light of the constant rivalry between the cities of the Greek East, having this honor
bestowed upon them was highly coveted. Second, heading a conventus brought with
it the expectation of stimulus for the a city’s economy. In a speech to the citizens of
Celaenae in Phrygia, Dio Chrysostom (d. 112 CE), recounted the economic boost that
occurred in their city whenever the annual (ðáñ’ §ôïò) court was held. He declared,
“so then, those having marketable goods are paid the highest value and nothing in
the city is idle” (òóôå ôÜ ôå êíéá ôï×ò §÷ïíôáò ðëåßóôçò ðïäßäïóèáé ôéìò êáÂ ìçä¥í ñãÎí
åÃíáé ôò ðüëåùò, Or. 35.15).46 He went on to observe that “this is no small thing
toward economic success. For, wherever a large crowd of people might gather, there
becomes, out of necessity, a large amount of money” (ôïØôï ä¥ ïÛ óìéêñüí ¦óôé ðñÎò
gÛäáéìïíßáí. Óðïõ ãñ í ðëgÃóôïò Ð÷ëïò íèñþðùí îõíß®, ðëgÃóôïíñãýñéïí ¦î íÜãêçò ¦êgÃ
ãßãígôáé, Or. 35.15-16).
Dio’s oration reflects the correlation between the presence of the provincial
governor and the increase in economic activity it spurred. This rise in
merchandising and consumption had a long term effect upon the local economy
because the governor’s arrival increased the number of animals as well as
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individuals into the conventus districts. Consequently, local farmers benefitted from
greater fertilization of their fields (Or. 35.16). Thus, the honor of hosting an assize
resulted in the expansion of local economies and promoted the vitality of the major
urban centers through which Rome administered the province of Asia.
Among the twelve prominent cities severely damaged by the 17 CE
earthquake, Sardis alone had the honorable distinction of being an assize center.47
Because of its administrative importance Tiberius would have taken an interest in
its restoration even if it had not suffered the greatest degree of damage from the
earthquake. Six years later, when the city of Cibyra in Phyrgia suffered from an
earthquake, Tiberius granted the city a three year remission of its taxes (Tac. Ann.
4.13.1). Cibyra, like Sardis, either had already received the honor of being an assizecenter, or it was growing so important economically and politically that it soon would
be given this benefit.48 Thus, the two examples of earthquake assistance for Asia
during the reign of Tiberius indicate a concern for cities whose restoration was in
Rome’s strategic interest.
Neokoroi
Another signal honor for the cities was to be awarded a neocorate. “Cities of
Hellenic culture in some eastern provinces of the Roman empire called themselves
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‘neokoroi’ usually translated ‘temple wardens’ to signify that they possessed a
provincial temple to the cult of the Roman emperor.”49 Even before the consolidation
of power in a single princeps, the Greek cities had honored Roman generals like they
had Hellenistic kings. Generals like Caesar and Mark Antony received divine
honors in Alexandria, Egypt.50
With the establishment of the imperial form of government, it became the
prerogative of the Emperor, in consultation with the Senate, to decide which cities
received the honor of hosting the imperial cult. In actuality, the right to construct a
temple in honor of the emperor was granted to a koinon, “an organization of cities of
similar ethnic background and interests within a region, bound together by the
practice of a particular cult.”51 Nevertheless, the cult’s temple resided in only one
city within the koinon.52 Securing this privilege depended upon having
representatives with close ties to the Emperor and demonstrating loyal service to the
Roman state.
Tacitus preserves a debate that took place before Tiberius and the Senate
between the representatives of Smyrna and Sardis as they competed for a chance to
win the honor of becoming a neokoros. In 26 CE, Tiberius and the Senate held a
competition between eleven cities of Asia for the right to construct a temple to the
Emperor. Tacitus’ account demonstrates both the intense rivalry between the cities
49
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and the basis upon which their envoys appealed for their respective selection for
their city to receive the honor of building the temple (Ann. 4.55-56). Each city
appealed for consideration on the basis the age (vetustate) of their people (generis),
and they gave a recitation of the record of their city’s loyalty to the Roman people,
when they subdued Asia Minor in the aftermath of the Third Macedonian War (171168 BCE), during Rome’s wars against King Perseus of Macedon (d. 168 BCE),
Aristonicus (Eumenes III, d. 128 BCE), and other, unnamed kings.
The Senate passed over the cities of Hypaepa, Tralles, Laodicea, and
Magnesia because they were deemed to lack the significance (parum validi)
commensurate with housing a temple dedicated to the imperial cult (Ann. 4.55.3).
The argument of the chosen winner of this competition, Smyrna, indicates, the
record of loyalty mattered more than the antiquity of the city’s existence (Ann.
4.56.1). Tacitus says Smyrna’s legates trusted most (maxime fidebant) their
recitation of the loyal service the city had given to Rome prior the end of the Third
Punic War (149-146 BCE) and the defeat of the kings of Asia Minor (Ann. 4. 56.1).
Status, defined by a rich history and a record of loyal service, was the key to winning
additional honor in this competition.53
As mentioned previously, during the Hellenistic period, the cities promoted
the imperial cult as a means of encouraging future benefactions. Likewise, having a
temple dedicated the Roman imperial court must have strengthened the bond
between the emperors and the Asian cities who oversaw them. Aelius Aristides, a
second century rhetorician and devotee of Asclepius, specifically mentioned the
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destruction of the provincial temple of Tiberius, Julia, and the Senate when he wrote
to Marcus Aurelius of the destruction Smyrna suffered from the 177 earthquake (Or.
19.3).54 The cities of Nicomedia (koinon Bithynia), Anazarbos (koinon Cilicia) and
Cyzicus (koinon Asia) all received some kind of earthquake assistance after they
became centers for the imperial cult. No doubt the emissaries that brought their
petitions for relief exploited this relationship in order to enhance their chances to
receive some form of aid.
Recognition of the Emperors
After receiving disaster assistance from an emperor, the cities of Asia often
followed Hellenistic precedent by honoring him as “savior” or “founder” of their city.
However, it should be noted that disaster relief did not create the only occasion for
the cities to honor the emperors with this nomenclature. Any imperial public works
in the provinces might result in an inscription honoring the emperor with these
titles.55 The city of Tralles, for example, honored Augustus as their êôßóôçò (founder)
after he gave them financial aid to rebuild their city after the 27 CE earthquake.56
Similarly, Cibyra commemorated Tiberius as “savior and founder” (GÙÔÇÑ ÊÁÉ
ÊÔÉGÔÇG) for receiving a three years remission of their tax obligations following a 23
CE earthquake that damaged the city.57 Finally, after Claudius restored the temple
of Dionysus at Samos, which collapsed in 47 CE in an earthquake, he was lauded as
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the island’s “new founder” (íåïí êôéóôçí [sic.]).

58

The titles given to the emperors in these inscriptions are connected to the
imperial cults in two ways. First, like the privilege of having a temple, the
willingness to claim the emperor as “founder” or “savior” of a city was a way to
increase that city’s esteem in the eyes of Rome. It was also a form of advertizing the
honors the city had received. Second the terms “savior” and “founder” were
ideologically charged terms the use of which had arisen in the Hellenistic period but
were now applied to Roman emperors. Both terms indicate the divine powers the
ruler of Rome had. Thus, the emperor’s ability to resurrect a city from an
earthquake damage reflected more than his financial capacity. It came from his
superhuman power.
Smyrna Earthquake (177 CE)
The aftermath of the Smyrna earthquake of 177 CE illustrates how a city that
functioned both as an assize district and a neokoros received relief from Marcus
Aurelius. It further shows how the personal relationship between a Greek elite,
Aelieus Aristides (d. 181 CE) and the Emperor could be instrumental for the
procurement of disaster aid. The letters and speeches of Aelius Aristides in response
to earthquake also recognize Marcus Aurelius and his son Commodus as the saviors
of Smyrna because of the assistance they provided.
According to Philostratus, Aristides was born in Mysia around the year 117
CE (V S 2.9). Because he had poor health from his childhood, Aristides became a
devoted follower of the healer god, Asclepius. His father, Eudaemon, made sure his
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son received the best education, and Aristides trained under Alexander of Cotiaeum
who also supervised the education of the future emperor, Marcus Aurelius. 59
In adulthood, Aristides held citizenship in the city of Smyrna, but he
remained outside the civic and social life of his polis by avoiding civic obligations
expected of an aristocrat. Laurent Pernot cites three instances from the years 147148 CE that demonstrate how Aristides claimed to have escaped from the usual,
civic duties expected of Greek aristocrats in the second century CE. 60 In 147 CE, the
Smyrnaean assembly applauded Aristides’ presence in their midst and offered to
nominate him for the common priesthood of Asia. But, he demurred, citing a dream
he had received from Asclepius (Or. 50.101). In response to his expressed devotion
to Asclepius, the assembly voted him to the office of the local priesthood of Asclepius
whose temple, at that time, was under construction in the city. Despite what
appeared to be an offer he could not refuse, Aristides again objected to the vote, later
claiming that “it was impossible for me to do anything, either impossible or trifling,
without the god, and therefore, it was not possible to think even of serving as a
priest, until I had inquired about this from the god himself” (ïÛä¥í ïÜôå ìåÃæïí ïÜôå
§ëáôôïí ïÊüí ô’ åÇç ðñÜôôåéí ìïé íåõ ôïØ qåïØ, ïÛä’ ïÞí áÛôÎ ôÎ ÊåñÜóqáé íïìßæåéí ¦îåÃíáé
ðñüôåñïí, ðñÂí í áÛôïØ ðýqùìáé ôïØ qåïØ, Or. 50.102). Finally, in the following year,
Aristides was nominated for the Provincial Assembly, but he invoked his god yet
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again and gained liberty from serving in this capacity (Or. 50.102). These examples
show that Aristides did not wish to fulfill civic duties voted to him by the assembly.
For him, the divine will of Asclepius superseded the votes of the people.
The year before the earthquake destroyed Smyrna, Marcus Aurelius and
Commodus visited the city on their return to Rome from their tour of the Eastern
provinces. After this brief stop, Marcus and Commodus returned to Rome in time for
Commodus to be granted imperium alongside his father on November, 27. A few
months later, in January 177 CE, Commodus assumed his first consulship and
received tribunician power. Also in 177 CE, he received all the honors, titles, and
powers of his father and became co-ruler.61 During their stay in Smyrna, Aristides
met with the Emperor, creating a bond that Philostratus later deemed invaluable for
Aristides’ success in securing imperial assistance to rebuild the city after the
earthquake (V S 2.9).
The earthquake most likely struck Smyrna in 177 CE or early 178 CE.
Aristides claimed he learned the unexpected (íåëðßóôïõ) news of the city’s
destruction while he resided at his Laneion Estate where, he said, the god Asclepius
brought (¦êßíçóÝí) him a few days prior the event and ordered (ðñïóÝôáîåí) him to
remain (Or. 19.6).62 The report of the condition of the city and its people affected
him greatly because he describes his monody to the city (Or. 18) and his letter to the
Emperors (Or. 19) as outlets for his personal travails (ôïØ ðÜèïõò) that the news evoked
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(Or. 20.3). He then says he thought himself uniquely able to call upon the Emperor,
and therefore, without waiting to receive any official capacity, on the following day,
he appointed himself to perform the service (¦ìáõôÎí §ôáîá äéÜêïíïí) of writing to
request the aid of the Roman ruler (Or. 19.6). It is not surprising to see Aristides
working unofficially to petition the Emperor independently of the city assembly.
Such independence was consistent with his modus operandi.
The correspondence to Marcus Aurelius paints at least a partial portrait of the
how the earthquake had destroyed the beautiful vistas and damaged the important
civic structures of the city. In his letter, Aristides reminded the Emperor and his coregent about the visual impression the city made on them when they first entered
Smyrna in 175/176 CE. In a highly emotional appeal, Aristides wrote, “Remember
what you said when you viewed it on approaching, remember what you said when
you entered, how you were affected, what you did” (¢íáìíÞóèçôå ôí ¦ðÂ ôò ðïñåßáò
¦öèÝãîáóèå Òñäíôåò åÆò áÛôÞí, íáìíÞóèçôå ôí åÇóù ðáñåëèüíôåò, ñò äéåôÝèçôå, ñò äéåèÞêáôå,
Or. 19.2). Aristides most likely had not accompanied the emperor and his son when
they first entered the city, but he provides enough particulars such as the
observance of the Theoxenia and the ability of the emperors to get a respite from
their long journey that it is conceivable he had learned these details through
personal interactions with Marcus Aurelius. It is also possible, given his knowledge
of when the Emperor had arrived in the city, that Aristides reasonably anticipated
the emotional response he had upon seeing the great vistas that the impressive city
had to offer. Regardless, Marcus must have found Smyrna to be a beautiful, awe-
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inspiring city, and Aristides used the Emperor’s intimate familiarity with the city to
build a dramatic, emotive case for the leader of Rome to restore the city.
Aristides’ letter took the Emperor on a verbal tour of the destruction. He
began by claiming that everything about the city that once amazed the Emperor now
“lies in the dust” ( íØí ðÜíôá ¦í êüíåé, Or. 19.2). He then described a kind of death
scene saying the harbor “has closed its eyes, the beauty of the market-place is gone,
the adornments of the streets have disappeared, the gymnasiums together with the
men and boys who used them are destroyed, some of the temples have fallen, some
sunk beneath the ground” (ìÝìõêå ì¥í ¦êåÃíïò ëéìÞí, ïÇ÷åôáé ä¥ ãïñò êÜëëç, êüóìïé ä¥
Òääí öáíåÃò, ãõìíÜóéá ä¥ áÛôïÃò íäñÜóé êáÂ ðáéóÂ äéÝöáñôáé, íáïÂ ä¥ ïÊ ì¥í êåÃíôáé, ïÊ ä¥
êáôÝäõóáí, Or. 19.3).
C. Cadoux’s seminal study of Smyrna postulates the site of the city gave it
significant military and commercial advantages.62 The harbor was an integral
component to the economic viability of the city because ships accessed the city by
sailing inland from the Aegean Sea into a small harbor where commercial life
thrived.63 Strabo wrote that a majority of the city was located in a plain near the
harbor. Strabo also saw the harbor as an important addition to the other significant
structures in the city’s possession (14.1.37). Given the consistent references to this
harbor and to the vitality and beauty of the city, it is no doubt correct to assume that
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Aristides meant this area of the city had “closed its eyes” due to the destructive
quake. Since the harbor played such an important role in the commercial life of the
city, even a minor disruption to its functionality threatened to imperil the economic
sustainability of Smyrna. Although it is impossible to know the extent of the
damage to the harbor caused by the earthquake, Aristides’ concern for the long-term
revitalization of the city made it a natural point of emphasis of which the Emperor
should be made aware.
The other damaged buildings Aristides mentions were all related to the Greek
concept of civic life. He told the Emperor of the destruction of the gymnasia as well
as the men and boys who regularly went there. The city had many buildings used
for this purpose, according to Aristides, but Strabo refers to a singular gymnasium
located near the harbor of the city where many of the important civic structures
must have also been. Hadrian had also funded the construction of another large
gymnasium that included an elaborate area for sun-bathing and a place for the
Gerousia of the city to oil themselves following their time of exercise. 64
Nevertheless, what is striking here is that Aristides places the loss of gymnasia on
par with the loss of human life. The destruction of the city of Smyrna meant the loss
of buildings as well as the death of its people.
Aristides also refers to a beautiful market-place that has now disappeared
after the earthquake along with the adornments of the streets. These adornments
most likely refer to structures that lined the streets described by Strabo as “large
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quadrangular porticoes, with both upper and lower stories” (14.1.37). The final
buildings mentioned by Aristides are various unnamed temples many of which he
says have fallen down or “sunk beneath the ground” (êáôÝäõóáí, Or. 19.3).
There can be no doubt that Aristides presented the destruction of Smyrna in
the most dramatic and, perhaps, hyperbolic terms possible in order to move the head
of the Roman state to act on behalf of his city.65 Nevertheless, all of these structures
mentioned above indicate why Aristides expressed alarm over the long-term
survivability of the city. The reputable beauty of the city, which had become the
hallmark of Smyrna’s renown in the ancient world, had more to do with its civic
buildings than with its vistas of the sea and surrounding plain.66 For ancient
Greeks, civic life required the presence of important civic structures. They could not
imagine the existence of a city, let alone its continuation, apart from the presence of
such edifices.67 Often, these important buildings had stood for centuries, and the
ancestors of current generations had served as benefactors for the erection of
temples, gymnasia, streets, porticoes, and stoa by which Greek civic life was defined.
Aristides made clear to the Emperor that his immediate concern lay with the need
for those vital structures to be rebuilt by imperial aid, but he was not concerned
about recent constructions built outside of the walls of the city (Or. 19.8). This also
helps explain why Aristides placed the death of men and boys on par with the loss of
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the gymnasia they frequented. For Aristides, the loss of the buildings along with
the people converted this once great city into “ruins and corpses” (¦ñåéðßùí êáÂ íåêñäí,
Or. 19.3). Thus, his description of post-earthquake Smyrna is reflective of genuine
concern that the city, with all of its history, might not “be thrown away like a broken
utensil, condemned to uselessness” (ì¬ êáèÜðåñ óêåØïò óõíôñéâ¥í ¦êñéöíáé êáôáãíùóè¥í
÷ñçóôßáò, Or. 19.7). Aristides implored Marcus Aurelius to let “it live again through
you” (íáâéäíáé äé’ ßìäí, Or. 19.7). The city could not live again as long as its civic
structures lay in ruins. Thus, for the revival of Smyrna, in Aristides’ view, the
Emperor needed to provide the financial resources that only his treasury could give.
This final appeal to permit the city to live reveals two important aspects of
Aristides’ perspective on the need for the Emperor to assist Smyrna’s reconstruction.
First, Aristides understood the destruction of the city to be so extensive that only the
Emperor possessed the financial capacity to fund its revitalization. In Greek cities,
euergetic acts performed by local aristocrats or Roman emperors typically focused
upon the building or beautification of specific structures such as aqueducts and
temples. For example, according to Aristides’ letter, on a previous occasion, Marcus
Aurelius had funded work on the temples in Smyrna (Or. 19.10). But,this letter begs
for the salvation of the whole city (ðí ó÷ìá óþóáíôåò, Or. 19.10). The damage to
Smyrna comes across as so extensive that it required the finances that only the ruler
of the Empire possessed in order to revive it.
In a section of the letter designed to remind the Emperor of Smyrna’s past
fidelity to Rome, Aristides described how Smyrna had previously given aid to the
Chians, Erythraeans, Teians, and Halicarnassians when they had suffered from
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earthquakes and famines (Or. 19.12). On those occasions, Smyrna had assisted with
gifts of wheat and money. But, the earthquake in 177/178 CE had crippled Smyrna
so pervasively that no one city had the financial capacity to assist it like Smyrna had
previously aided these other cities. If Smyrna was going to obtain the financial
resources that it needed to recover from this earthquake, they would need assistance
from Rome. Hence, Aristides wrote to the Emperor, “Hope in you remains” (º ä¥ ðáñ’
ßìäí ¦ëðÂò ëåßðåôáé, Or. 19.12). This was no hyperbolic presentation of the greatness
of the city’s past in order to justify the merits of imperial assistance. Instead, these
statements explain the enormity of the financial barrier to rebuilding one of the
important centers of Roman Asia Minor in the wake of the recent earthquake.
According to this letter, the city required the financial resources only the Emperor
could provide.
This point receives further emphasis a few paragraphs later in a discussion of
the now sunken temple that had been dedicated to the worship of the imperial cult.
Aristides wrote, “Perhaps it could recover this temple through the help of Asia if you
approve, but the restoration of the whole city belongs alone to you, to whom the gods
have given such great resources” (ôïØôïí ì¥í ïÞí êáÂ äé ôòzÁóßáò êïìßóáéô’ í Çóùò, í
ßìÃí äïê± ä¥ ôäí Óëùí ¦ðáíüñèùóéò ìüíùí ßìäí, ïÍò ïÊ èåïÂ ô ôçëéêáØôá ðÝäïóáí, Or.
19.13). It seems clear from this claim that Aristides wanted Marcus Aurelius to
think that the entire province of Asia lacked the economic ability to rebuild Smyrna.
The true nature of Aristides’ interest in asking for imperial assistance lay in the
financial costs needed to resurrect the city from the rubble. Rome alone had the
financial resources that this terrible situation demanded.
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The second perspective that emerges from the missive to the Emperor is
Aristides’ recognition of the relationship between the imperial will and the needed
aid he could provide. Smyrna did not have to re-emerge from this catastrophe. If it
received any imperial aid, it would do so because the Emperor wanted to help it.
Aristides recalled a well-known incident, at that time, from the previous ruling
dynasty wherein the imperial will wished the Nasamones out of existence (ì¬
âïýëåóèáé Íáóáìäíáò åÉíáé, Or. 19.9). The unattributed quote refers to a rebellion by
the Nasamones during the reign of Domitian, an event later recorded by Cassius
Dio. The Nasamones revolted against Rome because the Romans began to collect
taxes forcibly from those subject to the exactions. The Nasamones killed the taxcollectors, forcing Flaccus, the governor of Numidia, to suppress the uprising by force
of arms. Once Flaccus had succeeded in quelling the rebellion, Domitian is said to
have reported to the Senate, “I forbade the Nasamones to exist” (Íáóáìäíáò ¦êþëõóá
åÉíáé, Cass. Dio 67.4.6). Although he omitted the historical specifics, the orator’s use
of the story remains obvious. Smyrna would rise from the ruins of the earthquake
only if Marcus Aurelius wished for it to do so (Or. 19.9). And, in this admission, he
not only showed proper deference to the authority of the position of the Emperor, he
also recognized that the Emperor had the power to reconstitute the city with
imperial coin, but only if Marcus and Commodus wanted the city to be rebuilt.
It is the acknowledgment of the connection between the imperial will and the
state treasury that motivated him to write, “having indicated that you want Smyrna
to exist, you will speedily show to all of us what we desire” (ðñïäåßîáíôåò Óôé âïýëåóèå
Óìýñíáí åÉíáé, ôá÷Ýùò ðáóéí ºìÃí Ô ðïèïØìåí äåßîåôå, Or. 19.9). Thus, Aristides’ letter
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reflects an understanding that rebuilding the city required more than imperial
monetary assistance, it also demanded the emperor’s personal will for the city to
revive. Securing the necessary financial aid was, then, secondary to winning the
imperial will.
Smyrna no doubt sent formal messengers to request aid, but the extant
sources are biased toward the effect of Aristides’ letter to Marcus Aurelius. Aristides
did not write with any official sanction, and if Aristides’ personal correspondence
with Marcus Aurelius did motivate him to act on behalf of the city, it shows that
imperial aid could be granted outside of the rituals that had customarily governed
the imperial relationship with the provincials. Finally, the nature of his
correspondence with the Emperor shows that Aristides recognized the superiority of
the Emperor in deciding whether or not Smyrna should continue to exist. Receiving
the funds for reconstruction, therefore, only could occur if the Emperor concluded it
was in his, and the Empire’s, best interest for the city to recover from the
earthquake and fire.
The work of reconstructing Smyrna progressed to such a degree in 178 CE
that the provincial assembly was able to meet in the city that year.68 For this
occasion, Aristides composed a speech in which he remarked upon the progress of
the reconstruction of the city’s buildings and the restoration of its civic life.
Evidence of the ongoing rebuilding can be seen in his praise of the emperors Marcus
Aurelius and Commodus of whom he writes, “Because of their love for the existing
city, they did not think that they should move it, but they are restoring it upon its
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remains” (metaqeÃnai m¥n gr oÛk ²x\wsan §rwti tV ßparcobshV, oÊ dz ¦pÂ tän Æcnän
¦ge\rousin, Or. 20.20). This statement not only indicates that the restoration of the
city took place upon the remnants (tän Æcnän) of the destroyed city, but it also shows
the process of raising (¦ge\rousin) Smyrna from its ruins remained underway.
Aristides also refers to the restoration of Smyrna’s famous harbors. He
writes, “The harbors are getting back the embrace of their most beloved city, and it
in turn is adorned by them” (kaÂ d¬ limXneV te kom\zontai tV tV filtVthV p`lewV
gkVlaV kaÂ pVlin [aÞ] kataskosmeÃtai, Or. 20.21). This statement implies the
reconstruction of the harbors and the city progressed together, making it possible for
the harbors to adorn (kom\zontai) the city while the city enjoyed the renewed
existence of the harbors.
It is unknown when the reconstruction of Smyrna ended. But, by the time
Aristides penned his “Smyrnaean Oration” (Or. 21), he wrote of the restoration of the
city as a past event. The date for this work ranges from as early as 179 CE to as late
as 184 CE.69 Aristides most likely wrote this oration to welcome a new provincial
governor to “the city now restored for us” (ôò íØí íéïýóçò ºìÃí ðüëåùò, Or. 21.1).70
The speech recapitulates the rise and fall of Smyrna throughout its history, and
within that framework discusses the more recent travails experienced because of the
earthquake. After recounting the superior beauty compared to all other Greek cities
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Smyrna had before the earthquake, he now brags “then it was superior to other
cities, but now, one might almost say, to itself” (ôüôå ì¥í ãñ ôò ëëáò ðüëåéò, íØí ä’
áÛô¬ ó÷åäÎí ñò åÆðåÃí ¦áõô¬í íåíßêçêåí, Or. 21.11). Thus, for Aristides, the city had
emerged from the rubble and ashes in a greater condition than its previous form
because of the greatness of its new founders, the Roman emperors. 71

Conclusion
Euergetism permeated the entire process of Roman disaster assistance. The
system of exchange served as the framework through which the cities petitioned the
emperors for aid and the emperors reciprocated with their financial assistance. The
provincial cities, especially, had no claim to be entitled to receive an emperor’s help
for rebuilding their cities. Thus, to receive aid, the cities had to petition the
emperors of their own accord.
The cities of the Greek world were particularly interested in obtaining funds
necessary for the reconstruction their important civic buildings. They also wanted to
earn concessions that gave them a reprieve from their tax obligations. Therefore,
they actively sought to cultivate a special relationship with the emperors through
requesting to build temples for the imperial cult and praising the emperors’ divine
powers to rebuild after catastrophes. By following the long orchestrated norms of
euergetism, the Greeks showed their subservience to Rome and encouraged the
emperors to make future benefactions. Nevertheless, individual Roman emperors
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also had their own reasons for supplying aid to their subjects. The motives that lay
behind their responses will be the focus of the rest of this dissertation.
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Chapter 4
The Process of Relief

Introduction
At 5:23 A.M., December 28, 1908, a severe earthquake and subsequent
tsunami devastated the Italian harbor city of Messina, Sicily. The shocking number
of casualties, numbering more than 100,000, gained the attention of international
media. Despite the earthquake happening before governmental emergency agencies
became prevalent, the people of Sicily benefitted from the support of relief
organizations like the Italian Red Cross which immediately set up field hospitals
and sent trains and ships staffed with medical personnel to care for the injured. The
American Red Cross gave $48,000 to purchase materials and build houses for
survivors. American citizens donated over one million dollars to aid the American
Red Cross in its relief efforts, and the United States Congress appropriated $800,000
for direct assistance to the people of Sicily. 1
The international response to this disaster has comparative value with Roman
antiquity. In 1908, the proliferation of the automobile, the ubiquity of mass media,
and the invention of modern communication devices had yet to initiate a total
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transformation of human travel and communication.
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Yet, the Sicilians and Italians

experienced a near immediate response from the Italian government, the US
Congress, and major relief organizations. This outpouring of volunteer aid came
without the survivors making formal appeals to any government or private
individual. They received help at the most critical time, immediately after the event,
and were supplied with the necessary medical care and shelter so vital to
survivability following such a catastrophe.
The Romans did not have independent aid societies or a Roman Emergency
Management Agency to plan for eventual disasters, deploy medical supplies, provide
transportation services, or construct housing for a catastrophe’s unfortunate victims.
Roman assistance mainly took the form of imperial monetary grants and tax
remissions and resulted from the protocols for securing euergetism and patronage
established in the Hellenistic period and the Roman Republic.
Disaster relief also exposed the inequalities within the Roman world. Those
who lived in Rome had the likelihood of an emperor’s immediate response because in
the early Empire, Rome was the center of the emperors’ lives. But people living in
cities other than Rome were left to themselves to handle the immediate recovery
from an earthquake, fire, flood, or volcanic eruption. In provincial cities, the
oppressive Roman tax system stood as a barrier to recovery. Provincials could
obtain assistance from the Emperor, but securing his aid required submitting a
formal request and making an elaborate, even emotive, case for the worthiness of a
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city to receive the Emperor’s largesse. Outside of Rome, then, disaster assistance
from the state depended upon the community’s voluntary petition for imperial help.
Consequently, disaster relief in the Roman Empire amounted to a disjointed effort
that included private individuals, neighboring cities, and the state in the person of
the emperor. There was little collaboration between these entities.
Receiving imperial help also depended upon a city’s status from the emperor’s
vantage point. This chapter will examine the stages of disaster recovery, explain
how the Roman state was involved in providing aid during those stages, and it will
describe the processes provincials went through to receive the emperor’s aid.

Stages of Recovery
Modern studies of disaster relief provide a useful framework for
understanding the stages of recovery that follow a disaster, the kind of hardship a
community of people faces at each stage, and the type of aid needed during these
phases to facilitate the long-term rehabilitation of private and civic life. A disaster
stricken area generally undergoes four stages of response and recovery: emergency,
restoration, replacement reconstruction, and developmental reconstruction. 3 These
phases can be applied to ancient disasters to discover when Roman disaster
assistance most often took place, to investigate how imperial responses varied
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between Rome and the provinces, and to illuminate why people living in Rome’s
empire looked to the emperor for recovery aid.
Stage I
During the emergency phase, the relief efforts focus on the survivors and the
recovery of victims. Search and rescue operations take place. Debris and rubble are
removed, if possible, to prevent additional casualties and to facilitate efforts to locate
trapped victims. After a disaster has disrupted local social and economic systems,
those who survive become increasingly vulnerable to secondary disasters like
starvation and exposure. Therefore, during the emergency stage, “relief is
principally concerned with temporary shelters, medical treatment, food and clothing.
The underlying assumption is that, without this kind of assistance, the conditions of
the victims will deteriorate to such an extent that their lives will be in immediate
jeopardy.”4 This stage may last for many weeks depending upon the type and
severity of the disaster.
The ability of a Roman emperor to give assistance in the emergency phase
depended upon the locus of the extreme event. During this stage, early emperors
routinely gave help to the city of Rome, but time and space created a lag in
communication and response time preventing emperors from aiding the rest of Italy
or the provinces at this critical juncture.

Rome in the Early Empire
Nero’s aid to Rome’s residents during the Great Fire of 64 CE provides a more
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useful illustration of an emperor giving emergency assistance during an evolving
hazardous event. The fire, which began on July 19, burned for five consecutive days
before it temporarily subsided. When the blaze first began, Nero was in Antium
(modern Anzio), a resort town located some 38.5 miles outside of the city of Rome.
Tacitus says he showed little interest in returning to the city until he learned the
fire was on a course to destroy his Palatine home which connected to the gardens of
Maecenas (qua Palatium et Maecenatis hortos continuaverat, Tac. Ann. 15.39.1).
Tacitus gives a vivid account of the aid Nero gave to the city once he returned
from Antium. He writes:
sed solacium populo exturbato ac profugo
campum Martis ac monumenta Agrippae,
hortos quin etiam suos patefecit et subitaria
aedificia extruxit quae multitudinem inopem
acciperent; subvectaque utensilia ab Ostia et
propinquis municipiis pretiumque frumenti
minutum usque ad ternos nummos (Ann.
15.39.2).
But, as a relief for the evicted and fugitive
people, he opened up the Plain of Mars and
the monuments of Agrippa, in fact even his
own gardens, and he set up improvised
buildings to receive the destitute multitude;
and comestibles were sailed up from Ostia
and nearby municipalities, and the price of
grain was reduced to three sesterces (trans.
Woodman).

Based upon this passage, Nero’s emergency relief measures can be divided into two
categories: shelter and food. The fire displaced many people from their homes
creating a multitude of refugees. For these evacuees, Nero opened (patefecit) the
Campus Martius (campum Martis), the monuments of Agrippa (monumenta
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Agrippae), and his own gardens (hortos suos). He also had temporary shelters
(subitaria aedificia) constructed (extruxit) to house (acciperent) the helpless
mulititude (multitudenem inopem).
The fire destroyed all but four of Rome’s districts, and it no doubt disrupted
the city’s available supplies of grain. In his biography of Nero, E. Champlin
speculates that the destruction would have created the need for “the temporary
feeding and housing of perhaps 200,000 homeless.”5 Nero, therefore, tried to manage
both the supply and cost of food to prevent further loss of life caused by starvation
and to avoid a dramatic spike in the price of grain (Ann.15.39.2). To insure the
people of the city had access to adequate food supplies, food stuffs (utensilia) were
transported (subvecta) from nearby Ostia and other neighboring towns. From
centuries of experience with floods and fires, the Romans understood that
catastrophic events, like the Great Fire, increased demand for strained grain
supplies thereby causing the price of basic food stuffs to skyrocket. To avoid an
exorbitant rise in the cost of grain, Nero implemented price controls by reducing its
cost to three sesterces (pretiumque frumenti minutum usque ad ternos nummos, Ann.
15.39.2).6
Despite the important role emperors played in supplying relief in Rome
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during the immediate recovery phase, disaster aid remained ad hoc. The sources
offer no indication Roman emperors considered it necessary to have state agencies
prepared to offer emergency assistance to people. Yet, the existence of imperial
assistance did not monopolize emergency aid or exclude private action. Instead,
individuals and families bore the primary responsibility for search and rescue and
provided the medical care needed by the victims.
When a makeshift amphitheater, constructed by a freedman named Attilus,
collapsed in Fidenae in 27 CE, between 20,000 (Suet. Tib. 40) and 50,000 (Tac. Ann.
4.62) spectators died or suffered significant injuries. 7 Tacitus (Ann. 4.63) describes a
desperate and chaotic scene that unfolded when word of the tragedy spread and
loved ones converged on the site to search for their friends and relatives. To rescue
the living and recover the lifeless, it was first necessary to remove the rubble.
Although Tacitus does not specify who cleared the ruins (ut coepere dimoveri obruta),
the context indicates the people moved the debris as part of the process of rescuing
and recovering bodies of those dearest to them.
Those who suffered bodily trauma received swift medical attention in the
homes of Rome’s elite families. Tacitus recounts the help the victims were given:

7

There are two seminal literary analyses of Tac. Ann. 4.57-67 that discuss Tacitus’
fascination with war scenes. A.J. Woodman has shown that Tacitus uses a “captivecity topos (urbs capta topos) to compare the Fidenae disaster to Rome experiencing
a military seige. See A.J. Woodman, “Remarks on the Structure and Content of
Tacitus, Annals 4.57-67,” CQ 22, no.1 (May 1972): 150-158. Elizabeth Keitel applies
Woodman’s scholarship to Tacitus’ disaster narratives showing Tacitus’ fixation
with sudden disasters and demonstrating his use of the urbs capta topos to portray
Tiberius in the worst possible way. See Elizabeth Keitel, “The Art of Losing:
Tacitus and the Disaster Narrative,” in Ancient Historiography and Its Contexts:
Studies in Honour of A.J. Woodman, eds. Christina S. Kraus, John Marincola,
Christopher Pelling (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 331-353.

103
ceterum sub recentem cladem patuere
procerum domus, fomenta et medici passim
praebiti, fuitque urbs per illos dies
quamquam maesta facie veterum institutis
similis, qui magna post proelia saucios
largitione et cura sustentabant. (Ann. 4.63)
But as an immediate response to the disaster
the houses of the aristocracy were thrown
open and dressings and doctors made widely
available, and the City throughout those
days, though of sorrowful appearance,
resembled the established customs of the
ancients, who after great battles gave support
to the injured with lavishness and care
(trans. Woodman).

This account indicates the victims received prompt treatment by doctors (medici
passim praebiti) immediately after the event (sub recentem cladem) as well as care to
alleviate (fomenta) their suffering. The search for survivors, the recovery of the
dead, and the treatment of the injured were a spontaneous, frantic effort by selfinterested individuals with neither Tiberius, the army, nor a state institution
present to manage the crisis.
The tragic breakdown of Attilus’ wooden structure at Fidenae happened at an
inopportune time in Tiberius’ political career. He had grown weary of life in Rome
and had retired to Capri (Suet. Tib. 40) to escape the political and social fervor of the
capital (Tac. Ann. 4.57).8 Nevertheless, his absence illustrates that while an
emperor often supplied monetary support to help people recoup their financial
losses, it was usually private individuals who cared for the injured, gave medical
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treatment, recovered bodies, and removed debris. Emergency relief from this
sudden, man-made disaster came from the elites in Rome who gave attentive and
adequate auxiliary aid to those wounded in the collapse. Disaster assistance was a
collective effort of individuals acting to help each other. Whenever the emperors
became involved it was often for their own political benefit rather than for overall
welfare of the people.
In an empire with a clear political and social hierarchy, Rome’s condition took
precedence above all other cities in the Empire. Rome had special significance for
the emperors, especially those who came from the Julio-Claudian and Flavian lines
respectively. Making a tour of the Empire became a more common imperial practice
in the second century as Rome’s importance steadily declined. But the early dynasts
spent much of their time in Italy, particularly in Rome, where they maintained the
imperial court and interacted among Rome’s elites.9
The kind of relief given by Pompey and Nero should be seen in the broader
context of the evolution of the office of emperor and of the political importance of
Rome to the political aspirations of the early emperors. Disasters in Rome generated
a sense of urgency in the emperors because of Rome’s central place in the political
hierarchy of the Empire. Neglecting Rome in a time of crisis invited challenges to an
emperor’s legitimacy and power.
Consequently, the Caelian Hill fire and Fidenae disaster, both occurring in 27
CE, prompted Tiberius to abandon his retirement in order to return to Rome to give
financial assistance to the survivors of those tragedies (Tac. Ann. 4.63). In 80 CE,

9

ERW, 18-23.
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when Titus (r. 79-81 CE) learned of a major fire outbreak in Rome, he abruptly
ended his Campanian tour of the destruction caused by the recent Vesuvius eruption
so he could rush to the capital to supply monetary aid to the victims (Cass. Dio,
66.24.1).10
The absence of a petitioning process for obtaining imperial assistance also
signifies the supreme status of Rome and Italy. There is no indication from the
sources that Rome or the municipalities of Italy had to send embassies to the
emperor to request his financial support. Instead, an emperor, like Titus in 80 CE,
only needed to be informed a disaster had stricken the capital city in his absence,
and he returned to give the assistance the situation required. Even when an
emperor was not present to give emergency relief to the inhabitants of the city, they
assuredly knew he would invest in the long-term revitalization and reconstruction of
the city’s damaged regions in order to facilitate a full economic and civic recovery.
Emergency aid in Italy
Beyond Rome, those in harm’s way received no imperial aid during the initial
phase of recovery. The Elder Pliny (d. 79 CE), as commander of the imperial navy,
did attempt to rescue as many people as possible during the 79 CE Vesuvius
eruption. At the time of the eruption, Pliny was stationed with the navy at Misenum
(modern Miseno), 20 miles southwest of Naples. He owned a villa there, and his
sister and nephew, the Younger Pliny, accompanied him to the family estate where
they too experienced the pre-eruption earthquakes and witnessed the eventual

10

An in-depth discussion of Titus’ visit to Campania and its sequential relationship
to the 80 CE fire in Rome will occur below in ch. 5.
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super-explosion that claimed thousands of lives across Campania (Plin. Ep. 6.16;
6.20).
When Vesuvius first exploded, Pliny the Elder noticed the large plume above
the mountain and decided to make a closer observation of the phenomenon. As he
prepared to leave, he received a letter from a concerned woman named Rectina. The
Younger Pliny describes the events as follows:
Egrediebatur domo; accipit codicillos Rectinae
Tasci imminenti periculo exterritae - nam
villa eius subiacebat, nec ulla nisi navibus
fuga -: ut se tanto discrimini eriperet orabat.
Vertit ille consilium et quod studioso animo
incohaverat obit maximo. Deducit
quadriremes, ascendit ipse non Rectinae modo
sed multis - erat enim frequens amoenitas
orae - laturus auxilium (Ep. 6.16).
He was leaving the house; he received a letter
from Rectina the wife of Tascius11 who was
terrified by the imminent danger – for her
villa was at the foot of the mountain, and
there was no fleeing except by ships – she
asked that he might rescue her from the
hazard. He changed his plan and what began
with an inquisitive spirit ended with bravery.
He led the quadriremes, he personally
embarked intending to bring aid not only to
Rectina but also to many others – for [the
area] was crowded due to the pleasantness of
the region.
The Elder Pliny’s embarkation to save Rectina and many others(ascendit ipse
non Rectinae modo sed multis) is an example of his intention to give emergency
assistance during the Vesuvius eruption. Yet, like the earlier response by
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For a detailed discussion on the identity of Rectina’s huband as Tascius, see the
comments in A.N. Sherwin-White, The Letters of Pliny (London: Oxford University
Press, 1966), 373.
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individuals at Fidenae, Pliny the Elder’s actions were motivated as much by
personal concern as by official capacity. Pliny knew Rectina because their families
were friends.12 Her personal correspondence prompted him to use the resources at
his disposal as naval commander to save her and others. Despite having comm
Roman navy, Pliny took these actions independently without any direct
communication from the Emperor Titus. Thus, rescue assistance happened
extemporaneously because of individual choices, not at the direction of the state’s
ruler.
Emergency aid in the provinces
There are no examples of the Roman state giving emergency aid in the
provinces. People living in provincial cities relied upon each other. Cities also
assisted one another. Such inter-city aid, especially in the Greek east, mirrored
similar developments among Greek cities during the Hellenistic period. 13 In 177 CE,
the city of Smyrna suffered from a devastating earthquake.14 The Greek cities of
Asia and Europe responded by offering the Smyrnaeans food, shelter, and modes of
travel to escape their fallen city. The Second Sophistic orator and citizen of Smyrna,
Aelius Aristides (d. ca. 181 CE), provides a graphic picture of the kinds of immediate
assistance the citizens of Smyrna received from their fellow Greeks. He writes:
ãïñáÂ ì¥í ðáíôá÷üèåí ôïÃò êáô ÷þñáí ìÝíïõóéí
12

For the relationship between the families of Rectina and Pliny, see SherwinWhite (1966), 373.
13

The Rhodian earthquake of 227 BCE illustrates the development of the process of
petitioning for aid and was discussed in the previous chapter.
14

See chapter 5 below for a fuller discussion of this earthquake event and the
narratives associated with it.
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¦ê ãò êáÂ èáëÜôôçò åÆóáöé÷íïýìåíáé, ìéëëá ä¥
êáÂ óðïõä¬ ôäí ©êáôÝñùèåí ìåãßóôùí ðüëåùí,
êáëïýíôùí ôå ñò áßôï×ò êáÂ Ï÷Þìáôá êáÂ ðïñåÃá
¦ðéðåìðüíôùí, §ôé ä’ ïÆêÞóåéò êáÂ óõíåäñßùí
êïéíùíßáò êáÂ ðÜóáò öïñìò ðáñáóêåõáæüíôùí,
òóðåñ ãïíåØóéí ´ ðáéóÂí áÛôäí, ðáñáðë¬óéá ä¥
êáÂ ôäí ìåãÝèåé ì¥í ðïëåéðïìÝíùí, ðñïèõìßáò ä¥
êáÂ ôéìò ïÛä¥í ¦ëëåéðüíôùí (Aristid. Or. 20.16).
There were markets which came from
everywhere, by land and sea, for those who
remained on the spot, and there was the
rivalry and zeal displayed by the greatest
cities on each continent, inviting the refugees
and dispatching wagons and other means of
conveyance, and also providing housing, a
share of their council chambers, and every
other means of assistance, as if for their own
parents or children; and the same was done
by those who were less great, but wanted
nothing in their enthusiasm and their show of
honor (trans. Behr).

Providing the survivors of the earthquake with food and supplies (ãïñáÂ)15
became the initial way the Greek cities of Asia and Europe helped those who wished
to remain near the fallen city. Competing with one another by preparing
(ðáñáóêåõáæüíôùí) houses (ïÆêÞóåéò) for refugees and sharing the use of their civic
buildings (óõíåäñßùí êïéíùíßáò ) for Smyrnaeans to hold council meetings was a
second way the biggest cities on the two continents contributed to the relief of
Smyrna.16 Sending (¦ðéðåìðüíôùí) vehicles (Ï÷Þìáôá êáÂ ðïñåÃá ) to transport those
who wanted to leave Smyrna served as the final means of emergency aid offered by
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In his translation, Behr translated goraÂ with the term “markets”, but it seems
the term “supplies” would reflect the intended sense of the term in this context.
16

In Or. 20.17, Aristides says even lesser cities welcomed (äÝîáóèáé) refugees into
their cities as settlers (óõíïßêïõò).
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Smyrna’s neighbors to the earthquake’s victims.
Emergency assistance mirrored another growing trend within the imperial
system, namely, the consolidation of state functions in the person of the emperor.
When the state responded at this point in a crisis, it was because the emperor was
present. When the emperor was not nearby, the state did not provide immediate
help. Cities had to organize their people, and individuals acted instinctually to aid
one another with little expectation of state intervention.
Rome’s network of roads and the imperial post system eased travel and
communication throughout the Empire, but the speed of travel posed an impediment
to rapid recovery response especially in the provinces.17 Also the imperial
bureaucracy in the provinces was not designed to respond to local disasters. It
primarily collected taxes from the cities and maintained peace. Provincial governors
made an annual circuit of select cities, called assize or conventus cities, to adjudicate
local cases, but they did little, if anything, to help during crises. 18
In 22 out of 47 known earthquake events that took place in the early Roman
Empire, either no imperial aid was given, or no known source remains to attest to
the emperor’s beneficence. When a famine crippled Jerusalem between 45-47 CE,
during the reign of Claudius, it was neither the Emperor nor the governor of Judea

17

For a detailed description of the Roman system of roads and the difficulty of
travel, see Ludwig Friedländer, Roman Life and Manners Under the Early Empire,
7th ed., trans. by Leonard Magnus (London: Routledge, 1908), 268-286.
18

On the limited role of a provincial governor see also Fergus Millar, “State and
Subject: the Impact of Monarchy,” in Rome, the Greek World, and the East, ed.
Hannah M. Cotton and Guy M. Rogers, vol. 1 (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 2002), 296.
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who eased the conditions for its inhabitants. Food for the people came from Helena,
Queen of Adiabene, who had her servants purchase grain in Alexandria and dried
figs from Cyprus. (AJ, 20.51).19 Provincials had to rely upon such local acts of
kindness and the goodwill of other cities to get through the initial hardships caused
by an extreme hazard. Therefore, if it arrived at all, Roman assistance came during
the later stages of recovery.
Stages II-IV
Once the immediate needs of survivors are met and the initial search and
recovery attempts have ended, a recovering community transitions to the restoration
phase of relief. Three important things happen at this point. First, structures that
remain standing but that have become structurally unsound are torn down to
prevent additional casualties. Second, damaged public utilities and private
residences receive necessary repairs. Third, the survivors of the tragedy who sought
vital resources and shelter in nearby communities begin to return, if they return at
all. It is at this point that some degree of normalcy resumes for a community. 20
In the third phase, the reconstruction-rehabilitation period, the economic
vitality of the stricken area returns to pre-disaster levels. The damage caused by
the disaster to houses, local government services, if they existed, and the local

19

Acts 11: 28 calls this a “worldwide” famine. Pliny (HN, 5.58) claims the largest
known flood of the Nile occurred during Claudius’ reign. This may have contributed
to the famine. See also Barbara Levick, Claudius (New Haven and London: Yale
University Press, 1990), 179. Levick also suggests that Claudius could not respond
to the famine because it was a type of disaster that required speed. An
indispensible explanation of the evidence for and scope of this famine occurs in Jack
Pastor, Land and Economy in Ancient Palestine (London: Routledge, 1997), 151-156.
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See Kent (1987), 12 on the return to normalcy.
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economy becomes negligible. Survivors are able to obtain gainful employment again,
and the infrastructure necessary for future economic success is restored.
The last recovery stage, in the Kates-Pijawka model, is called developmental
reconstruction. At this point, most or all of the post-disaster rehabilitation has
taken place. Now, cities mark the occasion of the extreme event by constructing
monuments or buildings to commemorate the disaster. Communities begin to see
the areas most adversely affected by the disaster develop beyond pre-hazard levels.
It is also at this time that local leaders and experts assess vulnerabilities and create
strategies or erect barriers to increase the resiliency of the community. 21

Modes of Recovery Assistance
Most Roman disaster assistance outside of Rome came during these later
phases of recovery in the form of economic aid designed to stimulate local
reconstruction. The literary and epigraphical evidence attests to four kinds of
financial help: monetary gifts, tax remission, foregoing inheritances (bona caduca),
and the appointment of one or more Roman senators to oversee the reconstruction of
the damaged area. It is clear these became established methods of disaster
assistance, and Roman emperors repeated the relief measures utilized by their
predecessors. Therefore, these forms of disaster relief became precedents and gave
later emperors a range of options for giving aid depending upon the severity of local
damage and the exigencies of their political situation.
The emerging literature on the topic of Roman disasters lacks a deeper
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Kent (1987), 12.
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analysis of the methods of disaster assistance. Toner’s chapter wherein he discusses
how the Romans dealt with the aftermath of disasters exemplifies the current state
of the scholarship. He observes that “assistance could be in the form of cash, a tax
rebate, the cancellation of debts, or acts such as the advancement of civic status.” 22
Unfortunately, he offers no specific case studies that show the circumstances under
which gifts of cash, tax rebates, and a cancellation of debts occurred. He also offers
no explanation of what he means by aid “in the form of cash.” It is true that Roman
emperors gave grants of money as a form of disaster aid, but the current scholarship
rejects that hordes of coin were sent to disaster stricken cities. 23 In addition, he does
not address whether these grants were the same in all cases or whether they might
differ in amount depending on local needs. He also ignores altogether the use of
inheritance money as a method of disaster relief. Toner’s work illustrates that
greater contextual analysis of these methods is needed to provide a clearer and more
nuanced understanding of these forms of assistance.
Mitchell gives an excellent overview of occasions when monetary grants and
tax remissions for disaster assistance were used in the eastern provinces, but he
leaves larger historical questions to be answered.24 For example, were monetary
grants given proportionally based upon the degree of damage and loss, or did the
emperors earmark gifts for the reconstruction of specific buildings? If they were
given proportionally, does the current evidence offer clues about how the damage
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Toner (2013), 53.
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See discussion and references below, especially n.41 in this chapter.
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was assessed? Were there different types of monetary grants for people in Rome
than for provincials? On the matter of tax remissions, were individuals exempted
from paying their yearly dues, or did local communities continue to collect the
annual taxes and reuse, with imperial permission, the money for needed
reconstruction? Finally, under what circumstances did emperors redirect the use of
inheritances for local disaster relief? The following sections of this chapter will
attempt to answer to these questions.
Monetary Grants
Grants of money from the emperor to cities and individuals were the
consistently employed method of Roman disaster relief irrespective of the type and
location of a catastrophe.25 Emperors gave this kind of assistance with great
regularity, and the Greek sources for the early imperial period typically refer to such
grants with the plural term ÷ñÞìáôá, a very general term for money. Augustus
established this precedent for imperial disaster relief when he granted the cities of
Tralles and Laodicea, in Asia, money (÷ñÞìáôá) for the restoration of those cities in
27 BCE (Strabo 12.8.18). Ten years later, he gave money (÷ñÞìáôá ¦÷áñßóáôï) for the
reconstruction of Paphos after an earthquake caused considerable damage to Cyprus’
major city (Cass. Dio 54.23.7). These imperial ÷ñÞìáôá can be classified under two
headings: general and targeted.
General monetary grants are those acts of imperial munificence designed to
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Emperors from Augustus to Marcus Aurelius chose to give disaster aid in the form
of financial grants a total of twelve times. This is the most of any form of
earthquake support. For the commonality of this form of relief see also Mitchell
(1987), 346. See also Hans Kloft, Liberalitas Principis; Herkunft Und Bedeutung
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make money available for disaster rehabilitation but not designated for the
construction of specific structures. Grants of this variety were sometimes doled out
in proportion to the losses of the survivors, and other times they were bestowed
without such considerations. Tiberius’ responses to the Asia earthquake of 17 CE
and the Aventine Hill fire of 36 CE are good examples of general monetary grants
given in proportion to a people’s degree of loss.
After Tiberius learned of the catastrophic earthquake that destroyed twelve
cities of Asia in 17 CE, he promised (pollicitus) 10 million HS (centies sestertium) to
the citizens of Sardis because “the calamity, being harshest in Sardis, attracted to
them most of the sympathy” (asperrima in Sardianos lues plurimum in eosdem
misericordiae traxit, Tac. Ann. 2.47.2). The inhabitants of Magnesia ad Sipylum
were treated similarly since that city followed Sardis in the degree of damage
(proximi damno, Ann. 2.47.3).26 Tacitus’ narrative clearly creates a hierarchy of
need based upon the extent of the earthquake’s effects on the cities. Sardis came
first, Magnesia second, and then the rest of the cities. Sardis benefitted from
Emperor’s largesse the most because its degree of suffering left its citizens with the
most need.
In 36 CE, a severe fire (gravi igne) broke out on the Aventine Hill near the
Circus Maximus (Ann. 6.45.1). The fire started in the area of the Aventine where
the basket-makers’ shops were located, and it destroyed homes and high rise
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Tacitus’ emphasis upon the condition of Sardis and Magnesia is more than
rhetorical flourish. Strabo also pays inordinate attention to suffering of Sardis
(13.4.8) and Magnesia (12.8.18) during this earthquake and the assistance Tiberius
sent them after it.
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apartment complexes (insularum) along its path. Tacitus says the Emperor paid the
value of the houses and apartment buildings (exolutis domuum et insularum pretiis)
damaged in the fire (Ann. 6.45.1). Both Tacitus and Cassius Dio credit Tiberius with
making large contributions to homeowners and apartment tenants to defray the
losses they incurred (Tac. Ann. 6.45.1; Cass. Dio 58.26.5).27 Yet, Tacitus reveals that
Tiberius selected (delecti) four grandsons-in-law (progeneri) to form a board charged
with assessing the value of each person’s loss (aestimando cuiusque detrimento,
6.45.2).28 This response followed the pattern of the Caelian Hill fire in 27 CE when
Tiberius assisted the people commensurate with their losses (tribuendo pecunias ex
modo detrimenti, Tac. Ann. 4.64.1).29 These examples evince a consistent policy, in
Tiberius’ reign, of disaster relief distributions being given proportionally to the
degree of damage an individual or family suffered.
Proportional monetary grants served two important purposes. First, such
distributions were congruent with Tiberius’ frugal management of the state
treasury.30 By having a commission assess people’s private property damage, he
could alleviate their losses at a minimal cost to the state. Second, apportioning
27

The two sources give different amounts for the imperial contribution. Tacitus
valued it at 100 million HS (milies sestertium, 6.45.1). Cassius Dio says it was
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disaster aid commensurately to the degree of destruction enabled the Emperor to
supply the most aid to those with the greatest need. In this scheme, the more a city
or an individual suffered the more imperial money they would receive.
Consequently, although general monetary grants did not require a specific use of
imperial money, emperors did not lavish money on disaster victims haphazardly. By
giving the grants proportionally, the emperors guided the flow of money so it
maximized the assistance they offered.
Targeted monetary grants are imperial gifts assigned for particular uses.
This type of grant typically came during the third or fourth phases of recovery and
was often used to assist a damaged city normalize its economic conditions and
complete needed reconstruction projects through appropriating money for the
construction of buildings. Cities in Asia often sought such grants because the
reconstruction of important civic buildings such as temples, aqueducts, and
gymnasia, which frequently collapsed during earthquakes, required large sums to
complete.31 Therefore, when a source honors an emperor for such works projects, the
assumption is it reflects a community’s commemoration of an imperial financial
contribution to the reconstruction of buildings deemed vital to civic life. 32
The emperor Claudius contributed to the rehabilitation of earthquake stricken
cities in Asia by building specific structures. He rebuilt the temple of Dionysus
(aedem Liberi Patris) at Samos in 47 CE after it collapsed in an earthquake that
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struck the Aegean island.

33

Prior to his death in 54 CE, he also constructed an

aqueduct for the city of Sardis which may have still been rebuilding after the
devastating earthquake of 17 CE. An inscription preserved in both Greek and Latin
reveals that a Tiberius Claudius Demetrius superintended the construction of this
important water supply. The inscription reads:
[Ti. Claudi]us Drusi f. Caesar August[us
Germanicus, pont(ifex) max(imus), trib.
pot(estate) X, [co(n)s(ul) V, imp(erator) X]
XVII, p(ater) p(atriae), [a]quam cibitati
Sardianorum [ex fonte perduxit], [{vac.}] Ti
Cla[u]dio Demetri f. Quirina Apollop[hane
opera curante].
[Ôé. Êëáýäé]ïò Äñïýóïõ õÊÎò ÊáÃóáñ ÓgâáóôÎò
Ãgñìáíéêüò, [ñ÷égñgýò, äçìáñ÷éêò ¦îïõóßáò ôÎ é.r
àðáôïò ôÎ gr], [áÛôïêñôùñ] ôÎ êær, ðáô¬ñ ðáôñßäïò,
àäùñ ðÎ ðçãò ð[ñÎò ô¬í Óáñäéáíäí ðüëéí
äéÞãáãgí], [{vac.}] ¦ñãgðéóôáôÞóáíôïò Ôéâgñßï[õ
Êëáõäßïõ Äçìçôñßïõ õÊïØ Êõñgßíá
zÁðïëëïöÜíïõò] (Sardis 7.1.10 = CIL 3.409 =
IGR 4.1505).
[Tiberius Claudi]us Drusus, the son of Caesar
Augustus Germanicus, [pont(ifex) max(imus),
in the tenth year of his tribunician power, his
fifth year as consul, [in his seventeenth year
with imperial power], father of the country,
[brought] water from a source to [the city of
Sardis], [{vac.}] with Tiberius Claudius
Demetrius son of Qurinia Apollophanes as
superintendent of the work.
This inscription dates to the reign of Claudius, and there is a lack of evidence for
another earthquake in Sardis since 17 CE. Consequently, the scholarly consensus is
that the aqueduct had sustained damage in the 17 CE earthquake and had yet to be
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rebuilt until Claudius gave the funds to do so.

34

Appropriating funds for the construction of specific projects like temples and
aqueducts made the Emperor comparable to a local euergetes. The commemorative
inscriptions to Claudius’ largesse are much more conventional, differing little from
Sardis’ memorial to Julia Lydia’s reconstruction of the temple of Hera after 17 CE. 35
Unlike Tiberius’ earlier ÷ñÞìáôá, Claudius’ grant was not intended to stimulate
broader reconstruction because recovery, especially in Sardis, had progressed beyond
the need for the immediate infusion of capital. Consequently, Sardis must have
asked the Emperor to finance a public works project that enhanced the collective,
communal lives of its citizens.36 No doubt Samos did the same. Therefore, the use of
targeted monetary grants reflects euergetic enhancement rather than economic
stimulation.
Emperors also gave gifts (÷ñÞìáôá) that were neither proportional nor
targeted. Like proportional ÷ñÞìáôá they often were intended to instigate recovery
and rebuilding after hazardous events. Nero sent four million HS to Lugdunum
(mod. Lyon) after a fire destroyed the city and to reciprocate Lugdunum’s offer to aid
Rome following the Great Fire (Tac. Ann. 16.13.3).37 According to the epitome of
34

Construction on this aqueduct may have begun during the reign of Caligula. See
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Cassius Dio, Titus sent “other money” (÷ñÞìáôá ëëá) to encourage the recovery of
Campania in 79 CE (66.24.3). Likewise, Marcus Aurelius gave ÷ñÞìáôá to many
cities especially Sardis when it suffered from the 177 CE earthquake (Cass. Dio
72.32.3). Aristides claims Marcus and Commodus also arranged for other sources of
money (÷ñçÜôùí ðüñïõò ðgägßíõóáí), in addition to their own gifts, to aid the city in
its reconstruction efforts (Or. 20.8). The references to these imperial benefactions
offer no indication of their value, how they were apportioned, or of their purpose.
They only reveal that the emperors contributed money to assist the victims of a
disaster.
Despite frequently mentioning imperial benefactions as a form of disaster
assistance, the sources must be treated with caution on two points. First, too much
can be made of the stated values of the gifts. They are stylized, not actual. In his
analysis of financial figures in the Roman historians, Walter Scheidel concludes,
“”between ninety and one hundred percent of all existing financial numerical data
are merely conventional figures which cannot automatically be accepted as rough
appropriations or rounded variants of actual figures known to the authors.” 38
Scheidel shows that Roman authors preferred to use figures based upon powers of
ten (e.g. ten, one hundred, one thousand, ten million, etc.). 39 Tacitus’ use of the

to which Tacitus refers.
38
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figure ten million HS (centies sestertium; Ann. 2.47.4) for the valuation of Tiberius’
benefaction to Sardis in 17 CE falls within this entrenched, stylized pattern. 40
A Roman historian’s financial figures can be accurate rather than stylizations,
but given the degree to which conventions were followed, it is impossible to
distinguish between precision and convention. Thus, Scheidel cautions that
“practically all numerical references may be no more than indicatory of a certain
order of magnitude.”41 This means that the financial information given by Tacitus in
the above example should not be interpreted too rigidly. The quantity he states
offers little for assessing the true monetary value of Tiberius’ assistance. Instead,
Tacitus uses a literary form to convey that Tiberius gave moderate economic
assistance to rebuild Sardis and Magnesia.

Figure 3

Known Amounts of Imperial Monetary Grants for Disaster
Relief
Early Empire
Year

Cause

Amount (HS)

17 CE

Earthquake - Sardis

10 million

36 CE

Fire relief - Aventine Hill

100 million

53 CE

Fire - Bononia

10 million

65 CE

Fire reimbursment Lugdunum

4 million

Second, there is no clear evidence to ascertain how imperial grants reached
their beneficiaries. Scholars have generally agreed that emperors did not send bags
40
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containing large quantities of currency when they sent aid to the provinces.
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What

other arrangements were made to transport imperial coin to damaged cities remains
unknown. Neither is it obvious how fire victims in Rome received imperial
munificence. This might naturally have been the responsibility of appointed
commissions like the one in 36 CE, but Tacitus only states it estimated damage. He
stays silent on how Tiberius distributed the funds.
Despite the noted problems with the accuracy of the figures given in the
sources, they show, even if stylized, some indication of the value of the gifts and
therefore permit comparison. For example, the HS 4 million granted to Lugdunum
serves as the least known amount given for disaster assistance. Lugdunum received
this gift because they had given money to help the rebuilding of Rome after the
Great Fire of the previous year. Tacitus refers to Nero’s grant as “the same sum of
money which the Lugdunesnsians had previously offered the misfortunes of the
City” (quam pecuniam Lugdunenses ante obtulerant urbis casibus. Ann. 16.13.3).43
In comparative terms, this amount most likely did not represent a substantial cost
for Nero. Suetonius records that he spent the exact same amount, HS 4 million, for
the purchase of headbands for his dinner guests (Suet. Nero 27.3). Since Lugdunum
had sent this amount to assist Rome, we might surmise this represented a
substantial contribution for the city. Consequently, the reimbursement by Nero,
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while comparatively small, might have represented a significant influx of capital to
help that city rebuild.
The amount given by Tiberius to Sardis, HS 10 million, seems rather modest
given the magnitude of the disaster as it is reported in the sources. This amount
equals the value of the subvention that Claudius gave to Bononia to assist its
recovery from a fire. Based upon these very limited figures, it appears that neither
Tiberius nor Claudius spent lavishly on these two respective cities. In the case of
Sardis, the amount Tiberius contributed indicates that the majority of the financial
resources for resurrecting that city from the major earthquake of 17 CE came from
local elites and the tax revenues that he permitted them to keep. 44
In contrast, Tiberius’ grant of HS 100 million following the Aventine fire of 36
CE represents a substantial investment in the rehabilitation of that part of the city
(Tac Ann. 6.45.1). This amount equals the total contribution that Tiberius made to
the state treasury in an attempt to end a credit crisis in 33 CE (Tac. Ann. 6.17.3).
The total is also ten times larger than the grant he made for the recovery of Sardis.
Since we know nothing about the extent of Sardis’ damage in the 17 CE earthquake,
it is impossible to make a direct comparison between the condition of the two cities
and what their needs were. Nevertheless, the size of Tiberius’ grant in 36 CE does
reinforce the idea that the Emperor’s primary concern was the city of Rome, and the
Romans benefitted from the Emperor’s presence in a way that provincials could and
did not.
Tax Remission

44

See discussion on tax remissions below.
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The Romans imposed two main types of direct taxation upon their provincial
subjects: tributum soli and tributum capitis. Tributum soli was a tax upon both
public (ager publicus) and private (ager privatus) land. Land that owed dues to the
state in the form of tithes and rents paid tribute on them to the provincial
administration.45 Civic territories also paid the land tax as ager privatus unless a
community or city had received special immunity from this obligation. The land tax
included quotas on produce and payments on the assessed value of instrumentum
fundi “such as slaves, animals, equipment for cultivating and processing crops, farm
buildings, storage vessels, waggons (sic), boats, [and] grain stored for seed or
maintenance of familia.”46 People in the countryside also paid additional exactions
such as craft-dues (÷åéñùíÜîéïí), a pig tax, and a salt tax.47
Most of the Greek speaking provinces had grown accustomed to the
obligations that were part of tributum soli because the Hellenistic-monarch states
that preceded Roman rule had similar forms of taxation. Rathbone suggests that in
the cases of Asia, Egypt, and Sicily, the provinces for which there is the most
evidence, Rome did not make vast changes to the preexisting methods of taxation. 48
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Thus, as they had done with the system of euergetism, the Romans left unchanged
most of the forms and rates of taxation to which the Greeks had become accustomed.
The Romans also introduced a new form of taxation to the Mediterranean
known as the tributum capitis or poll-tax.49

This was a tax upon the person and

represents the “potent symbol of subjection to Roman rule.”50 This tax emphasized
the hierarchical distinctions stressed by the Romans between the farmers of the
country-side who paid higher rates and those who were urbanites who paid reduced
rates.51 Associated with tributum capitis was the census that took place, depending
on the province, in five, fourteen, and fifteen year cycles.52 The census took account
of all persons dwelling in houses as well as the number of buildings a property owner
had on his property.
Emperors, usually in consultation with the Senate, granted tax remission as
a form of disaster aid. Because Roman citizens had gained immunity from paying
tributum in 167 BCE, this type of assistance was only relevant in the provinces for
provincial cities bore the unequal burden of direct, Roman taxation.53 In light of
existing evidence, temporary tax exemptions for disaster relief rarely happened in
the early Empire and only after severe earthquakes. Emperors used this form of
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disaster aid a mere six times in 47 earthquake events during the first 200 years of
the imperial government.54 Therefore, it may have been “the simplest method” of
disaster relief, but it was sparingly used.55
Figure 4

Tax Remissions for Earthquake Relief:
Early Empire
Year (CE)

Location

Length of Exemption
(yrs)

17

Asia Province

5

23

Cibyra, Aegium

3

47

Antioch, Daphne

unknown

53

Phrygian Apamea

5

120

Aoria, Cyzicus, Nicea,
Nicomedia

unknown

177

Smyrna

10

Giving disaster relief by remitting taxes may have followed a precedent
established by the Senate during the Republic. However, the lone reference to such
senatorial action by comes from the 5th century CE Christian historian, Orosius
whose work serves partly as a compilation of Roman disasters which he made at the
behest of Augustine to counter pagan charges that recent disasters caused by the
Germanic invasions resulted from the abandonment of traditional, Roman religion.56
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See Figure 2.
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Mitchell (1987) calls tax remission “the simplest method” (345). The data for
imperial earthquake responses also do not support his claim that “It was surely
easier and more politic to ask for a remission of debts than for an outright imperial
grant” (346).
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An excellent introduction to Orosius, the sources of his work, its purpose, and
Augustine’s influence occurs in David Rohrbacher, The Historians of Late Antiquity
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He claims that in 121 BCE the Senate remitted the taxes of Catania in Sicily for a
period of ten years after an eruption of Mt. Etna destroyed that city (5.13.1).
Although his section on the history of the Republic used Livy as its main source, no
text of Livy is extant for that period to confirm Orosius’ account. 57
The Senate, as the guardians of state finances during the Republic, had the
power to help the plight of the Catanians. But after Augustus seized control of the
Empire, the management of the treasury came under the auspices of the emperor,
and the power to grant tax immunity as a means of aid became his and his
successors’ prerogative.58 Augustus, who readily gave disaster help, relied upon
monetary grants rather than tax remissions. Although, after the cities of Asia
suffered from earthquakes, in 12 BCE, he did pay the cost of their annual tribute
from his own finances (ôüí ôå öüñïí áÛôò ôÎí §ôåéïí ¦ê ôäí ©áõôïØ ÷ñçìÜôùí ôè êïéíè
¦óÞíåãêå, Cass. Dio 54.30.3). Cassius Dio explains that Augustus took this action
because the province (ôÎ §èíïò) needed (¦äåÃôï) assistance (¦ðéêïõñßáò, 54.30.3). Even
though he did not offer an extensive remission of tax obligations, Augustus did use
easing tax burdens as a way to alleviate additional financial stress upon the
recovering province.

(London: Routledge, 2002), 135-149. See also David S. Potter, Literary Texts and
the Roman Historian (London: Routledge, 1999), 71-72.
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Rohrbacher (2002), 138.

Levick (1999), 107 says Augustus did not work with the Senate to send aid to
Tralles and Laodicea in 27 BCE. Emperors, including Augustus, sought the
Senate’s consulta on monetary grants and tax remissions. See “The Senate and
Senators” in the section below.
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Tiberius made remitting taxes a more common form of disaster aid than did
his predecessor. His gift of a five year tax remission to spark the recovery of Asia
after the 17 CE earthquake established a trend for future tax remissions and
paralleled the Senate’s response to the Catanian catastrophe. Tacitus and Dio
concur that Tiberius remitted taxes for all twelve cities destroyed in the earthquake
irrespective of their degree of damage. Cassius Dio’s shorter version states that
Tiberius remitted “much money from the taxes” (¦ê ôäí öüñùí íåßèç ðïëë) while
Tacitus’ fuller account specifies the length of the remission. Later in his reign, when
the Asian cities Cibyra and Aegium were shaken by an earthquake in 23 CE,
Tiberius, in consultation with the Senate (senatus consulta), exempted them from
taxation for a three year period (subveniretur remissione tribuiti in triennium, Tac.
Ann. 4.13.1).
Claudius, Hadrian, and Marcus Aurelius followed the example Tiberius set
and suspended tax obligations to enable provincial cities to recover from
earthquakes. Claudius twice did this. He lightened the obligations of Syrian
Antioch in 47 CE so the city might rebuild arcades that had originally been built
when Tiberius was emperor (Mal. Chron. 246). He again granted remission in 53 CE
when a sixteen year old Nero secured a five year exemption for Apamea in Phrygia
(Tac. Ann. 12.58.2). According to the troublesome Scriptores Historiae Augustae, a
series of imperial biographies preserved in a 9th century codex, Hadrian routinely
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used remitting taxes to relieve many earthquake shaken cities (tributa multis
remisit, SHA. Had. 21.5-7).59
In 177 CE, the city of Smyrna (mod. Izmir) in Asia Minor suffered from an
earthquake that destroyed its famous harbors, temples, and gymnasia. The
emperor, Marcus Aurelius, had visited the city the previous year and forged a close
bond with it. To assist the restoration of the city’s civic life, Marcus and his son
Commodus, who was now co-regent, granted the city a tax remission for ten years.
In a brief excerpt, Eusebius’ Chronicon states, “Smyrna, a city in Asia, collapsed in
an earthquake, for the renewal of which, immunity from taxes was given for a period
of ten years” (Smyrna urbs Asiae terraemotu ruit, ad cuius instaurationem
decennalis tributorum immunitas data est, 210c).60 This claim is problematic
because the source is late, has no corroboration, and lists an unusually long
exemption period.
Eusebius’ account, however, is not without foundation. Emperors did follow
precedents, but nothing required them to follow the precise ways their predecessors
supplied recovery assistance. Despite the lack of an imperial exemplum for a ten
year tax remission, the Senate had granted Catania an exemption of that same
length in 121 BCE. In spite of coping with fluctuating finances, second century CE
emperors became increasingly comfortable with granting lengthy tax immunities
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A good introduction to the SHA and the historiographical problems associated
with it can be found in Ronald Mellor, The Roman Historians (London: Routledge,
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and Latin translations remain.
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and long-term debt relief as a way to extend favors to Rome and the provinces and to
give disaster assistance.61 Hadrian remitted the debts owed to the imperial and
public treasuries for a fifteen year period (Cass. Dio 69.8.1-2). Marcus Aurelius
expanded Hadrian’s relief for 45 additional years (Cass. Dio 72.32.2). 62 There is also
credibility to the claim of the SHA that Marcus Aurelius regularly remitted (remisit)
tribute and taxes (vectigalia) to ruined towns (oppidis labentibus) as a form of aid
(auxilium, SHA. Marc. Aur. 23.3). It is significant, therefore, that the epitome of
Cassius Dio groups Marcus’ earthquake aid to Smyrna and grants to other cities
with these long-term financial allowances (72.32.2). Hence, a ten year remission to
revitalize Smyrna in 177 CE fits within the broader trend of the tax breaks second
century CE emperors gave the provinces.
From these examples, two significant patterns emerge. First, tax remissions
were granted at the beginning of new tax cycles. From the outset of the Empire, the
tax system followed fifteen year and five year cycles (lustra).63 The five year cycle fits
within a broader fifteen year tax calendar so it is likely some overlap between the
systems occurred.64 Since new tax cycles began with the census, census years permit
an accurate calculation of the beginning of those cycles.
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Augustus held his first two censuses within a twenty year span in 28 BCE and
8 BCE respectively.65 In 47/48 CE, Claudius took another census that corresponded
with the renewal of the Augustan five year lustral cycle. This means that the five
year remission granted to the cities of Asia by Tiberius in 17 CE happened at the
start of a new tax-period. The year 23 CE began the next five year cycle, and in that
year, he granted a three year exemption to Cibyra and Aegium. Claudius’ five year
remission for Phrygian Apamea falls within this framework. This also lends
credibility to a ten year tax immunity for Smyrna after the 177 CE earthquake. Ten
years, a multiple of five, equals two consecutive tax cycles and fits within a broader
fifteen year tax cycle, and the year 178 CE, the year after the earthquake, marked
the beginning of a new five year tax cycle.
Second, tax remissions for disaster assistance were intended to provide shortterm stimulus for reconstruction not permanently alter a city’s tax obligations.
Earthquake damage would have disrupted the tax revenues a city could expect to
collect. Damage to lives and property would have reduced the value of assessments
on property of those living in the cities and those in the ÷þñá. Casualties caused by
quakes would have lessened the number of persons to pay tributum capitis. A
temporary stay of tax obligations for at least one tax cycle would have freed
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Duncan-Jones (1994), 61. These dates establish a baseline from which to
anticipate future census years. Following the 8 BCE census, the new tax cycles, in
a five year cycle, would begin in 3 BCE, 2 CE, 7 CE, 12 CE, 17 CE, and so on.
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additional, local money for rebuilding large civic structures and homes as well as
barns and storage facilities on countryside farms.66
That tax relief was temporary suggests that the Romans recognized their tax
system impeded disaster recovery and, therefore, needed to be lifted so rehabilitation
could occur. Yet, the limited number of years placed on the immunities suggests the
imperial hegemons expected the brief tax hiatus to stimulate a full rehabilitation so
that tax obligations could resume when the next tax cycle began.
Requests for a remission from tax burdens were a regular occurrence
especially by the Greek speaking provinces. Tacitus records that Claudius, in the
year 53 CE, granted an immunity from taxes to the island of Cos and to the city of
Byzantium (Ann. 12.61-63.). This text is instructive because it implies the cities had
to go through an appeals process to obtain these tax remissions similar to the
procedure for obtainging disaster assistance. Both Cos and Byzantium had envoys
who argued their poleis deserved tax immunities because of their past service and
loyalty to Rome.
Claudius shows a familiarity with the historical ties between Cos and Rome
during his discussions with the Senate about granting the island tax immunity.
Tacitus says it was the Emperor who “put forward a motion about granting
immunity to the Coans” (Rettulit dein de immunitate Cois tribuenda, Ann. 12.61.1).
Their appeal for immunity was based upon the same two criteria that the cities of
Asia had used in their debate for the right to house an imperial temple: antiquity
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and service to Rome.
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Tacitus claims Claudius proposed to grant them a remission

of tax obligations “recalling many things about their antiquity” (multaque super
antiquitate eorum memoravit, Ann. 12.61.1). Tacitus later comments that “there can
be no doubt that he could have submitted as evidence their many services to the
Roman people and their allied victories” (neque dubium habetur multa eorundem in
populum Romanum merita sociasque victorias potuisse tradi, Ann. 12.61.2).
During the discussions about a tax immunity for Cos, representatives from
Byzantium also petitioned to be excused from their tax burdens. They too appealed
to Claudius on the basis of their long history of loyalty to the Roman state. The
Byzantians recalled a treaty they had made with the Romans in 148 BCE during
their war with Andriscus, a pretender to the Macedonian throne (Ann. 12.63). They
also cited their offers of assistance to Sulla, Lucullus, and Pompey as well as the the
Caesars (Ann. 12.63). This history of fidelity to Rome and their exhaustion from
recent conflicts won them a gant of a five year tax remission (Ann. 12.63).
Besides the comparative value of the appeals process for tax remission that
Annals 12.60-63 brings to light, it also reveals that Byzantium, and presumably Cos
too, sought relief from a burdensome system. Two times the Byzantine envoys refer
to the “magnitude” of their tax obligations. Tacitus writes they “begged before the
senate to be excused from the magnitude of their burdens” (cum magnitudinem
onerum apud senatum deprecarentur, Ann. 12.62.1). Later, Tacitus claims they
asked for an end to “the pressing magnitude of their burdens” (magnitudine onerum
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urgente, Ann. 12.63.3). Byzantium requested a tax remission because of the
economic effects of Rome’s tax requirements.
There is additional evidence that Roman emperors recognized their tax
system proved onerous for provincials. Both Rostovtzeff and Duncan-Jones cite the
fifteen year tax remission by Hadrian and Marcus Aurelius’ extension of that same
immunity for 45 additional years as evidence of the economic struggle the provinces
faced because of Rome’s tax system.68
This evidence indicates that a disaster exacerbated economic conditions witin
a city or region. Furthermore, disasters, like an earthquake in Asia, gave the
representatives of a city the opportunity to request at least a temporary immunity
from an already burdensome system. The willingness of the emperors to grant tax
remissions demonstrates more than their generosity and liberality. It amounts to a
tacit admission of the onerous nature of their tax system, and it suggests they
understood a temporary pause in tax payments could stimulate economic restoration
whether a disaster had occurred or not. Disasters then represent unique situations
that necessitated economic stimulation through tax relief.
“The city, wherever it existed, was the basic unit for tax-collection.” 69 After
collecting taxes, the local community then relinquished them to the provincial
administration. Brunt has convincingly argued that a grant of tax remissions for
disaster relief only removed “communal liability” for submitting tax receipts to the
provincial fiscus but did not absolve the individual from paying his or her taxes.
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Communal liability refers to the tax obligations of the city as an entity. He cites as
evidence the small fishing community of Gyaros who sent an ambassador to Caesar
“to request a reduction in their tribute; for, he said, they were paying one hundred
and fifty drachmas when they could only with difficulty pay one hundred” (Óôé
ðñåóâåýïé ðåñÂ êïõöéóìïØ ôï öüñïõ: ôåëïÃåí ãñ äñá÷ìò ©êáôÎí ðåíôÞêïíôá êáÂ ôò ©êáôÎí
÷áëåðäò í ôåëïØíôåò, Strab. 10.5.3).70 Brunt also points to Augustus’ grant of a
“remission of one hundred talents of the appointed tribute” (©êáôÎí ôáëÜíôùí öåóéí
ãåíÝóèáé ôïØ ðñïóôá÷èÝíôïò öüñïõ) to the island of Cos in exchange for a painting of
Aphrodite Anadyomene (Strab. 14.2.19).71 These two examples illustrate two poleis
either seeking or obtaining tax remissions as entities, not as individuals of which
these city-states consisted.
Therefore, in the case of tax remissions for disaster assistance, cities
continued to collect tax revenues from individuals but did not have to remit them to
the state.72 They could then reallocate the funds to begin the recovery and
rebuilding process.73 Thus, farmers and non-elites would not have been advantaged
by tax immunity because despite being the most adversely affected by the quake,
they would have seen no reduction in their tax liabilities whatsoever. Consequently,
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“the burden of the reconstruction of towns would have fallen for the most part on the
population of their chora.”74
On the surface, grants of tax immunity appear to help cities and individuals,
regardless of their wealth class, rebuild following an earthquake event. But the
benefits of these tax remissions depended upon how the Roman state granted them.
However, since tax immunities were granted to communities and not individuals,
farmers, merchants, and even city elites had to continue to meet their tax obligations
despite the additional hardship a disaster might have created. Furthermore, by
granting communal immunity instead of individual relief, the emperors received
credit for their benevolent restoration of fallen cities, when in reality they shifted the
rebuilding of those cities to the residents who had the least ability to pay.

Inheritances
Two additional sources of money emperors made available for disaster
recovery came from inheritances bequeathed to the emperor from his friends (amici)
and the estates of those who died with no heir (bona caduca). The practice of
“making one’s friends or allies either partial heir or legatees in one’s will was
continuous from the later republic into the empire.”75 Under the empire, it became
common practice for the emperor to be named at least a partial heir of an elite’s
estate. Those closest to the emperor were expected to name him in their wills. 76
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Along with legacies, the imperial treasury absorbed the estates of those who
died without heirs. By longstanding custom, such lands were considered ‘royal’ and
went into the Fiscus, the technical term for the imperial estate.77 Because this
property became part of the emperors’ personal wealth, they had free use of this
revenue and could report it to the general state treasury (aerarium) or reserve it for
other uses.
Titus unquestionably apportioned these funds for disaster aid to Campania
after the Vesuvius eruption, and in doing so, he may have imitated one aspect of
Tiberius’ response to the Asia earthquake in 17 CE. The account of Suetonius
corresponds to the epitome of Cassius Dio on the details of Titus’ aid following the
Vesuvius catastrophe. Titus opted to send two former consuls to oversee the
rebuilding and he “assigned the property of those killed by Vesuvius for whom there
were no heirs for the restoration of the afflicted cities” (bona oppressorum in
Vesuvio, quorum heredes non exstabant, restitutioni afflictarum civitatium attribuit,
Suet. Tit. 8.4). Likewise, Cassius Dio says Titus helped the region when he “donated
the property of those who died without heirs” (ô ôäí íåõ êëçñïíüìùí ôåèíçêüôùí
¦äùñÞóáôï, 66.24.4).
The early emperors usually followed the example of Augustus and accepted
the wills only of those whom they knew personally.78 They also typically refused to
be the beneficiaries of those outside their inner-circle. Because Campania was a
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popular destination for Rome’s political class, it is unclear whether this property
belonged those who knew the emperor or to a few who did not know him yet made
him their heir. Regardless, what is key here is Titus’ assumption of responsibility
for intestate estates and his reallocation of them for the recovery of the region.
Titus’ response arguably followed an earlier precedent in Tiberius’ relief of
Asia. Unfortunately, the only comparable reference comes from Xilphilinus’
summary of Dio’s history, and the text potentially suffers from a lacuna. It reads:
ôáÃò ôå ¦í ô± ¢óß ðüëåóé ôáÃò ßðÎ ôïØ óåéóìïØ
êáêùèåßóáéò í¬ñ ¦óôñáôçãçêãò ó×í ðÝíôå
Õáâäïý÷ïéò ðñïóåôÜ÷èç, êáÂ ÷ñÞìáôá ðïëë ì¥í ¦ê
ôäí öüñùí íåßèç ðïëë ä¥ êáÂ ðáñ ôïØ Ôéâåñßïõ
¦äüèç: ôäí ãñ ëëïôñßùí Æó÷õñäò, ìÝ÷ñé ãå êáÂ
ô¬í ëëçí ñåô¬í ¦ðåôÞäåõóåí, ðå÷üìåíïò, ìçä¥
ôò êëçñïíïìßáò ò ôéíåò áÛôè óõããåíåÃò §÷ïíôåò
êáôÝëéðïí ðñïóéÝìåíïò, ðÜìðïëëá §ò ôå ôò ðüëåéò
êáÂ ôï×ò Æäéþôáò íÞëéóêå, êáÂ ïÜôå ôéì¬í ïÜôå
§ðáéíïí ïÛäÝíá ¦ð’ áÛôïÃò ðñïóåäÝ÷åôï (Cass. Dio
57.17.7-8).
And to cities in Asia which were damaged by
the earthquake, a praetor with five lictors
was assigned, and much money was remitted
from the taxes and much was also given by
Tiberius: for vehemently rejecting the
property of others, to whatever extent he
practiced any other virtue, and not accepting
the inheritances which some having relatives
left to him, he lavished very much on the
cities and individuals, and accepted neither
honor nor praise at all for them.
The difficult section of this paragraph begins with the explanatory phrase “for
vehemently rejecting the property of others” (ôäí ãñ ëëïôñßùí Æó÷õñäò...ðå÷üìåíïò).
What is unclear is whether this description serves a general character assessment of
Tiberius or offers more details about the Emperor’s earthquake assistance. Tiberius’
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predecessor refused to accept inheritances from those who died having living
children, so this passage may credit Tiberius with similar actions (Suet. Aug. 66.4).79
Not accepting inheritances from people with living heirs also differs from Titus who
appropriated the estates of those without heirs. Nevertheless, we cannot entirely
rule out interpreting Cassius Dio to mean that one source of Tiberius’ ÷ñÞìáôá for
Asia’s restoration came from his refusal to absorb inheritances into his fiscus. Such
action would have established a precedent of appropriating this money for disaster
assistance which Titus later followed.
The Senate and Senators
Under the imperial government, the Senate’s role gradually diminished as the
emperor’s auctoritas increased. However, emperors did seek out the advice of that
body and included it in decisions especially those involving the province of Asia.80 In
cases of disaster relief, emperors consistently involved the Senate and senators in
one of two ways. First, the Senate issued decrees (consulta) on monetary grants and
tax remissions. Tiberius began his political career by appealing to the Senate on
behalf of Chios, Laodicea, and Thyatira after those cities of Asia suffered from an
earthquake in 27 BCE (Suet. Tib. 8). In 23 CE, at Tiberius’ insistence, a senatus
consultum granted Cibyra and Aegium a three year tax remission (Tac. Ann. 4.13.1).
Following the 177 CE earthquake that hit Smyrna, Aristides claimed Marcus
Aurelius and Commodus “became ambassadors on our behalf to the Roman Senate,

79

80

Rogers (1947), 143.

Martin Goodman, The Roman World 44 BC-AD 180 (London and New York:
Routledge, 1997), 94-95. See also Levick (1999), 103 on consulta being mere
recommendations not policies.

139
requesting them to pass decrees for which no one of us would have dared to ask”
(áÛôïÂ ðñÝóâåéò ðåñÂ ºìäí ðñÎò ô¬í ïÇêïé âïõë¬í êáôÝóôçóáí,  ìçäåÂò í ºìäí ¦èÜññçóåí
áÆôóáé, ôáØô’ îéïØíôåò øçößóáóèáé, Or. 20.10).81
These examples suggest the Senate, though meeting only twice per month,
remained at the forefront of Rome’s relationship with its provinces. During the
Republic, provincial cities grew accustomed to informing the Senate of their
condition and petitioning it for needed aid. In order to secure benefits, the cities
relied upon ambassadors to bring their cases before the Senate. In the early Empire,
embassies could now appeal directly to the emperors, or they could be heard in the
Senate.82 This reveals a shift in the hierarchical structure of Roman politics. The
relationship between the emperors and the provinces evolved alongside the
transition of power away from the Senate toward the person of the emperor. In the
early Empire, that process was not yet complete. The emperors worked in
cooperation with the Senate to give disaster assistance.
Senators and magistrates also played an important role as assessors and
overseers of the reconstruction of damaged cities in the provinces and in Italy.
According to Tacitus, Tiberius sent M. Ateius, a senator with the rank of praetor, to
inspect the degree of damage among the ten lesser damaged cities affected by the 17
CE earthquake and relieve them (2.47.4; Cass. Dio 57.17.7). After his hasty
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departure from Campania, Titus selected two former consuls by lot (sorte) and sent
them to the region as to oversee its restoration (curatores restituendae, Suet. Tit. 8;
Cass. Dio 66.24.3).83
What senators did when assigned to these tasks remains difficult to ascertain.
The appointment of official overseers of imperial construction projects occurred
frequently. Hadrian appointed men who oversaw imperial construction in the
provinces under the title curatores operum publicorum dati ab divi Hadriano.
Curatores appear in Greek inscriptions with titles such as ñ÷éôÝêôïíåò, a term
signifying their supervisory role in the building process. Their chief duties were to
“farm out contracts to expedite the procuring of materials and labor, and to keep a
general eye on expenses.”84 However, the use of curatores throughout Italy in order
to prevent excessive expenditure did not become commonplace until after the reign
of Trajan when the appointment of curatores rei publicae for that purpose became a
regular practice.85
Curatores were chosen because each was “someone rich, influential, and
vigorous,” not because they had architectural expertise.86 Perhaps the emperors had
men ready at hand who could be used in the capacity of curatores whenever a need
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for them arose.

87

Thus, they not only protected the imperial coffers from over

expenditure and mismanagement, but financially conscious emperors could deflect
the costs of reconstruction and building to the imperial accounts by utilizing these
men of substantial wealth in a capacity that would enable them to absorb some of
the financial burden.
Although the position and function of the curatores became formalized after
the disasters in Asia and Campania, the tasks with which they were entrusted
resemble the bureaucratic responsibilities of the official curatores of the second
century CE. M. Ateius and the two ex-consuls sent to Campania traveled as
representatives of Tiberius and Titus, respectively, to provide much needed
assistance to the victims of two terrible tragedies.
Modern models for disaster assistance assume the involvement of government
emergency agencies, local emergency personnel, non-government organizations
(NGOs), and international bodies like the United Nations to contribute to providing
relief at all phases following a disaster.88 The Romans, and those living under their
rule, lacked the benefit of these agencies to assist the people who had suffered in a
major disaster. Nevertheless, these examples, while fragmented, demonstrate
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imperial assistance for every recovery stage could be accessed by the inhabitants of
Rome, Italy, and the provinces.

The Provincial Procurement Process
Having established the kinds of aid the Roman state provided after extreme
events, we now focus on how this assistance was obtained. Outside of Rome, Roman
disaster responses were always reactionary and had to be prompted by provincial
petition because only Antioch in Syria, during the reign of Trajan (r. 98-117),
experienced a disaster while the emperor resided within it.
In December 115 CE, the emperor Trajan, while on his Mesopotamian
campaign against the Parthians, wintered with his troops in the great Syrian city of
Antioch. During his stay, a major earthquake hit the region causing the
catastrophic collapse of many civic and private structures in Antioch. 89 Cassius Dio
reports that “many of the people were hurt even those outside of houses” (ôäí ä¥ ä¬
íèñþðùí ðïëëïÂ ì¥í êáÂ ¦êôÎò ôäí ïÆêéäí Ðíôåò ¦ðüíçóáí) and “ some were injured and
others killed” (êáÂ ïÊ ì¥í ¦ðçñïØíôï ïÊ ä¥ §èíçóêïí, 68.24.5). Many of the injured
suffered violently, losing limbs or sustaining head trauma or internal injuries
(68.25.1-2). Falling debris and collapsing buildings crushed those unfortunate who
were unable to dodge the danger. The rubble trapped victims, and though many
were rescued, others died slow deaths due to their injuries or hunger while they
awaited their removal. Trajan himself received injuries during the quake, and he
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only escaped through a window in his room (äéÝöõãå ì¥í äé èõñßäïò ¦ê ôïØ ïÆêÞìáôïò)
with the help of a few able bodied men (68.25.5). According to the 6th century CE
Chronigraphia of John Malalas (d. ca. 570 CE), Trajan rebuilt (§êôéóåí) many
structures in the city including the Middle Gate (ìÝóçí ðýëçí), the theater, a public
building (äçìüóéïí), an aqueduct (ãùãüí), and two large colonnades (ôï×ò äýï ¦ìâüëïõò
ôï×ò ìåãÜëïõò, Dindorf, 275-276).90
It was not extraordinary in the early Empire for an earthquake to destroy a
Greek provincial city. Guidoboni’s Catalogue lists no fewer than 31 known
earthquakes affecting one or more Greek cities from the reign of Augustus through
the reign of Marcus Aurelius.91 But, this deadly earthquake, while tragic for the
people of Antioch, is unique among the disasters that struck the provinces during
the early Empire because it is the only attested occasion that an emperor faced
danger alongside his subjects. Emperors had been present in Rome when the Tiber
flooded, and Titus had visited the damage in Campania following the Vesuvius
eruption, but Trajan experienced the Antioch earthquake first-hand and knew the
kind of assistance the city required.
The typical experience for provincial cities differed significantly from Rome
and Antioch. They had neither the privilege of being the imperial capital (Rome) nor
having the emperor present when an extreme event occurred (Antioch). If they
wanted imperial assistance for rebuilding and recovery efforts, they had to notify
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him that a disaster had taken place and petition him or the Senate for aid. The
voluntary nature of this act is made clear by Laodicea’s choice to rebuild itself
without seeking aid from Rome after an earthquake destroyed the city around 60
CE. (Tac. Ann. 14.27.1).92 Nevertheless, in extremely catastrophic cases like the
earthquakes in Sardis (17 CE) and Smyrna (177 CE), the total destruction of vital
civic infrastructure made the prospect of restoration and recovery unlikely without
significant financial support. In the Roman Empire, there was no greater source of
capital than the state treasuries. Therefore, although asking for the emperors’
assistance reinforced their reduced state within the Roman order, the Greek cities
readily sent embassies to them and the Senate because without access to their
economic resources the civic vitality of their cities could not recover from major
disasters.
In the chaotic aftermath of a disaster, cities in the provinces, especially in the
Greek east, followed an established “pattern of natural disaster, petition, and
imperial response” that “recurs throughout the principate” to access imperial
assistance.93 Central to this process, therefore, was communication between the
emperor and an injured city. Once the decision was made to request an emperor’s
economic intervention, the cities were required to send a representative to make a
formal petition because “no information or request could reach the emperor unless
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either a written missive were physically brought to him or he were addressed
verbally (or, as in many cases, both).”94 Administrative decisions came only at the
end of this ritualized process.95
Benefactors in the Greek cities served as their link to the emperors. Because
travel in the ancient world was costly, appealing for disaster relief required great
expense, and the cities had to fund sending their diplomats out of their own
treasuries.96 In this way, disaster relief exposes additional inequalities within the
Roman system. Only those cities that had the financial means to fund a diplomatic
mission could afford to ask for disaster aid. This helps explain why the larger cities
of Asia Minor received the majority of imperial assistance. They either had enough
funds on hand to finance diplomatic missions or they had elites with the economic
means and political ties necessary to gain an imperial audience. Given the
consistently poor state of Greek city treasuries, local elites became the faces of their
cities.
Since the Augustan succession, Rome insured its control of the Greek east by
establishing relationships with city elites.97 The very elites who represented the
cause of their cities were those with whom the emperors wanted to foster ties of
fealty. When the cities sought imperial disaster aid, both sides were able to benefit
94
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from the transaction. The civic life of Greek cities was restored while the emperors
maintained local loyalty.
Nevertheless, having access to the emperor’s inner circle did not guarantee a
positive outcome to imperial petitions. To improve their chances of obtaining an
emperor’s largesse, the cities needed representatives who had close, personal ties to
the emperors.98 Some cities relied upon the advocacy of members of the imperial
family to receive assistance. Tralles, Laodicea, and Chios benefitted from imperial
÷ñÞìáôá because Tiberius implored (deprecatus est) the Senate on their behalf (Suet.
Tib. 8). Claudius sent a financial gift to Bononia after a fire and granted a five year
tax remission for Apamea based upon Nero’s appeals for them (Tac. Ann. 12.58.2).
In the second century CE, the Greek cities frequently utilized their sophist citizens
to deliver petitions to the emperors.99 After the earthquake of 177 CE, Aelius
Aristides wrote a letter requesting the aid of Marcus Aurelius and Commodus
without waiting for the city to appoint him. Consequently Philostratus later
referred to Aristides as the founder (ïÆêéóô¬í) of the city because his initial
correspondence to Marcus Aurelius about the devastation in the city induced the
emperor to cry (V S 2.9).100
Conclusion
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The Roman imperial state provided disaster assistance to Roman citizens and
provincial subjects. The confines of time, space, and status affected the stage at
which relief came and the amount received. This chapter has demonstrated that
grants of money took a variety of forms depending upon the purpose for the gift.
Emperors also gave tax temporary tax remissions to initiate immediate rebuilding in
disaster stricken areas. In extreme cases, the emperors sent one or two Roman
magistrates to assess local damage and provide additional funding for local
reconstruction.
This chapter has also shown how Roman disaster aid brings to the fore the
inherent hierarchy in the Roman Empire because while the emperors supplied
disaster assistance, they did so in unequal ways. Rome in the early Empire received
the greatest attention from the emperors. Provincial cities received aid, but the
presence of the tax system and the need to petition for assistance reinforced the
secondary status of provincial cities. Thus, those cities relied upon a network of
people close to the emperors to gain his audience and secure his assistance. This
generated additional competition between cities for the honor of being rebuilt by
their Roman suzerains. This process was quite costly for provincial cities, especially
when faced with a dire situation, and made the system of euergetism important
within those cities because they often needed the financial resources of their local
elites to make send their ambassadors to the imperial court.
Finally, this chapter has shown that emperors did not supply the majority of
disaster assistance. The difficult and emotional work of moving rubble, searching
for bodies, recovering the dead, and helping the wounded was left to individuals,
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families, and cities. Even the cities of Asia Minor, who were fond of making appeals
to the emperors, did not request their aid for most of the earthquakes the cities
suffered. Consequently, through the process of relief, we see a voluntary system of
assistance. The emperors helped where and when they wished, and the cities
invoked their assistance when conditions and needed warranted it.
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Chapter 5
Disaster Relief and Imperial Politics

Disasters and Political Perception
In 2011, John Gaspar and Andrew Reeves published an analysis of the US
electorate wherein they found the American public holds governors and presidents
responsible for disaster and weather related events even though politicians do not
cause such events to happen. Their study divided voters’ attitudes into two
competing frameworks: the responsive electorate and the attentive electorate. The
responsive electorate describes people who judge the performance of leaders based
upon “the current state of the world without respect to cause.” 1 Voters in this
category punish politicians because damage has occurred from catastrophic or
weather related events and do not factor the response a politician makes to the
disaster into their perception of his or her quality of leadership.
The attentive electorate pays attention to how politicians react to crises and
holds leaders responsible for their response to the hazard but not the event itself.
The attentive voter also rewards politicians for attempting to respond and punishes
them for poor reactions.
Based upon their analysis of county-level damage estimates aggregated six
month prior to all gubernatorial elections from 1970-2006 and presidential elections
from 1972-2004, Gaspar and Reeves discovered that the US electorate is both
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responsive and attentive. Voters blame politicians for exogenous events and punish
2

presidents and governors at the polls for their occurrence. Yet, their “findings show
that electorates reward governors who act in the face of severe weather damage.” 3
Even when states receive no direct federal aid, voters view governors favorably for
their “intention of declaring a disaster.” Presidents who deny federal disaster
benefits are punished.
Gaspar and Reeves’ analysis resulted in three significant findings. First,
American voters do blame presidents and governors for extreme events that are
otherwise beyond their control.4 Second, they tend to “reward for both observed aid
as well as innuendo of action.”5 Third, “a disaster declaration outweighs all of the
observed cases of damage in terms of electoral benefit.” 6
What Gaspar and Reeeves learned from their study of American disaster
politics reflects broader human attitudes about disasters and disaster responses that
have existed since antiquity and that transcend time and space. Blaming a political
leader when a disaster occurs is neither an American nor a modern phenomenon.
Even in states, like the Roman Empire, where the public has no direct recourse to
remove a political leader from power, disaster relief is vital for the public’s overall
confidence in the leadership abilities of their current leader. A disaster followed by a
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poor response could create public trepidation at the ineffectiveness or incompetence
of political leaders. This could foster strained relations between heads of state and
the people they govern.
Disasters and Political Stability
Disasters have tremendous power to destabilize states, especially when
governments or political leaders prove ineffective at responding to them. Stuart
McCook has recently shown that the powerful March 26, 1812 earthquake in
Venezuela exposed the inability of the government of the First Republic to give
needed relief to victims of that Holy Thursday quake. Since the government did not
adequately respond, Venezuelans concluded it lacked the capacity to govern
effectively. Consequently, many sided with opposition royalist forces who were
fighting the “patriots” of the republican colonial government. The earthquake
hastened the end of the Venezuelan Congress’ control of the republic, and in its place
an executive triumvirate with dictatorial authority assumed power to resolve the
political and environmental crises the quake had exacerbated.7
The earthquake also sparked philosophical discussions over the most
appropriate form of government for Venezuela. Those who favored the royalist
regime of King Ferdinand VII used religion to suggest the earthquake was an
expression of divine anger for Venezuela’s rebellion against the Spanish monarch.8
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In light of the failures of the Venezuelan Republic, Simón Bolívar, the influential
South American political thinker and revolutionary leader, became an advocate for
strong, centralized government to respond quickly and efficiently to emergencies. 9
Hence the quake dramatically affected how people thought about the function of
government and the relationship between divine will and political structure.
Venezuela in 1812 shows the heightened public attention disasters can attract
to governments and political leaders. These events give heads of state opportunities
to demonstrate the quality of their leadership and the effectiveness of their
governments. They also afford them chances to cement their place in the collective
memory of the public. This correlation between public memory and disaster
response existed in ancient societies. During the early Empire, earthquakes and
fires sometimes occurred on occasions when the Roman public and, especially,
Rome’s political elites had grave concerns about their emperor’s ability to carry out
his office. The disaster cast a further shadow over the emperor’s political standing,
and his response to the disaster became integral for changing how the public viewed
him.
This chapter will explore the attitudes the Romans and their subjects had
toward disasters and disaster response. Analyzing their attitudes will illuminate
how important responding to extreme events was in building the political careers of
future emperors and in establishing a sitting emperor’s credibility and legitimacy
when his political capital was diminished or popular sentiment doubted his capacity
to govern. Above all, this chapter will show how the same methods of disaster
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assistance were employed by different emperors, facing their own political crises, to
reassert or remake their public image.

Disasters in Roman Popular and Political Mentalité
Ancient people interpreted physical, cosmological, and seismic phenomena to
portend the direction of the future or offer a divine commentary on the present. 10
Natural events like earthquakes, floods, or fires were indistinguishable from
cosmological signs like eclipses or comets. They were all “harbingers of doom.” 11 At
the least, disasters had the potential to disrupt the delicate balance of an unequal
Roman society. Consequently, disasters adversely affected the emperors because in
the ancient mind they created a direct link between the stability of an emperor’s
regime and his subject’s lives. Among some of Rome’s political vanguard, disasters
raised doubts about an emperor’s capacity to govern or the stability of his reign.
Their occurrence had the potential to undermine his legitimacy.12
An example of the political implications of prodigia comes from Tacitus’ list of
prodigies that occurred at the end of the year 64 CE. He writes:
Fine anni vulgantur prodigia imminentium
malorum nuntia: vis fulgurum non alias
crebrior, et sidus cometes, sanguine inlustri
semper [Neroni] expiatum; bicipites hominum
10
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aliorumve animalium partus abiecti in
publicum aut in sacrificiis, quibus gravidas
hostias immolare mos est, reperti. et in agro
Placentino viam propter natus vitulus, cui
caput in crure esset; secutaque haruspicum
interpretatio, parari rerum humanarum aliud
caput, sed non fore validum neque occultum,
quin in utero repressum aut iter iuxta editum
sit (Ann. 15.47).
At the end of the year publicity was given to
prodigies announcing looming calamities: the
discharge of lightning at no other time more
frequent, and a comet, something always
expiated by Nero with illustrious blood; twoheaded fetuses of humans and other animals,
respectively discarded in public and
discovered during the sacrifices at which it is
the custom to immolate pregnant victims.
And in Placentine territory next to a road a
calf was born whose “head was on its leg”;
and there followed the diviners’
interpretation that in preparation there was
another head of human affairs, but it would
not be effective or concealed, because it had
been suppressed in the womb and delivered
by the wayside (trans. Woodman).
In this paragraph, Tacitus not only provides an impressive list of prodigia
that reportedly happened at the end of the year, but he says the interpreters of such
events directly connected them with Rome’s politics. Nero, he says, habitually
expiated the sightings of comets, no doubt because they had negative implications
for his power as well as the state. 13 Tacitus claims, however, that the interpreters
concluded that the appearance of a calf with its head on its leg portended the
existence of another head of human affairs. In Roman politics, this could only mean
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that Rome would soon have a new emperor. Indeed, since these events happened at
the end of 64 CE, Tacitus knew that the end of Nero’s regime drew near.
According to Davies, the advent of the imperial form of Roman government
transformed the Roman perception of prodigia in two significant ways. First,
prodigies and omens drew greater public attention because they signaled the
potential end of a regime or dynasty.14 Second, the heightened public awareness of
such phenomena made emperors highly sensitive to news of their occurrence, since
reports of catastrophes and cosmic signs could agitate public confidence about the
stability of the current political order. Conversely, the increased exercise of imperial
power against political enemies reduced public discourse on such events with the
exception of those so prodigious they could not be ignored.15
The amplification of the importance of prodigia during the early Empire had
lethal effects for those who wrongly presumed hazards and celestial signs foretold an
imminent conclusion to an emperor’s reign. Tacitus demonstrated the deadliness of
misinterpretation in his narrative of the events of 27 CE. In that year, he explains,
the Emperor left Rome for Capri and “experts in heavenly matters said that Tiberius
had left Rome under such movements of the planets as denied him a return”
(ferebant periti caelestium iis motibus siderum excessisse Roma Tiberium ut reditus
illi negaretur, Ann. 4.58.2).16 The experts’ misinterpretation of the cosmological signs
caused “the extermination of many who inferred and publicized a speedy end to his
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life” (unde exitii causa multis fuit properum finem vitae coniectantibus
vulgantibusque, Ann. 4.58.2).17
While Tiberius was away, four other events occurred that exacerbated the
rumors of the his personal demise (Ann. 4.59.1). First, during his journey to
Campania, the Emperor and his entourage stopped to dine in a cave near the villa
Spelunca. During their dinner, a rockslide buried the mouth of the cave, and
Tiberius escaped injury because Sejanus protected him (Ann. 4.59.2). Second, two
distinguished men of Rome died at the end of the year: Asinius Agrippa and Q.
Haterius (Ann. 4.61). Third, the collapse of Atilius’ hastily constructed
amphitheater at Fidenae killed thousands creating scenes of death, injury, and aid
that Tacitus compares to a time of war (Ann. 4.62-63). Fourth, immediately
following the Fidenae tragedy, a devastating fire burned the Caelian Hill (Ann.
4.64). These events collectively prompted the public to maintain “that it was a fatal
year and that the princeps’s counsel of absence had been undertaken with
unfavourable omens” (feralemque annum ferebant et ominibus adversis susceptum
principi consilium absentiae, Ann. 4.64.1).18
We should not conclude that every hazardous event raised public doubts about
the current emperor. But, Tacitus’ commentary, while dramatized, shows that a
fire, earthquake, flood, or volcanic eruption in the midst of other adverse
circumstances could cause the Roman public to doubt the emperor in light of these
otherwise exogenous events. Pressure especially came from the political elites who
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formed the social circle of the emperors. However, from the outset of the Empire,
Roman rulers learned how to offset the germination of popular concern and to
remake their image in the eyes of their peers.
Toner has observed “that disasters created a threat to the political order
which sometimes required the state to reassert its political strength.” 19 This
statement is only partially accurate. It is true that disasters could generate angst
and unrest among the people of Rome and the provinces. However, Toner does not
specify what he means when he says disasters “required the state to reassert its
political strength.”20 Who or what does he mean by “the state?” If he means the
Emperor as the embodiment of the state, he is correct because the emperors needed
to show strength in the face of disastrous events that otherwise suggested their
weakness. If he intends “the state” to refer to Rome’s ruling elites, it remains
unclear how they might have acted in unison to assert themselves over Roman
society.
Toner’s generalized observation needs refinement for two reasons. First, the
emperors made sure to give disaster relief in Rome because there was little unity
within the elite class. Threats to the security of the emperors did not come from the
lower ranks of Roman society, they came from the elites. Second, the political and
chronological context of each emperor was different. Therefore, it is not enough to
observe ways “the state” tried to reinforce itself. Major disasters need to be
examined within the overall context of the reigns of individual emperors to
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understand why disasters created unrest and why it was vital for a particular
emperor to quell public concern through relieving his suffering subjects. Thus, the
focus must be on individual acts of disaster relief and how they affected the political
image of the current emperor.
Disaster Relief and Political Image
The potential for the public to interpret extreme events negatively made
disaster assistance an indispensable political tool for Rome’s emperors. Since a
disaster could unsettle the order of society, disaster relief became increasingly
important for reestablishing and maintaining balance in a socially imbalanced
world. Imperial generosity became the mechanism emperors used to reorient
popular thinking about disasters so the public might see them as opportunities to
receive imperial gifts rather than as expressions of the anger of the gods (ira deum).
Therefore, by responding to disasters with monetary grants, Roman emperors
transformed the practices of Hellenistic euergetism and Roman patronage into a
sustained method of mitigating popular concerns about their legitimacy or
competency to govern.21
There are examples from antiquity where disaster assistance played an
integral role in reasserting the emperor’s legitimacy to rule or in reshaping public
perception about his capacity to govern. The following section will analyze Tiberius’
response to the Caelian Fire (27 CE), Titus’ reaction to the Vesuvius eruption (79-80
CE), and Nero’s relief measures after the Great Fire (64 CE). Each of these
emperors had to respond to a disaster at a critical time in his reign. For them,
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disaster relief came to be about more than fulfilling one of the civic functions of the
emperor. It was a matter of restoring the political balance of society and their place
at its head.

Caelian Response (27 CE)
Major Sources for Imperial Relief
The two major accounts of Tiberius’ reaction to the Caelian Hill fire come from
Tac. Ann. 4.64.1-2 and Suet. Tib. 48.1. Tacitus’ narrative dramatizes the disaster as
part of a series of ominous events that occurred in 27 CE. In Ann. 4.57-67, he
focuses upon the reasons why those events bolstered the confidence of Tiberius’
opponents and how the Emperor responded to abate growing public concern. 22
Suetonius’ version is much shorter and emphasizes Tiberius’ relief of the victims as
one of only two examples of his public generosity. Thus, these two authors had
competing motives for including this disaster narrative. Tacitus wanted to show
how the emperor benefitted politically from responding to the fire, and Suetonius
tried to demonstrate that Tiberius’ miserliness elucidates his poor character.
Nevertheless, these two accounts, along with a brief comment by Velleius Paterculus
(2.130) permit a sketch reconstruction of the severity of the fire, why the emperor
responded with monetary grants, and who benefitted from his aid.
Overview of the Disaster
Since the time of the Republic, the Caelian Hill was one of the more densely
populated regions of the city making it home to large apartment complexes (insulae)
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that had been constructed to accommodate the influx of people (Suet. Tib. 48).

23

According to Tacitus, the fire that consumed Caelius Mons was extraordinary (ultra
solitum) for a city quite accustomed to significant blazes (Ann. 4.64.1).24 The fire
devastated the area so completely that its social landscape was permanently
transformed. After the fire, the more affluent members of Roman society settled in
the region where they continued to construct large palatial homes through the fourth
century CE.25
It is difficult to reconstruct Tiberius’ precise location at the time of the fire.
Although earlier in the year he had absconded from Rome for his Caprean
retirement, the collapse of the Fidenae amphitheater compelled him to return to the
mainland so the public could have access to their emperor (Suet. Tib. 40). This does
not mean that Tiberius returned to Rome, but he did reside somewhere on the
mainland so he could be accessed by the people of Rome. After responding to that
disaster, Suetonius says he retired again to the island (regressus in insulam, Tib.
41). Tacitus, however, presents all of the ominous events of the latter half of 27 CE,
including the Caelian fire, with Tiberius out of the city. He also claims the Fidenae
and Caelian disasters were concurrent events saying that the Fidenae disaster “had
not yet abated when a violent fire afflicted the City more than usual, with the
Caelian Hill burned down (nondum ea clades exoleverat cum ignis violentia urbem
23
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ultra solitum adfecit, deusto monte Caelio, Ann 4.64.1).

26

Since Suetonius places

Tiberius somewhere on the mainland after the Fidenae collapse and Tacitus claims
the Caelian fire happened immediately after that disaster, Tiberius might have not
yet returned to Capri making him available to respond to the fire in a timely manner
after it raged through the Caelian Hill.
Political Context of Relief Measures
What is clear is that Tiberius was aware the fire had occurred, and he knew it
intensified the groundswell of negative public sentiment against him. According to
Tacitus, it was knowledge that the public was beginning to blame his absence for the
fire that prompted Tiberius’ financial disaster aid. Tacitus writes:
feralemque annum ferebant et ominibus
adversis susceptum principi consilium
absentiae, qui mos vulgo, fortuita ad culpam
trahentes, ni Caesar obviam isset tribuendo
pecunias ex modo detrimenti (Ann. 4.64.1)
People were maintaining that it was a fatal
year and that the princeps’s counsel of
absence had been undertaken with
unfavorable omens (which is a habit of the
public, interpreting chance events in terms of
blame); but Caesar confronted the issue by
distributing money in proportion to the losses
(trans. Woodman).
Tacitus dismisses the public’s interpretation of the year’s disasters as “the
habit of the crowd” (mos vulgo, 4.64.1). Nevertheless, the key point in the Tacitean
assessment of this event is that the imperial response to the fire occurred because “a
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religious interpretation was beginning to gain momentum.”
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Instead of seeing the

fire and the Emperor’s absence from Rome as coincident, Tacitus says the public
view shifted ad culpam (Ann. 4.64.1). Consequently, Tiberius thought the fire
necessitated a generous response so he could stop the deterioration of the public’s
confidence in the stability of his reign. In Tacitus’ words, “Caesar confronted the
issue by distributing money in proportion to the losses” (Caesar obviam isset
tribuendo pecunias ex modo detrimenti, Ann. 4.64.1). Therefore, Tiberius gave
proportional monetary grants designed to temper public fear over the current
condition of the state under his rule.28
Despite its clarity, Tacitus’ narrative raises two significant questions. First,
why did Tiberius use distributions of money to check public concern? Second, who
benefitted from his proportional grants? The first question has a simple answer: by
27 CE, imperial largesse had become the standard form of disaster relief. 29
Augustus had used monetary grants to help provincial cities after earthquakes, and
Tiberius followed his predecessor’s example when he aided the cities of Asia in 17
CE. Nine years after the Caelian response, Tiberius again used gifts of money to his
political advantage in response to the Aventine fire (Tac. Ann. 6.45). We must then
conclude Tiberius knew the people’s concerns could be allayed by responding in a
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way they anticipated. And, after 58 years of imperial government, they had grown
accustomed to the emperor assisting them with gifts of money. 30
The answer to the second question is more complex, but it is also important
for appreciating the pervasiveness of societal angst over the future of Tiberius’ reign.
Suetonius places Tiberius’ concern with the wealthy owners of the insulae that were
destroyed by the fire. He describes this as a time “when he [Tiberius] made good the
losses of some owners of blocks of houses on the Caelian Mount, which had burned
down” (rursus quibusdam dominis insularum, quae in monte Caelio deflagrarant,
Tib. 48.1).31 Velleius Paterculus, however, credits the Emperor with an
indiscriminate response to the fire claiming he assisted “all ranks of people” (omnis
ordinis hominum, 2.130). This comports with Tacitus’ version that claims, “he
helped by his munificence even unknowns who had been summoned spontaneously”
(ignotos etiam et ultro accitos munificentia iuverat, Ann.4.64.2). The portrait here is
of an emperor not only concerned with Rome’s elites who owned the apartment
complexes and had political clout, but who also cared about the lower class renters
who occupied the buildings.
Putting these anecdotes together creates a portrait of widespread loss of
property among all ranks of those who dwelled on the Caelian. Those who lived in
the tenements would have lost their personal effects and would have been displaced
from their homes. The owners of the high-rise complexes would have lost revenue
from rents and their initial investment for construction costs. If, as Tacitus asserts,
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Rome’s inhabitants blamed Tiberius for this disaster, there is every reason to believe
the fire inflamed opposition from all orders of Roman society. Tiberius’ aid,
therefore, confronted widespread concern about his reign.
Tiberius reacted to the Caelian disaster through established methods of
disaster relief. His motivation for giving assistance grew out of the extreme
misfortune of all who suffered loss in the fire, but his political standing was
ultimately the intended beneficiary of his aid. The pervasive public disquiet over the
events of 27 CE provides some explanation for Tiberius’ advertisement of his
munificence in the aftermath of the fire. Suetonius says he valued his beneficence to
such a degree (tamen beneficium tanti aestimavit) that he changed the name from
the Caelian Hill to the Augustan Hill (Tib. 48.1; Tac. Ann. 4.64.3). Thus, as he
would do again in 36 CE, Tiberius’ response to the 27 CE fire turned a disaster into a
situation that enhanced his personal reputation. Nevertheless, the gifts had the
initial design of altering the populace’s attitude about the current state of his reign.

Great Fire Response (64 CE)
Nero’s response to the Great Fire of 64 CE, along with the sources that
describe it, was analyzed in the previous chapter as an example of emergency relief,
but his assistance deserves further examination because of the political motivations
he had for giving aid. This incident reveals how disaster assistance could be used
brazenly to achieve political objectives, and it also shows that such aid did not
always succeed in assuaging public rancor about the emperor.
Recovery Relief Measures
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Besides the emergency measures that Nero took to aid people displaced from
their homes, to insure the city’s grain supply, and to control grain’s price, he led the
transition into the restoration phase of recovery. His recovery measures can be
divided into three categories: building codes, financial assistance, and appeasement
of the gods.
The fire burned through ten of the city’s fourteen districts, prompting Tacitus
to later write that “it would not at all be easy to arrive at the number of houses,
apartment complexes, and temples that were lost” (domuum et insularum et
templorum quae amissa sunt numerum inire haud promptum fuerit, Ann. 15.41.1).
Nero, so it seemed, relished the opportunity to rebuild much of Rome, and, as he did
so, he implemented important building codes designed to transform the look and
beauty of the city and to prevent a future conflagration from destroying lives and
property on a comparable scale to the 64 CE fire.
Rome’s reconstruction, under the Emperor’s supervision, would not happen
haphazardly (passim, Tac. Ann. 15.43.1). The new city districts (vicorum) would be
of standardized size (ordinibus, Tac. Ann. 15.43.1). Instead of the narrow streets for
which Rome was known before the fire, the resurgent city would have “wide spaces
for roads” (latis viarum spatiis, Tac. Ann. 15.43.1).32 Tenement apartment
complexes would now have enforced height restrictions (aedificiorum altitudine),
open areas (patefactis areis), and frontage porticoes (porticibus quae frontem) to add
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Buildings, especially houses and insulae,

were now required to be constructed “without beams and consolidated by Gabine or
Alban rock, because such stone was impervious to fire” (sine trabibus saxo Gabino
Albanove solidarentur, quod is lapis ignibus impervius est, Tac. Ann. 15.43.3).34
Finally, new buildings were to have self contained walls rather than sharing
partitions with neighboring structures (Tac. Ann. 15.43.4).35
Scholars have routinely remarked on the negative ramifications for the look of
the city and the effects on the intra-city social relations of Nero’s new building
regulations.36 For example, the broader thoroughfares would have lessened the
available amount of property for tenement reconstruction. Consequently, the
property shortage created by the new regulations would have driven up rents for
those who could least afford the increase in the cost of living. Toner has speculated
that “clearing away the crammed little lanes of old Rome will also have destroyed
social networks among the poor.”37 Newbold also theorizes that the fire would have
33
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altered the existing warehouse space used by shopkeepers and traders. He further
suggests that Nero’s new building and space requirements would have limited the
available quantity of property for the reconstruction of storehouses and shops. This
had the potential to spark a heated competition to purchase land on the city’s outer
corridor for rebuilding them.38
The Emperor’s financial contributions for the recovery and reconstruction of
Rome began with his promise to fund the cost of removing the debris and to pay for
the retrieval of the dead from the ruins (Suet. Nero 38.3). He also arranged for the
ships that transported grain from Ostia to return carrying loads of rubble for
disposal in the Ostian marshes (Tac. Ann. 15.43.2). The newly required porticoes for
insulae Nero promised (pollicitus est) to erect with his own money (sua pecunia, Tac.
Ann. 15.43.2). Lastly, to encourage immediate rebuilding, he offered financial
incentives (praemia) to private individuals, based upon rank and family finances,
who completed houses or apartments within a specified time frame (Tac. Ann.
15.43.2).
Nero’s promises to pay for the removal of rubble and the retrieval of the dead,
along with his rebuilding plans, no doubt helped Rome’s inhabitants immensely, but
their fulfillment came at considerable cost to the provinces. 39 Suetonius says, “and
from the contributions which he not only received, but even demanded, he nearly
bankrupted the provinces and exhausted the resources of individuals” (conla-
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tionibusque non receptis modo verum et efflagitatis prouincias priuatorumque census
prope exhausit, Nero 38.3).40 Tacitus’ account widens the target of Nero’s economic
exploitations to Italy and the gods. He claims:
Interea conferendis pecuniis pervastata Italia,
provinciae eversae sociique populi et quae
civitatium liberae vocantur. inque eam
praedam etiam dii cessere, spoliatis in urbe
templis egestoque auro, quod triumphis, quod
votis omnis populi Romani aetas prospere aut
in metu sacraverat. enimvero per Asiam atque
Achaiam non dona tantum, sed simulacra
numinum abripiebatur, missis in eas
provincias Acrato et Secundo Carrinate.
(Ann.15.45.1-2).
Meanwhile, for contributions of money, Italy
was being laid waste and the provinces
ransacked, as well as allied peoples and those
communities which are called free. To that
plunder even the gods subscribed, their
temples in the City despoiled, and their gold
carried off—gold which during triumphs and
vows every generation of the Roman people
had consecrated in prosperity and dread
respectively. Indeed across Asia and Achaea
it was not only gifts to but representations of
divinities which were looted, after the
dispatch of Acratus and Secundus Carrinas to
those provinces (trans. Woodman).
Nero not only exacted contributions from Italians and provincials, but he also
confiscated gifts made to the gods housed in Rome’s remaining temples. His
representatives, Acratus and Secundus Carrinas, also extracted donatives stored in
and statues from the temples in Asia and Achaea. One reason Nero may have
plundered temples is because many housed great wealth. P. Temin has shown that
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Greeks and Romans used temples as storehouses for personal and public treasuries.
Individuals made endowments to the temples that in turn could be lent out at
interest to merchants or other investors. Temin says, “temples were an important
means of “pooling” investment funds in the early Roman Empire.”41 In his view,
therefore, temples served as ancient banking institutions because they received
deposits and lent money at interest.42 Thus, in addition, to the votive offerings made
to the gods and the elaborate statues housed in Greco-Roman temples, many temples
had large financial resources for Nero to expropriate.
Nero’s decision to exploit the provincial treasuries and private incomes to
increase his financial resources for rebuilding Rome meant provincial merchants and
farmers covered at least some of the cost Rome’s reconstruction. Their taxes
supplied the revenues collected in the provincial treasuries. Other cities volunteered
to give money to help Rome rebuild. Lugdunum offered to contribute at least four
million HS for Rome’s recovery (Ann. 16.13.3). Thus, Nero’s guarantees shifted the
financial burden for rebuilding Rome to wealthy individuals and provincials.
After he had finalized his plans for rebuilding the city, the final component of
Nero’s response was appeasing the gods through religious ritual. During the
Republic, whenever a time of crisis arose, the Senate consulted the books of Sibyl to
learn how to remedy the situation. Although Tacitus does not state who consulted
the books following the 64 CE fire, he is clear that it was done at Nero’s direction
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(Ann. 15.44.1). After consulting the Sibylline books, “supplication was made to
Vulcan, Ceres, and Proserpina, and Juno was propitiated by matrons” (supplicatum
Vulcano et Cereri Proserpinaeque ac propitiata Iuno per matronas, Ann. 15.44.1).43
The Politics of the Relief Measures
All of Nero’s emergency and recovery-restoration measures to provide housing
for refugees, prevent the starvation of Rome’s population, promote reconstruction,
and protect the city from a future conflagration seem like logical reactions. Yet,
Tacitus, who is the lone source for the politics of this disaster, makes each form of
imperial response a calculated political maneuver. In describing Nero’s emergency
relief during the fire’s emergency phase, Tacitus’ language implies that by aiding the
people, Nero tried to achieve some larger objective. Of the relief measures Tacitus
writes that “despite being popular, [the measures] failed in effectiveness” (quae
quamquam popularia in inritum cadebant, Ann. 15.39.3). This does not just reveal
the public response to the initial attempts by the Emperor to help victims of the
disaster. It also indicates that relief providing at this stage of the fire had some aim
which it did not achieve. What, then, was Nero trying to accomplish? And in what
sense did these acts prove ineffectual?
Since people believed major disasters to be expressions of the gods’ anger,
Nero had reason to believe he was already under the public’s suspicion. His initial
help, particularly with the grain supply and its price, repeated the precedents
established by Pompey and Augustus, but Nero knew already that the people of
Rome expected him to maintain the supply of grain for the city. Just prior to the
43
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outbreak of the Great Fire, the Emperor decided against leaving Rome for a journey
to Achaea and Egypt (Tac. Ann. 15.36.1). In preparation for the trip, Nero visited
the temple of Vesta and suddenly changed his plans. Tacitus then writes:
deseruit inceptum, cunctas sibi curas amore
patriae leviores dictitans. vidisse maestos
civium vultus, audire secretas querimonias,
quod tantum [itineris] aditurus esset, cuius ne
modicos quidem egressus tolerarent, sueti
adversum fortuita adspectu principis refoveri
(Ann. 15.36.2-3).
He relinquished his undertaking, insisting
that all his concerns were trivial when
compared to his love for his fatherland: he
had seen the sorrowful looks of the citizens,
he could hear the secret complaints that he
would be embarking on so great a journey
when they could not endure even his limited
excursions, accustomed as they were to being
rekindled by the sight of their princeps to
counteract the effects of chance events (trans.
Woodman).
In this passage, Tacitus says the Emperor “heard their secret laments”
(audire secretas quierimonias) over his planned departure. According to Tacitus,
those laments expressed the people’s uneasiness about an extended imperial absence
because they depended upon him “to restore them from chance disasters” (adversum
fortuita...refoveri, Ann. 15.36.3). After Nero publicized that he would not embark
upon a journey to the East, Tacitus explains why the plebs, particularly, welcomed
the news. He says:
haec atque talia plebi volentia fuere,
voluptatum cupidine et, quae praecipua cura
est, rei frumentariae angustias, si abesset,
metuenti (Ann 15.36.4).
Words such as these were welcome to the
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plebs, with its desire for pleasure and
dreading a straitened grain supply (which is
its primary concern) if he were absent (trans.
Woodman).
Thus, he reveals that the plebs grew unsettled at the prospect of his trip to the East
because they feared a strained grain supply in his absence (rei frumentariae
angustias, si abesset, Ann. 15.36.4).
An adversum fortuita did happen in the form of the Great Fire, and Tacitus, in
these earlier passages, has already signaled to his readers that the people of Rome
expected Nero to revive them and that the plebs looked to him to give stability to the
supply and price of grain. Nero, understanding these expectations (Ann. 15.36.3-4),
acted accordingly, but unexpectedly, public rumor disrupted the normal course of the
politics of Roman disaster relief causing Nero’s assistance to fail in its effectiveness.
Hence, Tacitus writes of those relief measures that “despite being popular, [they]
failed in effectiveness because a rumor circulated that at the same time of the city’s
fire, he [Nero] went on a private stage and sang the demise of Troy” (quae
quamquam popularia in inritum cadebant quia pervaserat rumor ipso tempore
flagrantis urbis inisse eum domesticam scaenam et cecinisse Troianum excidium,
Ann. 15.39.3).
Nero followed the precedents of Pompey and Augustus, and he did everything
the people expected. His relief measures were popular. But, his generosity proved
ineffectual at reversing the rapid decline of his public image. The same Roman
citizenry who objected to his eastern trip were beginning to suspect he was not
someone who would restore their fortunes. Instead, rumors led to the popular
suspicion that their emperor who at worst celebrated the city’s destruction because
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of his personal ambition to rebuild it or at best was indifferent to its demise and the
suffering of its people.
The Question of Culpability
After a second blaze ignited near the estate of Tigellinus, his praetorian
prefect, Nero’s political situation worsened. A new rumor spread that Nero ordered
Tigellinus to start the fire. The association of this fire with someone so close to Nero
sparked claims that he wanted the old city to be destroyed so he could found a new
one named after himself.44 The political pressure intensified for the emperor, and
the remainder of his response including the building codes, the financial promises,
and the expiation of the gods was designed to curtail public suspicion of him.
The ancient sources neither agree on Nero’s culpability for starting the fire
nor on what he did while the city burned and the people suffered. Suetonius (Nero
38.1), Cassius Dio (62.16.1), and the Elder Pliny (HN 17.1.5) all accept that Nero
personally ordered the burning of the city. Cassius Dio’s epitome that says Nero
ordered men to set fire to buildings in various parts of the city to prevent anyone
from tracing its place of origin (62.16.1). Suetonius says that Nero sent his chamber
attendants (cubicularios) to consular estates to start the blaze, and several granaries
near the Domus Aurea were knocked over with siege engines and set on fire (Nero
38.1). Suetonius (Nero 38.2) and Cassius Dio (62.18.1) also equally claim that Nero
gave a full dress public recital of a song lamenting the destruction of Troy while the
inhabitants of Rome experienced loss of life and property.
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Tacitus, on the other hand, takes a decidedly less certain view of Nero’s guilt
for setting the blaze. He dismisses insinuations that the fire resulted from an
imperial directive as mere chatter.45 Nero, he claims, was at Antium when the fire
began, and the Emperor too suffered the loss of his personal property, particularly
the Domus Transitoria, in the blaze (Ann. 15.39.1). While Tacitus, therefore, rejects
the rumors about Nero’s involvement as factual, he does concede they influenced all
the gestures for relief and recovery Nero made in the fire’s aftermath. This includes
his consultation of the Sibylline books.
Because the ancient accounts do not agree on the degree of Nero’s
responsibility for the Great Fire, it is no surprise to see varied views by modern
scholars on the question of his culpability. Griffin calls Tacitus’ scepticism of Nero’s
responsibility for the fire “just.”46 She points to Nero’s own loss of tenements on the
Palatine and Oppian Hills as evidence for his lack of involvement. Furthermore, she
argues that “The Fire [sic], after all, did not start, or restart, in the area Nero
ultimately developed for the Domus Aurea.”47 D. Shotter also rejects blaming Nero
for causing the fire. He says, “we need no explanation beyond Rome’s susceptibility
to fire and the fact that a strong wind was blowing at the time of outbreak.” 48 In his
recent work on the Great Fire, Dando-Collins implies that Nero did not start the fire
by claiming its outbreak and the subsequent popular rumors threw Nero into a state
45
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of depression. Instead, he concludes his work by speculating that Nymphidius, the
prefect of the city’s vigiles and head of the Praetorian Guard in 64 CE, set a plan in
motion to overthrow Nero and install a puppet ruler by giving the order for the
spreading of the fire.49
Champlin believes the evidence suggests Nero did start the fire of 64 CE. He
points to two key developments to support his conclusions. First, Champlin
interprets Nero’s cancellation of two imperial journeys to the East as an indication
that the Emperor knew something bad was about to occur in Rome. In both cases,
Nero publicly proclaimed his reason for canceling his trips was so he could remain in
the city to cheer the people if something happened to cause them to suffer. Second,
Champlin concludes that Flavus’ accusation that Nero was an arsonist serves as
adequate proof of his culpability for the fire (Tac. Ann.15.67.2). Thus, Champlin
writes, “it looks as if Nero was responsible for the Great Fire after all, as his ancient
critics maintained, and his motive can only have been the alleged one, that he
wanted to rebuild the city.”50
Nero’s Use of Religion
When Tacitus gives his final assessment of the political failure of Nero’s
response to the Great Fire, he divides the imperial measures into two classifications:
human counsel (humanis consiliis) and divine propitiation (dis piacula, Ann.
15.44.1). Humanis consiliis refers to the practical measures, like building codes,
that were outlined above. Dis piacula is how Tacitus characterizes Nero’s public use
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of religion in the aftermath of the fire. After describing Nero’s new building codes
and promises to help the recovery and rebuilding processes, Tacitus says:
mox petita dis piacula aditique Sibyllae libri,
ex quibus supplicatum Volcano et Cereri
Proserpinaeque, ac propitiata Iuno per
matronas, primum in Capitolio, deinde apud
proximum mare, unde hausta aqua templum
et simulacrum deae perspersum est; et
sellisternia ac pervigilia celebravere feminae,
quibus mariti erant (Ann. 15.44.1).
expiations for the gods were sought and the
books of the Sibyl were appealed to, as a
result of which supplication was made to
Vulcan, Ceres, and Proserpina, and Juno was
propitiated by matrons, first on the Capitol
and then at the nearest stretch of sea, from
which water was drawn to besprinkle the
temple and the representation of the goddess;
and sittings and vigils were celebrated by
ladies who had husbands (trans. Woodman).
Nero’s use of these religious rituals after the fire has become the subject of
scholarly disagreement. In her biography of Nero, M. Griffin passes it over as
merely the first failed attempt to placate public outrage directed at the Emperor
over the fire and sees no greater symbolism in the use of the rituals themselves. 51
Champlin, however, sees populist symbolism in Nero’s invocation of Vulcan, Ceres,
and Juno. He argues the books of Sibyl prescribed supplicating at the mundus of
Cereris, a ritual pit that was originally “the round trench said to have been dug by
Romulus in the Comitium, into which he threw different first-fruits (Ceres was the
god of the harvest), at the founding of Rome.”52
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By invoking these gods, Nero’s design, Champlin suggests, was to associate
his reconstruction of Rome with the original founding by Romulus.53 Furthermore,
Vulcan and Ceres were “popular gods” whom the people associated with one another
because of the proximity between their altars and because their worship took place
on successive days, August 23-24, every year. Each of these gods was venerated
because Rome’s inhabitants feared fires and because Ceres controlled the passage
into the world of the dead.54
Champlin thinks the propitiation of Juno was designed to embrace the
relationship between the 64 CE fire and the Gallic destruction of Rome in 390 BCE.
He arrives at this conclusion because the accounts of the fire in Tacitus and Cassius
Dio each make associations between the Gauls’ sack of Rome and the fire during
Nero’s reign. Tacitus, who provides the most detailed comparison, points out that
some “noted that the start of this conflagration arose on the fourteenth day before
the Kalends of Sextilis, on which the Senones too ignited the captured City” (fuere
qui adnotarent XIIII Kal. Sextiles principium incendii huius ortum, quo et Seneones
captam urbem inflammaverint, Ann. 15.41.1).55 Cassius Dio twice asserts the
comparison between the Great Fire and the Gallic invasion. After describing a
dramatic scene wherein the people give up trying to save their possessions, Dio
claims that they reflected on the historical nature of the fire in the following
manner:
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¦ðÂ ì¥í ôïÃò óöåôÝñïéò ìçä¥í §ôé ëõðgÃóèáé, ôÎ ä¥
äçìüóéïí ÏäõñïìÝíïõò íáìéìíÞóêgóèáé Óôé êáÂ
ðñüôgñüí ðïôg ïàôùò ßðÎ ôäí Ãáëáôäí ôÎ ðëgÃïí
(62.17.3).
[the survivors] did not grieve over their own
[possessions], but lamenting the State [they]
were reminded that on a previous occasion
most [of the city was burned] by the Gauls.
Later Dio assesses the magnitude of the disaster by saying, “At that time, the city
experienced the sort of disaster which [it had] neither formerly nor recently
[experienced] except [during the invasion] of the Gauls” (ôïéïýôå ì¥í ä¬ ðÜègé ôüôg º
ðüëéò ¦÷ñÞóáôï ïËå ïÜôg ðñüôgñüí ðïôg ïÜè' àóôgñïí, ðë¬í ôïØ ÃáëáôéêïØ, 62.18.2).
Since the sources indicate that Rome’s inhabitants in 64 CE were aware of
parallels with the fourth century BCE Gallic sack of their city, Champlin suggests
that Nero invoked Juno Moneta, “Juno the Warner,” because of her association with
the Gallic conflict. After promising to build a temple to Juno Moneta in 345 BCE, M.
Furius Camillus, whose father played a role in repelling the Senones from Rome in
390 BCE, built it the next year on the home site of M. Manlius Capitolinus who in
390 BCE had been made privy to an impending Gallic attack by a flock of geese. In
Champlin’s view, Nero’s appeal to Juno was designed to recall “resistance to the
Gauls” made possible by the warning given to Manlius Capitolinus and to conjure
the memory of the restoration of the city after it was sacked and burned by the
Gallic invaders.56
Champlin’s interpretation has great appeal particularly because he views
Nero’s responses to the fire as a form of popular politics. The problem arises when
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Champlin argues that Nero, through appealing to the gods Vulcan, Ceres, and Juno
wanted the people of Rome to think about its original founding by Romulus and the
rebuilding after the Gallic invasion. Champlin’s Nero embraces the popular rumors
and makes a public display of them in his appeasement of the gods.
Such a view requires reading against the primary sources. All the major
literary sources claim rumors abounded that Nero wanted to destroy the old city so
he could rebuild it. Tacitus even lists his desire to rebuild the city as one of the
popular perceptions that arose after the second fire started near the estate of
Tigellinus (Ann.15.40.2). But it was these same rumors Tacitus claims Nero tried to
dispel through human aid, imperial largesse, and appeasing the gods. It was
precisely because these efforts failed to curb rumors of his culpability that the
Emperor then resorted to blaming the much disliked Christians for starting the
blaze (Ann. 15.45.2).57 It seems the last thing Nero wanted was for people to believe
he wanted to found a new city. To promote himself as a new Romulus would have
fanned the flames of the very popular rumors that Nero wished to extinguish. The
better explanation is that he used the traditions of religion to induce the Romans to
forget the reports that he had sinister motives.
Champlin is right on one account, namely, that Nero used the past to
interpret the present. It seems more likely that Nero tried to use traditional means
to quiet rumors about him.58 During the fire’s first wave, he used the common
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method of securing the grain supply and demonstrating his generosity by making
shelter available for the homeless. Then, after the second fire broke out near
Tigellinus’ estate, Nero resorted to generosity again. This time he promised to give
financial rewards for timely construction, and he promised that he would fund the
costs of the newly required porticoes. He depended upon the sense of security his
new building codes would engender to demonstrate his concern for the future of the
city and its people. Finally, he followed the republican custom of consulting he
Sibylline oracles during times of crisis. During the Republic, the Senate alone
usually referred to these books to learn how to cope with unexpected crises. The
symbolism would be clear to the people of Rome that Nero, rather than intentionally
harming the citizenry for his own aggrandizement, was taking care of their longterm well-being by ensuring no fire of this scale would again be permitted to happen
in the city.
This would also explain the importance of expiating Vulcan and Ceres. The
extraordinary fire destroyed lives and property on a scale which Rome had not
experienced since the Gallic invasions of 390-386 BCE. Vulcan, the god of fire,
needed to be appeased in order to prevent Rome from a similar destructive fire in the
future. Such a disaster also seriously threatened the sustainability of life after the
fire because of its destruction of grain supplies. Ceres, equivalent of the Greek
Demeter, was the goddess of grain and the harvest. Nero had already portrayed her
on the reverse of his coinage in 61-62 CE in praise of his care for supplying the city’s
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Thus, observing the rituals of these gods was to protect the city’s future by

appeasing the gods of fire and grain.60

Figure 5: Silver denarius dating to 61-62 CE depicting Nero on the obverse and
Ceres on the reverse.61
Supplicating these gods, therefore, reflects the two immediate logistical
concerns this disaster created: structural safety and security of food supplies. Nero’s
building codes were designed to mitigate the potential for another large scale fire,
but the 64 CE fire had also jeopardized the grain supply, further threatening the
city’s survival. Nero used grain ships from Ostia to carry debris out of Rome because
Ostia, as the principal harbor for the city of Rome, supplied Rome with its grain
from all over the Mediterranean. In a brief section related to Nero’s post-fire
building schemes, Suetonius says he “planned to extend the walls as far as Ostia and
to bring the sea from there to Rome by a canal” (destinarat etiam Ostia tenus moenia
promouere atque inde fossa mare ueteri urbi inducere, Nero 16.1). This plan suggests
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the continuation of a long term strategy, begun by Claudius, to secure the city’s food
supply.62 In the aftermath of a food shortage in Rome in 41 CE, Claudius had
expanded the harbor at Ostia to ensure the grain imports from Africa could quickly
be brought into Rome throughout the year.63 Nero’s intention to extend the walls
must be viewed as part of a broader struggle by the early emperors to prevent food
crises in Rome by facilitating the movement of grain from the sea, to the harbors at
Ostia, and into the city via the Tiber. Despite these practical strategies, the
invocation of these two gods, no doubt, was an integral aspect of providing the long
term protection of the new city’s infrastructure and food supply.
When Nero’s acts of public aid and religious piety failed to change the decline
of public trust in him, he took the extraordinary step of shifting blame toward a
disliked religious group. Traditional scholarship follows the current reading of
Tacitus’ text and says that Nero used the Christians as scapegoats to deflect
suspicion from himself.64 Tacitus’ text reads:
ergo abolendo rumori Nero subdidit reos et
quaesitissimis poenis adfecit, quos per flagitia
invisos vulgus Chrestianos appellabat (Ann.
15.44.1-2).Therefore, to dispel the rumor,
Nero supplied defendants and inflicted the
choicest punishments on those, resented for
their outrages, whom the public called
Chrestiani (trans. Woodman).
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The text clearly intends to connect the Chrestianos with Christians because the next
line offers the following explanation for the origin of their name:
auctor nominis eius Christus Tibero
imperitante per procuratorem Pontium
Pilatum supplicio adfectus erat (Ann. 15.44.23).
The source of the name was Christus, on
whom, during the command of Tiberius,
reprisal had been inflicted by the procurator
Pontius Pilatus (trans. Woodman).
Those caught and convicted of initiating the blaze were subjected to public
humiliation as part of the process of capital punishment for the crime. Tacitus
writes:
et pereuntibus addita ludibria, ut ferarum
tergis contecti laniatu canum interirent aut
crucibus adfixi [aut flammandi atque], ubi
defecisset dies, in usu[m] nocturni luminis
urerentur (Ann. 15.44.4-5).
And, as they perished, mockeries were added,
so that, covered in the hides of wild beasts,
they expired from mutilation by dogs, or fixed
to crosses and made flammable, on the
dwindling of daylight they were burned for
use as nocturnal illumination (trans.
Woodman).
A recent, revisionist interpretation of this text by Dando-Collins suggests the
references to Christians in Tacitus may have been forgeries interpolated into the
text by a later Christian redactor.65 Dando-Collins points to four key textual clues
that he believes indicate the text of Tacitus did not originally refer to Christians.
First, he argues the term Christian does not appear in first century Roman
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literature. Second, Romans did not use the term Christian because they saw the
religion as a subgroup of Jewish religion not an independent system of worship.
Third, Tacitus’ text, he says, refers to Pontius Pilate, the Roman governor of Judea
at the time of Jesus’ crucifixion, as “procurator” (procuratorem). He says this is the
title by which Pilate is known in Christian literature, but Tacitus, who had access to
official state records, would have known Pilate’s official Roman title was “prefect of
Judea.” Finally, he argues that Christians would not have constituted “an immense
multitude” in the city but remained a “small community” which Tacitus would not
have referred to as a “class at Rome.”66
Instead of denouncing Christians, Dando-Collins postulates the text originally
may have indicted Egyptian followers of the cult of Isis.67 Isis was an Egyptian
goddess whose association with motherhood and the promise of eternal life made her
an attractive deity both to Roman women and men of all social classes.
Consequently, “the worship of Isis was among the most popular of the religious cults
followed at Rome by noncitizens [sic] during the first century.” 68 In support of this
theory, Dando-Collins claims that despite its popularity, the majority of the public
disliked the religion. Furthermore, he states that Nero personally “scorned the
cult.”69 He also believes the humiliations heaped upon Nero’s scapegoats reflect
mockeries reserved for followers of Isis rather than Christianity. According to

66

This summary is based upon Dando-Collins (2010), 11-14.

67

Dando-Collins (2010), 12.

68

Dando-Collins (2010), 14.

69

Dando-Collins (2010), 16.

185
Tacitus, the Romans insulted the victims by covering them with animal skins and
throwing them to the dogs (Ann. 15.44.4-5). They were also subjected to crucifixion
and set ablaze. Dando-Collins thinks this indicates that the Romans associated the
cult of Isis with the broader Egyptian religious practice of portraying their gods as
animals. Anubis, the Egyptian god of the dead, took the form of a dog’s head,
therefore, being attacked by dogs would have constituted an insult to an Egyptian
cult. Finally, he connects together the burning of those crucified with the religion
because fire, “played a key part in Isiac religious observances.70
Dando-Collins’ theory, while imaginative, has little currency. It is true that
there is no consensus regarding the people Tacitus refers to as Chrestiani in Annals
15.44. There is also suspicion this reference to Christians by Tacitus reflects the
work of later Christian redaction of the text.71 However, E. Laupot has recently
shown that statistical and linguistic analysis of this text along with a fragment
known as Tacitus’ Fragment 2 supports the reading as originally Tacitean.72 In
addition, E.M. Smallwood has explained that Josephus made a habit of referring to
early governors of Judea as “procurators” rather than prefects. 73 While this does not
prove Tacitus would have blurred the usage of Roman governmental terminology, it
does show that the mixed usage of terms was not the reserve of Christians.
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Finally, Dando-Collins’ suggestion that Tacitus would not have referred to
Christians as a “class” appears to be an error of translation rather than an argument
based upon historical substance. In the Latin of Tacitus’ text, the people subjected
to persecution by Nero are designated by the accusative plural noun reos. They are
further described by the accusative plural adjective invisos. Reos comes from reus, a
noun that refers to plaintiffs or defendants in a trial. 74 The adjective invisos, from
invisus, means “hateful, odious, or disliked.” 75 Neither of these terms suggests a
class or order of people as do the terms equites or nobiles. Dando-Collins, then, has
uncritically followed the reading Church-Bodribb translation of Tacitus’ Annals
15.44 to arrive at the conclusion that Tacitus referred to Christians as a class when
the Latin indicates he portrayed the Chrestiani as defendants put on trial for
starting the Great Fire.
In addition to these points, Dando-Collins seems to accept that the text can
simultaneously be a forgery and reveal accurate information, since he does not
question that Nero carried our religious persecution to redirect the public’s attention
away from himself. He offers no evidence that Christians substituted their own
name for the cult of Isis or some other group. Nero’s excesses of humiliation and
execution alone cannot sustain the argument that Tacitus originally named the
followers of Isis as the victims of his cruelty.
Furthermore, the Parthian religion of Mithra would seem an equally valid
candidate for persecution by the Romans. Followers of that cult used fire in their
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worship rituals, and their religion also grew popular in Rome in the first century
CE.76 More recent analysis, like that of Shannon, on Annals 15.44 does not question
the authenticity of the reading Chrestianos. The historical problem lies more in
determining why Nero carried out the persecution than whom he victimized.
Shannon argues that the scapegoating of a foreign cult was consistent with
the use of other traditional religious practices, such as the rites to Vulcan and Ceres,
that Nero emphasized after his other measures failed to convince the public that he
did not start the fire.77 The Romans did not dissuade people from observing other
religious rituals besides the traditional gods of the state, but they saw their own
gods as vital to the maintenance of proper social order. 78 Cassius Dio purports to
record a speech by Maecenas, a powerful friend and confidant of Augustus, in which
he says to the Emperor:
ôï×ò ä¥ ä¬ îåíßæïíôÜò ôé ðåñÂ áÛôÎ êáÂ ìßóåé êáÂ
êüëáæå, ì¬ ìüíïí ôäí èåäí ªíåêá, ôí Ò
êáôáöñïíÞóáò ïÛä*ëëïõ í ôéíïò ðñïôéìÞóåéåí,
ëë* Óôé êáÂ êáéíÜ ôéíá äáéìüíéá ïÊ ôïéïØôïé
íôåóöÝñïíôåò ðïëëï×ò íáðåßèïõóéí
ëëïôñéïíïìåÃí, êê ôïýôïõ êáÂ óõíùìïóßáé êáÂ
óõóôÜóåéò ©ôáéñåÃáß ôå ãßãíïíôáé, ðåñ »êéóôá
ìïíáñ÷ß óõìöÝñåé (Cass. Dio 52.36.2).
Those who attempt to distort our religion
with strange rites you should abhor and
punish, not merely for the sake of the gods
(since if a man despises these he will not pay
honour [sic] to any other being), but because
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such men, by bringing in new divinities in the
place of the old, persuade many to adopt
foreign practices, from which spring up
conspiracies, factions, and cabals, which are
far from profitable to a monarchy (trans.
Cary).
These words are designed to show the danger foreign religions presented to the
stability of monarchical government. Nevertheless, they also illustrate the overall
attitude of at least the senatorial class of Romans toward foreign gods. The speech
of Maecenas lists other social ills, such as factions, conspiracies and cabals, that are
not compatible with monarchy. These were all symptoms of the worship of new
divinities rather than the traditional gods.
The Romans were a deeply religious people who believed “that religion is a
patrimony of the past which sustains the life of the state.” 79 Hence, in the second
century CE, “Christians were seen as religious fanatics, self-righteous outsiders,
arrogant innovators, who thought that only their beliefs were true.”80 Therefore,
foreign religions, like Christianity, might lead to neglect of the traditional state gods
and cause them to be angry.
Nero’s persecution of a people associated with a foreign cult would have been
interpreted as an attempt to cleanse Rome of followers of a superstition hostile to the
Roman gods. Since the fire itself would have had a religious interpretation, the
crucifixion and humiliation of Christians would have served the purpose of placating
the traditional gods of the Roman state. It also gave Nero an additional opportunity
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to cloak himself in traditional practices that conveyed a sense of concern for the long
term well-being of the city and its people. In the Chrestiani, Nero found a group that
became the objects of widespread anger.
However, as Tacitus explains, even this act backfired on Nero. The harsh and
humiliating punishments to which the victims were subjected caused the public to
become sympathetic toward them. Therefore, Tacitus’ text indicates that Nero never
successfully renewed his public image in the eyes of the residents of Rome.
Traditional piety and imperial generosity reinforced his guilt and cruelty.
The Great Fire of 64 CE did not instigate an immediate overthrow of Nero’s
regime, nor was it singularly responsible for his eventual demise. Other broader
factors like his treatment of senators, a growing megalomania, and a shift in public
loyalty away from the person of the emperor and toward the institutions of Empire
facilitated his downfall.81 Nevertheless, his miscalculation of the political value of
disaster assistance permitted the rumors surrounding the fire to damage his public
image. The traditional acts of imperial generosity were unable to reassert the
goodness of the Emperor in the public mind. Instead, his relief measures, though
popular, fed the narrative that he was responsible for the fire.
Vesuvius Response (79-80 CE)
Major Sources for Imperial Relief
Only two literary sources detail the assistance the Emperor Titus gave for the
reconstruction of Campania following the 79 CE Vesuvius eruption: Suet. Tit. 8.3-4
and Cass. Dio 66.21.1-24.1. Both sources suffer from serious organizational or
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textual flaws. Andrew Wallace-Hadrill has described the account of Titus’ reign as
“one of the weakest” of Suetonius’ imperial biographies and characterizes it as
“marked by uncritical panegyric.”82 Suetonius, like other second century CE Roman
authors, remembered Titus as a universally beloved emperor, and his narrative of
Titus’ life is much less critical than his presentations of Augustus and Tiberius.
The portion of Cassius Dio’s Histories that includes Titus’ imperial tenure only
exists in summary form preserved in the works of two late 11 th and early 12th
century monks, Ioannes Xiphilinus (11th cent.) and Ioannes Zonaras (12th cent.).
Millar describes Xiphilinus’ epitome of Cassius Dio as “not so much a précis of Dio as
a rather erratic selection from his material, substantially, but not invariably, in
Dio’s order and often keeping very closely to Dio’s wording.” 83 Despite having
significant omissions and “a spasmodic and barely intelligible narrative,” Xiphilinus’
work preserves valuable information about Dio’s life, and its greatest contribution
lies in conserving the structure of Dio’s books which discuss the history of Rome
after 47 CE.84
Although Xiphilinus’ work consists of a “mixture of quotations, abbreviations,
and omissions,” its form is very common for historical summaries from the early
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Because he quoted extensively from Cassius Dio, Xiphilinus has

conserved the skeletal structure of Dio’s history, especially for the early Empire.
Nevertheless, what remains exists in redacted form that omits much of Dio’s own
commentary and historical interpretation.86 Thus, Xiphilinus has preserved the
parts of Cassius Dio’s history that he deemed important, but his condensed
quotations permit the confident, yet cautious, use of Cassius Dio for reconstructing
major events of the early Empire including Titus’ reaction to Vesuvius’ eruption.
Zonaras’ chief value is the preservation of Dio’s first twenty books that cover
the history of Rome to 146 BCE. But, Zonaras is also important for studying the
early Empire because he used Cassius Dio and perhaps Xiphilinus’ epitome to
summarize the period from Julius Caesar’s assassination through the reign of Nerva
(r.96-98 CE). Thus, for the period ranging from the end of the Republic until the
beginning of the 2nd century CE, Zonaras is key, along with Xiphilinus, for the
reconstruction of Dio’s text.
Titus’ assistance to the cities of Campania also has epigraphical attestation.
Inscriptions from Naples, Nola, Salerno, and Sorrento credit him with restoration
work in their cities. All four cities escaped total destruction from Vesuvius’ eruption
but sustained damage from the accompanying earthquakes. Each of the four
inscriptions commemorates Titus’ reconstruction assistance following an
earthquake. But they, like their literary counterparts, also have problems.
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Since these inscriptions refer to a form of earthquake assistance, dating them
becomes less straightforward because earthquakes in 62 CE and 64 CE struck this
same region. Seneca the Younger (d. 65 CE) claims the 62 CE earthquake
“devastated all of the region and caused great destruction” (totiens defunctam metu,
magna strage uastauit, QNat. 6.1.2).87 Naples, he says, was only “lightly affected”
(leviter) suffering only the loss of private (privatim) structures not civic (publice)
buildings (QNat. 6.1.2)88 His geographical description of the region’s scope which
included Surrentum (mod. Sorrento) implies that the 62 CE quake also affected that
city since it destroyed the whole region (6.1.1-2). Therefore, it is difficult, without
additional context, to ascertain whether the inscriptions memorialize Titus’
earthquake relief following the Vesuvius event or whether those cities received
money from him to rebuild structures damaged by one or more of the earlier quakes.
Current scholarly consensus dates all four inscriptions between the last half of
79 CE and 81 CE, placing their provenance after the Vesuvius eruption.89 The most
debated of the four has been the Salerno inscription that reads:
imp. t. cAESAR
uespASIANUS aug.
tribuNIC · POTEST · VI
cos. u CENSOR · P P
imp. xII · A · P · S · RESTITVit90
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A. Merlin originally placed the date “dans le second semstre 76 ap. J. -C,” but after
the influential analysis of G. Paci, this inscription is now dated during the reign of
Titus.91 Paci’s proposed reconstruction of the text of the inscription reads:
[IMP· TITUS· C]AESAR· [DIVI
VESPASIANI· F· V· VESP]ASIANUS· [AVG
PONTIF·MAXIM· TRIBV]NIC·
POTESTVI[III
IMP·XV· COS· VII· DES·VIII]· CENSOR·P·P
[TERRAE· MOT· CON]LAPS· RESTITV[IT]92
[The Emperor Titus Cae]sar, son of the divus
Vespasianus, Vespasianus Augustus, pontifex
maximus (holding the) power of tribune for
the VIIII TIME, (acclaimed) emperor for the
fifteenth time, elected consul for the seventh
time, consul designmate for the eighth (?)
time, censor, father of the nation, restored
[the ---] destroyed [by earthquakes?] (trans.
Guidoboni).

Arguing that line three properly reconstructed refers to Titus’ possession of
tribunician power for the ninth time, power he assumed only after the death of his
father on June 23/24, 79 CE, Paci dates this inscription between July 1, 79 CE and
June 30, 80 CE.93 The remaining three epigraphical records also date after Titus’
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ninth tribunician power lending further support to the literary sources’ claims that
he sent aid to Campania after the volcanic eruption.94
This summary of the sources has shown that problems exist with the precise
readings of the literary and epigraphical evidence for Titus’ aid to Campania.
Nevertheless, they reveal enough specifics to assess the overall nature of his
response to region. As the following analysis will show, the sources compliment one
another in significant ways and make possible a clearer understanding of the cities
Titus helped and how those cities used the financial assistance he gave them.

Overview of the Disaster
The month of Vesuvius’ 79 CE explosion has sparked intense debate among
scholars since the late 19th century. Pliny’s letters to Tacitus on the topic of the elder
Pliny’s death provide the traditional dates of August 24-26 for the eruption (6.16;20).
According to Pliny, earthquakes preceded the event by a day or two, but, more
importantly, he places his uncle’s command of the Roman navy at Misenum on
August 24, 79 CE (Nonum Kal. Septembres, 6.16.4). It was on that day, he claims,
they noticed Vesuvius’ ash column rising in the distance (6.16.4).
Most of the recent literature on the Vesuvius eruption accepts the Plinian,
late summer eruption without question. In a recent biography of the volcano, A.
Scarth discusses the 79 CE event without mentioning any other possible date than

94

See Guidoboni (1994), 225-226 for brief introductions to the additional
inscriptions. The other three inscriptions will be discussed below.

195
95

August 24-26.

Nevertheless, there are reasons to doubt the accuracy of Pliny’s

date. First, August 24 neatly coincides with Vulcanalia festival celebrated by the
Romans August 23-24 each year. Since Vulcan was the god of fire, Pliny, or a later
redactor, might have wished to give his presentation of the eruption additional flare
by having it begin at the same time as the festival.
Second, based on archaeological analysis of fruits and other produce preserved
by the lava flow at Pompeii, M. Ruggiero in 1879 proposed an alternative, late
autumn date of November 23 for the eruption.96 Ruggiero’s theory was revitalized by
U. Pappalardo in 1990, but its chief support has come more recently from the study
of wind patterns in Campania by G. Rolandi.97 Rolandi’s analysis determined that
the distribution of ash toward the cities southeast of the volcano is inconsistent with
the June-August high altitude wind pattern for the Vesuvius region. In the late
summer, the winds trend toward the west, an opposite direction from the destroyed
cities. This poses additional evidence against a late August eruption in 79 CE.
Thus, wind direction analysis and archaeological findings suggest the eruption most
likely occurred in late November 79 CE, not in August as Pliny claims.98
95

Alwyn Scarth, Vesuvius: A Biography (Princeton & Oxford: Princeton University
Press, 2009), 39-86.
96

Michele Ruggiero, “Pompei e la regione sotterrata dal Vesuvio nell’anno LXXIX,”
Memorie e notizie pubblicate dall’Ufficio Tecnico degli scavi delle province
meridionali (Napoli: Francesco Giannini, 1879), 1:20.
97

U. Pappalardo, “L’eruzione pliniana del Vesuvio nel 79 dC: Ercolano,” in
Volcanology & Archaeology: European Workshop: Papers, eds. Claude Albore
Livadie and François Widemann (Council of Europe, 1990): 209-211; Rolandi (2008),
87-98.
98

A good summary of the issues with dating this disaster can be found in Guidoboni
(1994), 224.

196
Vesuvius is the more recent iteration of an older volcanic complex called
Somma.99 Somma and Vesuvius join together to form what geologists call a
composite volcano. Soil studies conducted around the base of the volcano have
improved geologists’ understanding of the history of its eruptions and its pattern of
activity. A chief characteristic of this volcano is explosive Plinian eruptions
accompanied by large deposits of pumice and pyroclastic flows. 100 Plinian or
Vesuvian eruptions “cause more than 1km3 of magma to be projected up 25 km into
the atmosphere at speeds between 600 and 700 ms-1 by a continuous jet stream and
thermal expansion.”101 This is what caused the umbrella-pine like cloud (arbor
quam pinus) that Pliny and his uncle, from their Misenum villa, witnessed rising in
the distance (Ep. 6.16.5). Once the magma chamber of the volcano empties during
this kind of eruption, the ash column collapses creating pyroclastic avalanches of
extremely hot gas and ash destroying and burying everything in its path.102 When
the ash cloud collapsed in 79 CE, pyroclastic flows and ash deposits destroyed the
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cities of Pompeii, Herculaenum, Oplontis and Stabiae and obliterated the towns of
Leucopetra, Taurania, Sora, and Cossa.103
Vesuvius does not have one of these super-eruptions with great regularity.
Instead, these explosive eruptions typically mark the end of a long period of
dormancy and initiate a new cycle of activity. The span between major explosive
eruptions ranges from between 1400-4000 years. Nevertheless, in between these
major eruptions, Vesuvius has less disruptive periods of minor activity. Based upon
the total thickness of the sand layer deposits near modern Terzigno, located about
five miles north of Pompeii, Sigurdsson estimates that prior to its 79 CE eruption,
Vesuvius had gone through a period of quiescence for approximately 700 years.104
This explains why ancient authors, like Diodorus (4.21.5) and Strabo (5.4.8), believed
it had long gone extinct.
The long quiescence of Vesuvius also helps to explain the reputation the
mountain had in antiquity as a hill “covered with wild vine of abundant growth”
(ìðåëïí ä¥ ðïëë¬í ãñßáí ¦ðéðïë¬ò ðåöõêõÃáí) and as a place known for thick forests
and wild boars (Plut. Vit. Crass. 9.2). In fact, the whole area near Vesuvius became
noted for its agricultural bounty. Strabo referred to it as the “most prosperous plain
of all” (ðåäßïí åÛäáéìïíÝóôáôïí ôäí ðÜíôùí) proven, he says, by its productivity in
grain and wine (5.4.3). The agricultural productivity of the land made possible “a
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local, landed aristocracy who made its wealth through agriculture.”
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The dormancy

of the volcano, its forestation, and the productive Campanian soil caused Sigurdsson
to observe “that the Romans did not consider the mountain a threat and were
probably not even aware of its volcanic character until that fateful day in AD 79.”106
The Campanians’ unawareness of their extreme risk worsened the degree of death
and destruction the eruption caused.

Political Context of Relief Measures

The summer of 79 CE brought significant change to the Romans and their
Empire. On June 23/24 of that year, the first emperor from outside the JulioClaudian family, the emperor Vespasian (r.69-79 CE), died in his home in the Sabine
territory. Consequently, his elder son, Titus, acceded to the office of emperor
marking the first time a Roman emperor’s successor was his biological progeny.
Titus’ rule was brief, lasting only two years, but later generations of Roman
authors compared him in greatness to Augustus (Cass. Dio 66.29.5). Suetonius
famously called him “the delight and darling of the human race” (amor ac deliciae
generis humani, Tit. 1.1).107 Titus earned this reputation in imperio, for before
succeeding his father, “he did not escape hatred, much less public criticism” (ne odio
quidem, nedum viturperatione publica caruit, (Suet. Tit. 1.1).108 Thus, Titus’
105
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reputation went through a total transformation, and his responses to three
disasters, the Vesuvius eruption, the 80 CE Rome fire, and a plague outbreak, were
integral to his political makeover.
Rome’s political class knew their new emperor well because as the son of a
notable general and senator, Titus grew up within the ranks of the elites. He moved
into public life when he became part of the contubernium of the Emperor Claudius,
where he lived as the friend and schoolmate of the Emperor’s son, Britannicus (Suet.
Tit. 2).109 Titus benefitted from this association by receiving an elite education in
horsemanship and rhetoric, and he learned to write in both Latin and Greek (Suet.
Tit. 3).
After his father won control of the Empire in 69 CE, Titus’ reputation suffered
from what Rome’s political elites considered scandalous behavior. As head of
Vespasian’s praetorian guard, Titus became known for cruelty because he conducted
himself arrogantly and he removed anyone suspected of plotting against his father
with unsparing ruthlessness (Suet. Tit. 6). He solidified this reputation when he
ordered the execution of Aulus Caecina whom he accused of conspiring with Eprius
Marcellus to undermine Vespasian’s rule (Suet. Tit. 6; Cass. Dio 65.16.3-4).
Consequently, Suetonius says, “he brought about so much unpopularity at the time
that hardly anyone ever acceded to the principate with such an adverse reputation
and against the will of all” (ad praesens plurimum contraxit invidiae, ut non temere
quis tam adverso rumore magisque invitis omnibus transierit ad principatum, Tit. 6).
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In addition to his reputation for cruelty, Titus came to be known as a
profligate. He was said to revel with his friends late into the night, and he was said
to have illicit sexual liaisons with young boys (exoletorum), eunuchs (spadorum), and
Queen Berenice (d. ca. 92 CE), the daughter of Herod Agrippa I, whom he met while
leading the suppression of the Jewish revolt in Judea. Therefore, when Titus
replaced Vespasian as emperor, the Roman political elite feared he would be a
second Nero practicing imperial avarice, profligate spending, and trials for treason
(Suet. Tit. 7.1).
These concerns formed the backdrop against which Titus assumed the
imperium on June 23/24, 79 CE. The literary sources are clear that Titus knew of
the public’s perception of him, and Cassius Dio’s epitome claims the seriousness of
possessing power caused him to take the office and his reputation seriously
(66.18.12). Titus seems to have reversed the public’s perception him quickly by not
reintroducing sedition trials, being frugal with state finances, and avoiding
impropriety when Berenice visited Rome in 79 CE.
One key component to remaking the Emperor’s public persona was his
response to the three major disasters that struck Italy during his brief reign. These
disasters did not occur in a remote province; they affected the inhabitants of Rome
and Italy as well as the Emperor’s social circle. Thus his recovery assistance after
the Vesuvius disaster was vital to reorienting people’s attitudes about his character
and his capacity to govern well.
Recovery Measures for Campania
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Sometime after the eruption, Titus took the extraordinary step of traveling to
Campania to inspect the damage personally (Cass. Dio 66.24.1). No other emperor
in the early Empire made a journey to a disaster site outside of Rome so he could
review the devastation for himself. Before he left Campania to return to Rome,
Titus provided three standard forms of assistance to aid local recovery. He sent two
commissioners, called by Suetonius curatores restituendae, who were chosen by lot
from the former consuls to oversee the recovery efforts (Suet. Tit. 8.4; Cass. Dio 66.
24.3).110 He also applied the funds from the estates of those who died intestate (bona
caduca) toward rebuilding the region (Suet. Tit. 8.4; Cass. Dio. 66.24.3). Finally, the
Emperor granted them “other money” (÷ñÞìáôá ëëá) in addition to the other forms of
assistance he made available (Cass. Dio. 66.24.3).
The literary claims of Titus’ assistance compared to the lack of evidence of
rebuilding in cities like Pompeii and Herculaenum raises questions about the
intended beneficiaries of imperial munificence. Suetonius’ account only furthers the
confusion because he ambiguously states that Titus applied intestate estates “for the
restoration of the suffering cities” (restitutioni afflictarum civitatium, Tit. 8.3). Since
the cities were buried under 50 feet of volcanic ash, it is unlikely Suetonius meant
Pompeii, Herculaenum, or Stabiae. Zanker has explained that there is evidence in
Pompeii that survivors tried to search for reusable building materials among the
buried ruins.111 However, he dismisses entirely the possibility that searches for
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materials took place under the direction of the curatores Campaniae restituendae
who were sent to the region by Titus to oversee its reconstruction. 112
P. Allison has suggested Roman elites were the intended beneficiaries not the
cities. She argues, “While Flavian emperors (AD 69-96) were known for their
concern for social welfare, it is likely that imperial and senatorial interest from
Rome concerned villas of their own kind as much as, if not more so than, the
property of these local townspeople.”113 It is true that the wealth of Rome’s elites
flowed into the region in the last two centuries of the Republic as Campania became
a popular destination for leisure. Rome’s elites built lavish country estates
northwest of Vesuvius near places like Puteoli, Cumae, Misenum, and especially
Baiae.114
Elite investment also transformed cities to the southeast like Pompeii where
wealthy residents abandoned the more native Hellenistic style of building in order to
imitate what they could see taking place along the coast of Naples. No longer were
the old style tufa houses of the Oscan landowners and merchants built in the style of
the Greeks.115 Rome’s elites accumulated villas and affected construction on both
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sides of the volcano to such a degree that Strabo described the region from Misenum
to Surrentum as one continuous city (5.4.8).
Since the elites were Titus’ social and political peers, Allison’s interpretation
seems plausible. They were also those with reservations about Titus’ character and
capacity to govern. Furthermore, Tiberius’ money grants to the owners of apartment
complexes following the Caelian and Aventine fires provides a precedent for an
emperor helping affluent property owners to offset their losses from a major disaster.
Thus, through traditional relief measures, Titus might have demonstrated his
generosity to Rome’s elites and, by doing so, allayed their concerns about the nature
of his government.
Allison, however, while acknowledging that other scholars limit their reading
of the literary evidence to Pompeii and Herculaenum, commits a similar offense in
her treatment of the archaeological evidence for rebuilding in Campania.116 Scarth
also focuses only on the more well-known cities and claims of Titus’ aid,
“unfortunately, no descriptions have survived of the kinds of public works that were
undertaken at the time.”117 It is the case that if the search for evidence of
reconstruction is limited to the cities most affected by the disaster, there are no
indications that rebuilding occurred, and an alternative explanation, like Allison’s, is
needed to account for Titus’ expenditure of money. However, the epigraphical data
from Naples, Nola, Salerno, and Sorrento, which neither Allison nor Scarth
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considers, can be reconciled with the literary evidence to produce an alternative
explanation of how Titus aided the Vesuvius region.
First, it must be remembered that the literary sources point to a regional
disaster and do not emphasize specific cities affected by the eruption. Thus,
Suetonius writes, “there were some dreadful disasters during his reign, such as the
eruption of Mount Vesuvius in Campania” (Quaedam sub eo fortuita ac tristia
acciderunt, ut conflagratio Vesuvii montis in Campania, Tit. 8.3). It has already been
suggested above that Suetonius could not have meant Pompeii, Herculaenum, or
Stabiae when he stated that Titus used intestate property “for the restoration of
suffering cities” (restitutioni afflictarum civitatium, Tit. 8.3). Cassius Dio’s epitome
also says, “In Campania some fearful and amazing things happened” (¦í ä¥ ô±
Êáìðáíß öïâåñÜ ôéíá êáÂ èáõìáóô óõíçíÝ÷èç, 66.21.1). Tacitus even mentions “cities
having been consumed and buried in the most fruitful region of Campania” (haustae
aut obrutae urbes, fecundissima Campaniae ora) as a characteristic of post-Nero
Roman history (Hist. 1.2.1). While the summaries of Cassius Dio do name Pompeii
and Herculaenum as two cities destroyed by the volcano (66.23.3), the ancient
sources, including Cassius Dio, do not give them degree of attention they receive by
modern scholars. Thus, the search for rebuilding with imperial money must be
broadened to include all Campanian cities from Misenum to Surrentum (Strab.
5.4.8).
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Figure 6: Ancient Campania118

Also, the region of Campania was affected by more than one type of disaster
during the Vesuvius event. Pliny (6.16) and Cassius Dio (66.22.3) mention
earthquakes occurring for days prior to the volcanic blast. This means evidence for
recovery should include restoration from earthquake damage and should not be
limited to resurrection from either general ashfall or the ashes of the pyroclastic
flows.
Four inscriptions from Campanian cities credit Titus with the restoration of
specific structures after the earthquakes that accompanied the 79 CE volcanic
eruption. These records manifest the kind of targeted imperial assistance that
emperors often gave to help cities rebuild after disasters. 119 A diglot inscription from
Naples dating between 80 and 81 CE reads:
[ÁÛôïêñÜôùñ] Ôßôïò ÊáÃóá[ñ]
[èåïØ ÏÛåóðáóéáíïØ õÊÎò Ï]ÛåóðáóéáíÎò
Óåâáóôüò,
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[ñ÷éåñå×ò ìÝãéóôïò, äçìáñ÷]éêò ¦îïõóßáò ôÎ é
[áÛôïêñÜôùñ ôÎ éår, ðáô¬ñ ðáôñßä]ïò, àðáôïò ôÎ ç,
ôåéìçôÞò,[¦í ÍÝáé ðüëåé äçìáñ÷Þóáò,
ãùí]ïèåôÞóáò ôÎ ã, ãõìíáóéáñ÷Þóáò
[— — — — — — — — — ßðÎ óåéóìäí
ó]õìðåóüíôá C ðïêáôÝóôçóåí.
[Imperator] Titus Caesa[r,*son of god
Vespasianus, V]espasianus
Augustus,*[pontifex maximus,] holding the
tribunician power for the tenth
time...,*[imperator for the fifteenth time,
father of his country,] consul for the eighth
time, censor, **[in Naples having been the
demarchos,] agonthetçs for the third time,
and gymnasiarch,*[----, when by earthquakes]
they had collapsed, he restored them.*120
[Imp(erator) Titus Caesar divi Vespasia]ni C
f(ilius) C Vespasianus C Aug(ustus)
[pontifex max(imus), trib(unicia) pot(estate) X,
imp(erator) XV], co(n)s(ul) C VIII C censor C
p(ater) C p(atriae) C
[— — — — — — — — — — — — — — —
terrae mo]tibus C conlapsa C restituit.121
[The emperor Titus Caesar] Vespasianus
Augustus, son [of the divus Vespasia]nus
[pontifex maximus, on whom a tenth power
has been conferred, emperor for the fifteenth?
time], consul for the eight time, censor, father
of the nation, restored [—] destroyed [by
earthqua]kes.122
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The inscribed text credits Titus with the restoration (ðïêáôÝóôçóåí/restituit) of
multiple buildings that were destroyed ([ó]õìðåóüíôá/conlapsa) by earthquakes.123
While the reading in its current condition does not name specific buildings Titus
restored, the commemoration of imperial largesse by the city suggests they were
buildings highly valued for the civic life of the community.124
The Salerno inscription too has lacunae that prevent knowing what structures
Titus helped restore there, but the Sorrento and Nola texts remain in good condition.
The Surrentum inscription reads:
IMP· TITVS· CAESAr divi
VESPASIANI· F· VESPASIanus
AVG· PONT· MAX· TR· POT· ix imp. xii
COS· IIX· CENSOR· P· P· HOROLOGium
cum suis|ORNAMENTIS· TERRAE·
MOTIBus conlapsum rest.125
The emperor Titus Caesar Vespasia[nus]
Augustus son of the [divus] Vespasia[nus]
pontifex maximus, on whom a ninth power as
tribune has been conferred, [emperor for the
fifteenth? time], consul for the eight time,
censor, father of the nation, [restored,
together with all] it ornaments, the cloc[k
destroyed] by earthquakes (trans. Guidoboni).

123

The neuter plural participles, [ó]õìðåóüíôá and conlapsa, indicate Titus restored
more than one building which had succumbed to earthquakes.
124

An inscription of this type most likely would have specified the structures Titus
helped build. Especially helpful on this point is Agnès Bérenger-Badel’s explication
of the two types of inscriptions that correlate imperial aid to a specific seismic
event. See Bérenger-Badel (2005): 144-146.
125

AE (1902), 40.

208
Thus, as the inscription indicates, Surrentum had an ornate clock that had
succumbed to damage from earthquakes. The city honored Titus with the
restoration (restituit) of horologium the earthquakes had destroyed.126
Nola obtained imperial munificence for rebuilding a “terastyle temple of the
Genius of the colony” (terastylum Geni coloniae).127 The Latin inscription, which
likely dates between March and June 81 CE, says:
Imp(erator) Titus Caesar divi Ves[pasiani f.
Vespasianus Aug(ustus)] | pont(ifex)
max(imus) trib(unicia) potest(ate) X,
imp(erator) XVII c[o(n)s(ul) VIII, desig(natus)
VIIII? censor p(ater) p(atriae)] | tetrasylum
Geni coloniae ter(rae motib(us)? colapsum
restituit].128
The emperor Titus Caesar [Vespasianus
Augustus son] of the divus Vesp[asianus],
pontifex maximus, on whom a tenth power as
tribune has been conferred, emperor for the
seventeeth time, consul for the eight time,
censor, father of the nation, [restored] the
tetrastyle temple of the Genius of the colony
[for it had been destroyed by] ear[thquakes]
(trans. Guidoboni).
These inscriptions offer three important pieces of evidence. First, current
scholarship places their provenance after the Vesuvius eruption.129 Consequently, it
is unlikely that Titus’ aid went toward the reconstruction of buildings that were
damaged before the 79 CE catastrophe. Second, all of the inscriptions refer to
126
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buildings restored after they had sustained damage from or been destroyed by
multiple earthquakes. The Latin text of the diglot inscription from Naples preserves
the ablative plural ending ibus on what is believed to be the words terrae motibus
(earthquakes). Likewise the extant portion of the Surrentum inscription contains
the plural reading of TERRAE MOTIB. The reconstructed sections from the Salerno
and Nola inscriptions respectivley all assume references to the plural reading terrae
motibus (earthquakes).
At the time of the Vesuvius eruption, Pompeii had yet to recover fully from the
devastation it suffered from an earthquake that struck the Campania region in 62
CE.130 It is likely that other cities also had lost important civic buildings in that
quake and had not rebuilt them by 79 CE. The epigraphical references to multiple
earthquakes combined with their post-eruption dates of origin suggest the damage
received in Naples, Nola, Salerno, and Surrentum was not limited to the severe
earthquake that struck Campania 17 years before the Vesuvius disaster. The only
known earthquakes to have happened after 62 CE were those that accompanied the
eruption of Vesuvius. Therefore, there is a high probability that the beneficence
those cities received from Titus helped to rebuild structures that were ruined by
earthquakes associated with the eruption of Vesuvius.
Thirdly, this evidence conforms to the claims made by the literary sources
that Campanian cities benefitted from Titus’ largesse. It further suggests what the
archaeological data already confirm, namely, that Titus’ aid was not intended for the
cities buried by Vesuvius’ eruption. Instead, it went to cities whose losses were not
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as catastrophic. Given Titus’ reputation for frugality, it seems unlikely he would
have spent large sums on places like Pompeii and Herculaenum where there was
little hope for rebuilding.131 Furthermore, the presence of the curatores restituendae
indicates Titus wanted to keep his expenditures under control. Temples and other
public-use buildings are precisely the types of reconstruction projects emperors often
agreed to finance for Italian and provincial cities because they were beneficial to
civic life and their costs were finite. Thus, Titus’ gifts to Campania were more
targeted for the restoration of specific structures than the literary sources indicate.
Nevertheless, such aid is what decades of imperial practice would cause us to expect.
All the evidence for Titus’ post-Vesuvius eruption aid shows little innovation
in the imperial gifts themselves. By 79-81 CE, the forms of imperial disaster
assistance had long been established, and legitimacy was confirmed by assisting the
people in expected ways. What makes his assistance after this tragedy unique is the
political context in which it was given and the transformation of Titus’ public image
to which that aid contributed.
Titus did not need to bestow his munificence directly on Rome’s elites to
change public perception about his character and ability to rule. Since the Roman
public expected emperors to extend their generosity by giving money, Titus’ targeted
assistance for the restoration of buildings vital to Campanian civic life permitted
him to be seen acting in ways anticipated from good emperors. At the same time,
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Titus was able to control costs and thus continue the image of frugality that his
father’s financial policies established for the new dynasty.
Titus’ known response to the Vesuvius eruption was patterned after the practices of
his predecessors because his munificence took the form of monetary grants, those
gifts of money funded the construction of specific damaged civic structures, and he
sent representatives from the Senate to supervise the use of imperial funds. By
imitating his father’s financial policies and, therefore, not spending exorbitant
amounts on the restoration of hopelessly buried Campanian towns, he was also able
to show that his reputation for greed and profligacy had given way to a munificence
worthy of the imperial office. Jones has observed, “he was well aware of the need to
observe the formalities and appear to be generous, and at the same time ensure that
he had the funds to be so.”132 Therefore, the Vesuvius eruption permitted Titus to
exhibit the characteristics of generosity and frugality simultaneously.
Responding to the Vesuvius eruption was not the only occasion Titus had for
demonstrating his generosity to the Roman people. In 80 CE, during his Campanian
tour of Vesuvius’ destruction, a major fire broke out in the city of Rome (Cass. Dio
66.24.1). Dio’s epitome lists the important buildings destroyed by the fire. It reads:
êáÂ ãñ ôÎ ÓåñáðåÃïí êáÂ ôÎzÉóåÃïí ôÜ ôå óÝðôá êáÂ
ôÎ Ðïóåéäþíéïí ôü ôå âáëáíåÃïí ôÎ ôïØzÁãñßððïõ
êáÂ ôÎ ðÜíèåéïí ôü ôå äéñéâéôþñéïí êáÂ ôÎ ôïØ
ÂÜëâïõ èÝáôñïí êáÂ ô¬í ôï Ðïìðçßïõ óêçíÞí, êáÂ
ô zÏêôáïõßåéá ïÆêÞìáôá ìåô ôäí âéâëßùí, ôüí ôå
íåãí ôï ÄéÎò ôï Êáðéôùëßïõ ìåô ôäí óõííÜùí
áÛôï êáôÝêáõóåí (66.24.1).
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For it burned the Serapeion and the temple of
Isis and the Saepta and the temple of
Neptune, and the bath house of Agrippa and
the Pantheon and the Diribitorium and the
theater of Balbus and the stage of Pompey
and the Octavian buildings with the books
and the temple of Jupiter Capitolinus
together with its [temple of Jupiter] nearby
temples.
When Titus received word of the fire, he traveled to Rome and appointed two former
consuls as curatores restituendae to oversee the rebuilding of Campania (Cass. Dio
66.24.3; Suet. Tit. 8.4). Suetonius describes Titus’ aid for the reconstruction of the
lost buildings in this way:
cuncta praetorium suorum ornamenta
operibus ac templis destinavit praeposuitque
complures ex equestri ordine, quo quaeque
maturius paragerentur (Tit.8.4).
He set aside all the ornaments of his villas for
the public buildings and temples, and put
several men of the equestrian order in charge
of the work, that everything might be done
with the greater dispatch (trans. Rolfe).
In these actions, two points stand out. First, the Emperor used his personal
property for ornamental repairs on public buildings and temples. This reinforces the
idea that the dividing line between the emperor’s personal property (fiscus) and the
state treasury (aerarium) had become blurred very early in the Empire’s history.
Titus’ gifts were tantamount to the use of state funds for disaster repair. 133 Second,
the practice of delegating individuals, in this case men of equestrian rank, to oversee
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the reconstruction efforts appears to have grown into a normative practice. Titus
made such appointments for the rebuilding of Campania, and now he selected men
to oversee the reconstruction of Rome.134
Suetonius lists a third disaster that occurred during Titus’ short tenure as
emperor. In addition to the volcanic eruption and fire in Rome, “a plague the likes of
which had hardly ever been known before” (item pestilentia quanta non temere alias)
broke out during his reign (Tit. 8.1, trans. Rolfe). Suetonius’ text is unclear whether
this pestilence affected the entire empire or only the inhabitants of Rome. However,
Cassius Dio’s epitome offers a potential clue. Cassius Dio most likely refers to this
pestilence when he connects the outbreak of a sickness in Rome to the ash falls from
Vesuvius. After explaining that dust (êüíéò) from Vesuvius “came to Africa and to
Spain and to Egypt” (µëèå ì¥í êáÂ ¦ò zÁöñéê¬í êáÂ ¦ò Óõñßáí êáÂ ¦ò ÁÇãõðôïí), he says, “it
also came to Rome” (µëèå ä¥ êáÂ ¦ò ô¬í ‘Ñþìçí, 66.23.4). The summary of Dio then
blames the arrival of this ash for a later pestilence in Rome saying:
º ì¥í ïÞí ôÝöñá áàôç ïÛä¥í ìÝãá ôüôå êáêÎí
áÛôï×ò åÆñãÜóáôï àóôåñïí ãñ íüóïí óößóé
ëïéìþäç äåéí¬í ¦íÝâáë¦ (66.23.5)
Thus, at that time, this ash affected them
[the Romans] (with) no great malady, yet
later a pestilence brought a severe sickness
on them.
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Any real correlation between the plague and the Vesuvius eruption is doubtful, but
scholars accept that during Titus’ reign, Rome did suffer from a plague that may
have killed as many as 10,000 Romans per day.135
According to Suetonius, Titus labored to find any divine or medical remedy for this
terrible pestilence. Suetonius writes:
Medendae valitudini leniendisque morbis
nullam divinam humanamque opem non
adhibuit inquisito omni sacrificiorum
remediorumque genere (Tit.8.4).
For curing the plague and diminishing the
force of the epidemic there was no aid, human
or divine, which he did not employ, searching
for every kind of sacrifice and all kinds of
medicines (trans. Rolfe).
This text conveys the impotence of the Roman Emperor to stop the suffering of the
people. It also illustrates the imperial prerogative for placating the wrath of the
gods, and it also shows Titus working tirelessly to provide any possible relief for the
public. He acted generously and as protector of the people.
The Campanian response together with his aid after the 80 CE fire in Rome
and his expiation of the gods during the plague proved vital for a full reassessment
of Titus’ capacity to be emperor. Disaster relief was, therefore, an important
component in how Titus’ brief reign was remembered by later generations of
Romans. Suetonius includes his discussion of Titus’ disaster assistance in a larger
section on Titus’ public generosity (Tit. 8.1-5). His disaster relief efforts were
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transformed into something more than a Roman emperor fulfilling the duties of his
office in a way consistent with his predecessors. Instead, the relief measures became
vital aspects of a later, positive reworking of his overall character and his capacity to
manage the Roman state in a way beneficial for the people of the Empire.

Disaster Relief and Imperial Political Initiation: Tiberius and Nero
Before concluding this chapter, it is necessary to discuss the importance
disasters played in marking out the careers of two future emperors. Both Tiberius
and Nero made their political debuts by advocating for cities from Asia Minor to
receive earthquake assistance from the Roman state. While Augustus campaigned
in northern Spain against the rebellious Cantabri, an emissary from Tralles, a city
in Asia Minor, arrived to inform him of an earthquake that struck in 27 BCE and to
request his assistance.136 Strabo recounts the loss of the city’s gymnasium along
with additional parts of the city (ºíßêá ôÎ ãõìíóéïí êáÂ ëëá ìÝñç óõíÝðåóåí, 12.8.18).
Augustus gave them money (÷ñÞìáôá) for rebuilding (Strab. 12.8.18). The 6th century
historian, Agathias (d. 580 CE), later claimed Augustus committed funds for the
rebuilding of the city and sent former consuls to oversee its reconstruction (Agath.
2.17). An inscription from Tralles lauds Augustus as its founder most likely because
he aided the city after the earthquake.137
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Tralles, however, did not suffer from this earthquake alone because at least
three additional cities sought relief from the damage the quake caused. When the
earthquake struck in 27 BCE, Tiberius was with Augustus in Spain being introduced
to military life, but two years later he returned to the capital, and delegates
representing Laodicea, Thyatira, and Chios sought his help (opemque implorantibus)
in making their case before the Senate (Suet. Tib. 8.1).138 Tiberius agreed and
entreated the Senate (senatum deprecatus est) on their behalf.
This was an important moment for Tiberius’ eventual succession to the
imperium. In 27 BCE, Augustus had taken him on the Spanish expedition in order
to introduce Tiberius to military life and the soldiers. With his appeal to the Senate
for earthquake assistance in 25 BCE, Tiberius made a typical entrance into political
life for a Roman politician.139 Suetonius even refers to his performance before the
Senate as the beginning of his “civil career” (civilium officiorum, Tib. 8.1). This
rhetorical achievement along with his military training indicates that Augustus was
already preparing Tiberius as a potential successor. Thus, working to obtain
disaster assistance was an important way to demarcate a possible future emperor
with substantial political clout.
In 53 CE, the future Emperor, Nero, had a similar public introduction. That
year marked his 16th year of age, and he had already married. But, to enter political
life and demonstrate his oratorical prowess, he became an advocate for cities who
sought relief, for some reason or another, from their hardships. The colony in north
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Italy at Bononia, he won 10 million HS to help them rebuild after a fire (Tac. Ann.
12.58.2). He also secured for Apamea in Asia a five year tax remission after it had
been destroyed by an earthquake (Ann. 12.58.2).
Whether or not these cities would have entrusted their ability to procure
disaster relief to political neophytes from the Rome’s imperial family would seem
doubtful given the stakes. Nevertheless, the real significance of these readings lies
in Tacitus’ association of disaster aid with the public emergence of these future
emperors. Handling or making requests for disaster relief would be an important
aspect of being the emperor of Rome. Suetonius and Tacitus appear eager to
demonstrate that both Tiberius and Nero showed promising signs of their
preparedness to be emperor from the outset of their political careers.

Conclusion
The examples given in this chapter demonstrate how politically significant
disasters could be for Roman emperors. If a disaster occurred at a time when the
Roman public already questioned the stability of the regime (Tiberius) or the ability
of the Emperor to rule well (Titus), they could generate additional opposition and
further embolden those willing to risk actively seeking an emperor’s removal from
power.
They also show that disaster assistance was an important public relations tool
in the arsenal of the emperors. Tiberius, Nero, and Titus actively used disaster
assistance to change public opinion of their reigns not merely to project imperial
power through benefaction. Furthermore, the failure of Nero’s relief measures
provides evidence that imperial generosity did not have a guaranteed verdict in the
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court of Roman public opinion. Emperors could follow established precedents for
disaster relief, but circumstances during their reigns determined how the public
would view them and their gifts. Finally, Tacitus shows the political weight being
associated with disaster relief had by associating the budding political careers of
Tiberius and Nero with making requests for disaster assistance on behalf of
damaged cities.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion

This study has focused on specific case studies from the ancient literary and
epigraphical sources to examine the practice of disaster relief by the Roman
emperors of the first and second centuries CE. From this examination, three
important characteristics of Roman disaster relief have emerged.
First, the Romans did not themselves invent the framework within which
imperial relief was provided either at Rome or in the provinces. The practice of
euergetism predated the ascendancy of Rome, but it was the mechanism not only for
disaster relief but also the achievement of stability and balance within the cities of
the empire. Disaster assistance also provides insight into how the Romans adapted
their rule to local norms in order to achieve and maintain the stability of the Empire.
Also, the Greek cities’ worship of the living emperor as a god helped give certain
cities an advantage over others for receiving imperial benefactions.
Second, the status a city or individual had from the viewpoint of the emperor
determined its likelihood to receive imperial aid. Cities that had been granted the
right to build a temple devoted to the emperor or cities deemed vital to Rome’s ruling
interests in a specific provinces increased the chances that city would benefit from
the emperor’s aid. Rome, because it was the main home of these early emperors,
received the greatest amount of imperial attention in the city of Rome. Many cities
such as Ephesus, Sardis, Smyrna, and Nicaea appear as repeated beneficiaries of the
emperors’ liberality because they were associated both with the imperial cult as well
as with provincial administration.

220
Status also affected the process of relief. The inhabitants of Rome benefitted
from disaster aid more than provincial cities because in the early Empire the
emperors lived and stayed in Rome for a majority of their reign. In addition, the
inhabitants of Rome did not have to petition the emperor for his aid as did those who
lived in the provinces. On the other hand, in order to receive the assistance of the
emperor, the cities of the Greek east sent embassies to him either to represent their
interests and to procure the needed finances for rebuilding their cities back home.
The use of ambassadors also depended upon the cities selecting men of whom the
Roman emperor had some knowledge. Securing disaster assistance or gaining other
imperial favors became much more likely if the emperor already had a working
relationship with the selected ambassador.
On an individual level, status or a person’s rank within Roman society might
determine how much access they had to the emperor, and therefore, the amount of
his largesse they might receive. By examining the practice of tax remissions (ch. 4),
we saw how emperors shifted the financial responsibility for funding the restoration
of destroyed or damage cities through granting to cities immunities from their
communal taxes. This permitted the cities to continue collecting taxes locally like
they would do if a disaster had not occurred.

As a consequence, country-side

farmers not only had to recover from experiencing the disaster, but they also had to
continue to pay the taxes they owed to their city-state even if the hazardous event
had not occurred.
Finally, we saw disaster assistance as an important political weapon in the
arsenal of Rome’s emperors. Because the Romans were a deeply religious people,

221
they took seriously signs from the gods and other omens that portended the demise
of the current emperor. The Roman public often interpreted occurrences of disasters
as signs from the gods of dissatisfaction with the current emperor. Thus, giving gifts
of money to the victims of disasters served to quell rising public rancor over any kind
of event that could be interpreted as disastrous. Thus, disaster relief was a vital
function of the state to give help to imperial subjects, and it was an important
political opportunity that could change the public’s view of the emperor for good or
bad.
Therefore, the study of Roman imperial disaster assistance has a greater
importance beyond the identification of the processes associated with imperial aid.
It reflects how power gradually became centered in the position of the emperor and
he increasingly became the focal point of the state. As the position of emperor
became more prominent, the political ramifications of disasters and their relief
increased as well. Not only did individuals and cities turn to the emperors to
provide assistance in the form of grants and tax remissions, but the emperors tried
to use these opportunities to their political advantage to prevent the decay of public
confidence in their leadership. Thus, disaster relief became an important tool used
by emperors to craft their own imperial image.
In addition, disaster assistance brings to the foreground the extensive reach of
the state throughout the Empire. The Roman government and its policies affected
the lives of individuals and cities beyond Rome and the Italian peninsula. The
emperors managed the provinces through governors, civil bureaucrats, and the
army. But, even rural farmers in distant provinces felt the weight of the Roman tax
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system imposed on them from the capital. They were the primary contributors to
the coffers of the treasury. Most likely, these individuals paid the majority of the
costs of imperial disaster relief through paying meeting their annual tax obligations
which provincial governors still collected despite the occurrence of a major disaster
like a fire or earthquake.
The recent scholarly interest in Roman disasters opens up exciting new
avenues to see the machinery of Roman government in action. This dissertation will
hopefully spark further scholarly inquiry into the interaction between the emperors
and their subjects. Perhaps it can also generate additional research into the nature
of imperial politics and the role disasters and disaster relief playing in shaping the
image of power each of the early emperors tried to project upon the inhabitants of
the city of Rome.
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